This conduct, my lords, was exactly conformable to the demands of those by whom the court has hitherto been opposed, and who have signalized themselves as the most watchful guardians of liberty. Among these men, votes of credit have never been mentioned but with detestation, as acts of implicit confidence, by which the riches of the nation are thrown down at the feet of the ministry to be squandered at pleasure. When it has been urged, that emergencies may arise, during the recess of the senate, which may produce a necessity of expenses, and that, therefore, some credit ought to be given which may enable the crown to provide against accidents, it has been answered, that the expenses which are incurred during the recess of the senate, will be either necessary or not; that if they are necessary, the ministry have no reason to distrust the approbation of the senate, but if they are useless, they ought not to expect it. And that, instead of desiring to be exempted from any subsequent censures, and to be secured in exactions or prodigality by a previous vote, they ought willingly to administer the publick affairs at their own hazard, and await the judgment of the senate, when the time shall come, in which their proceedings are laid before it.
Such have hitherto been the sentiments of the most zealous advocates for the rights of the people; nor did I expect from any man who desired to appear under that character, that he would censure the ministry for having thrown themselves upon the judgment of the senate, and neglected to secure themselves by any previous applications, for having trusted in their own integrity, and exposed their conduct to an open examination without subterfuges and without precautions. I did not imagine, my lords, that a senate, upon whose decision all the measures which have been taken, so apparently depend, would have been styled a senate convened only to register the determinations of the ministry; or that any of your lordships would think his privileges diminished, because money was not demanded before the use of it was fully known. If we lay aside, my lords, all inquiries into precedents, and, without regard to any political considerations, examine this affair only by the light of reason, it will surely appear that the ministry could not, by any other method of proceeding, have shown equal regard to the senate, or equal confidence in their justice and their wisdom. Had they desired a vote of credit, it might have been justly objected that they required to be trusted with the publick money, without declaring, or being able to declare, how it was to be employed; that either they questioned the wisdom or honesty of the senate; and, therefore, durst undertake nothing till they were secure of the supplies necessary for the execution of it. Had they informed both houses of their whole scheme, they might have been still charged, and charged with great appearance of justice, with having preferred their own safety to that of the publick, and having rather discovered their designs to the enemy, than trusted to the judgment of the senate; nor could any excuse have been made for a conduct so contrary to all the rules of war, but such as must have dis-honoured either the ministers or the senate, such as must have implied either that the measures intended were unworthy of approbation, or that they were by no means certain, that even the best conduct would not be censured.
These objections they foresaw, and allowed to be valid; and, therefore, generously determined to pursue the end which every man was supposed to approve, by the best means which they could discover, and to refer their conduct to a full senate, in which they did not doubt but their integrity, and, perhaps, their success, would find them vindicators. Instead of applying, therefore, to the remains of the commons, a few days before the general recess; instead of assembling their friends by private intimations, at a time when most of those from whom they might have dreaded opposition, had retired, they determined to attempt, at their own hazard, whatever they judged necessary for the promotion of the common cause, and to refer their measures to the senate, when it should be again assembled.
The manner in which one of the noble lords, who have spoken in support of the address, has thought it necessary that they should have applied to us, is, indeed, somewhat extraordinary, such as is certainly without precedent, and such as is not very consistent with the constituent rights of the different powers of the legislature. His lordship has been pleased to remark, that the crown has entered into a treaty, and to ask why that treaty was not previously laid before the senate for its approbation.
I know not, my lords, with what propriety this contract for the troops of Hanover can be termed a treaty. It is well known that no power in this kingdom can enter into a treaty with a foreign state, except the king; and it is equally certain, that, with regard to Hanover, the same right is limited to the elector. This treaty, therefore, my lords, is a treaty of the same person with himself, a treaty of which the two counterparts are to receive their ratification from being signed with the same hand. This, surely, is a treaty of a new kind, such as no national assembly has yet considered. Had any other power of Britain than its king, or in Hanover any other than the elector, the right of entering into publick engagements, a treaty might have been made; but as the constitution of both nations is formed, the treaty is merely chimerical and absolutely impossible.
Had such a treaty, as is thus vainly imagined, been really made, it would yet be as inconsistent with the fundamental establishment of the empire, to require that before it was ratified it should have been laid before the senate. To make treaties, as to make war, is the acknowledged and established prerogative of the crown. When war is declared, the senate is, indeed, to consider whether it ought to be carried on at the expense of the nation; and if treaties require any supplies to put them in execution, they likewise fall properly, at that time, under senatorial cognizance: but to require that treaties shall not be transacted without our previous concurrence, is almost to annihilate the power of the crown, and to expose all our designs to the opposition of our enemies, before they can be completed.
If, therefore, the troops of Hanover can be of use for the performance of our stipulations, if they can contribute to the support of the house of Austria, the ministry cannot, in my opinion, be censured for having taken them into British pay; nor can we refuse our concurrence with the commons in providing for their support, unless it shall appear that the design for which all our preparations have been made is such as cannot be executed, or such as ought not to be pursued.
Several arguments have been offered to prove both these positions; one noble lord has asserted, that it is by no means for the advantage either of ourselves or any other nation, to restore the house of Austria to its ancient elevation; another, that it is, by the imperial constitutions, unlawful for any of the princes of Germany to make war upon the emperour solemnly acknowledged by the diet. They have endeavoured to intimidate us, by turning our view to the difficulties by which our attempts are obstructed; difficulties which they affect to represent as insuperable, at least to this nation in its present state. With this design, my lords, has the greatness of the French power been exaggerated, the faith of the king of Sardinia questioned, and the king of Prussia represented as determined to support the pretensions of the emperour; with this view has our natural strength been depreciated, and all our measures and hopes have been ridiculed, with wantonness, not very consistent with the character of a British patriot.
Most of these arguments, my lords, have been already answered, and answered in such a manner as has, I believe, not failed of convincing every lord of their insufficiency, unless, perhaps, those are to be excepted ty whom they were offered. It has with great propriety been observed, that the inconsistency imputed to his majesty in opposing the emperour for whom he voted, is merely imaginary; since it is not a necessary consequence, that he for whom he voted is, therefore, lawfully elected; and because his majesty does not engage in this war for the sake of dethroning the emperour, but of supporting the Pragmatick sanction; nor does he oppose him as the head of the German body, but as the invader of the dominions of Austria.
With regard to the propriety of maintaining the Austrian family in its present possessions, and of raising it, if our arms should be prosperous, to its ancient greatness, it has been shown, that no other power is able to defend Europe either against the Turks on one part, or the French on the other; two powers equally professing the destructive intention of extending their dominions without limits, and of trampling upon the privileges and liberties of all the rest of mankind.