It has been shown, that the general scheme of policy uniformly pursued by our ancestors in every period of time, since the increase of the French greatness, has been to preserve an equipoise of power, by which all the smaller states are preserved in security. It is apparent, that by this scheme alone can the happiness of mankind be preserved, and that no other family but that of Austria is able to balance the house of Bourbon.
This equipoise of power has by some lords been imagined an airy scheme, a pleasing speculation which, however it may amuse the imagination, can never be reduced to practice. It has been asserted, that the state of nations is always variable, that dominion is every day transferred by ambition or by casualties, that inheritances fall by want of heirs into other hands, and that kingdoms are by one accident divided at one time, and at other times consolidated by a different event; that to be the guardians of all those whose credulity or folly may betray them to concur with the ambition of an artful neighbour, and to promote the oppression of themselves, is an endless task; and that to obviate all the accidents by which provinces may change their masters, is an undertaking to which no human foresight is equal; that we have not a right to hinder the course of succession for our own interest, nor to obstruct those contracts which independent princes are persuaded to make, however contrary to their own interest, or to the general advantage of mankind. And it has been concluded by those reasoners, that we should show the highest degree of wisdom, and the truest, though not the most refined policy, by attending steadily to our own interest, by improving the dissensions of our neighbours to our own advantage, by extending our commerce, and increasing our riches, without any regard to the happiness or misery, freedom or slavery of the rest of mankind.
I believe I need not very laboriously collect arguments to prove to your lordships that this scheme of selfish negligence, of supine tranquillity, is equally imprudent and ungenerous; since, if we examine the history of the last century, we shall easily discover, that if this nation had not interposed, the French had now been masters of more than half Europe; and it cannot be imagined that they would have suffered us to set them at defiance in the midst of their greatness, that they would have spared us out of tenderness, or forborne to attack us out of fear. What the Spaniards attempted, though unsuccessfully, from a more distant part of the world, in the pride of their American affluence, would certainly have been once more endeavoured by France, with far greater advantages, and as it may be imagined, with a different event.
That it would have been endeavoured, cannot be doubted, because the endeavour would not have been hazardous; by once defeating our fleet, they might land their forces, which might be wafted over in a very short time, and by a single victory they might conquer all the island, or that part of it, at least, which is most worth the labour of conquest; and though they should be unsuccessful, they could suffer nothing but the mortification of their pride, and would be in a short time enabled to make a new attempt.
Thus, my lords, if we could preserve our liberty in the general subjection of the western part of the world, we should do it only by turning our island into a garrison, by laying aside all other employment than the study of war, and by making it our only care to watch our coasts: a state which surely ought to be avoided at almost any expense and at any hazard.
To think that we could extend our trade or increase our riches in this state of the continent, is to forget the effects of universal empire. The French, my lords, would then be in possession of all the trade of those provinces which they had conquered, they would be masters of all their ports and of all their shipping; and your lordships may easily conceive with what security we should venture upon the ocean, in a state of war, when all the harbours of the continent afforded shelter to our enemies. If the French privateers from a few obscure creeks, unsupported by a fleet of war, or at least not supported by a navy equal to our own, could make such devastations in our trade as enabled their country to hold out against the confederacy of almost all the neighbouring powers; what, my lords, might not be dreaded by us, when every ship upon the ocean should be an enemy; when we should be at once overborne by the wealth and the numbers of our adversaries; when the trade of the world should be in their hands, and their navies no less numerous than their troops.
I have made this digression, my lords, I hope not wholly without necessity, to show that the advantages of preserving the equipoise of Europe are not, as they have been sometimes conceived, empty sounds, or idle notions; but that by the balance of one nation against another, both the safety of other countries and of our own is preserved; and that, therefore, it requires all our vigilance and all our resolution to establish and maintain it.
That there may come a time in which this scheme will be no longer practicable, when a coalition of dominions may be inevitable, and when one power will be necessarily exalted above the rest, is, indeed, not absolutely impossible, and, therefore, not to be peremptorily denied. But it is not to be inferred, that our care is vain at present, because, perhaps, it may some time be vain hereafter; or that we ought now to sink into slavery without a struggle, because the time may come, when our strongest efforts will be ineffectual.
It has, indeed, been almost asserted, that the fatal hour is now arrived, and that it is to no purpose that we endeavour to raise any farther opposition to the universal monarchy projected by France. We are told, that the nation is exhausted and dispirited; that we have neither influence, nor riches, nor courage remaining; that we shall be left to stand alone against the united house of Bourbon; that the Austrians cannot, and that the Dutch will not, assist us; that the king of Sardinia will desert his alliance; that the king of Prussia has declared against us; and, therefore, that by engaging in the support of the Pragmatick sanction, we are about to draw upon ourselves that ruin which every other power has foreseen and shunned.
I am far from denying, my lords, that the power of France is great and dangerous; but can draw no consequence from that position, but that this force is to be opposed before it is still greater, and this danger to be obviated while it is yet surmountable, and surmountable I still believe it by unanimity and courage.