Lord BATHURST spoke next, in substance as follows:—My lords, the question under our consideration has been so long and so accurately debated, that little can be added to the arguments on either side; and therefore, though I think it necessary on so important an occasion, to make a solemn declaration of my opinion, I shall endeavour to support it, not so much by any arguments of my own, as by a recapitulation and comparison of those which have been already heard by your lordships.
It has not been denied, that the punishment of crimes is absolutely necessary to the publick security; and as it is evident, that crimes cannot be punished unless they are detected, it must be allowed, that the discovery of wicked measures ought to be, in a very great degree, the care of those who are intrusted with the government of the nation; nor can they better discharge their trust, than by defeating the artifices of intrigue, and blocking up the retreats of guilt.
This, likewise, my lords, is admitted with such restrictions as seem intended to preclude any advantage that might be drawn from the appearance of a concession; for it is urged, that guilt is not to be detected by any methods which are not just, and that no methods are just which are not usual.
The first position, my lords, I have no intention to controvert; as it is not to violate justice, but to preserve it from violation, that this bill has been projected or defended. But, my lords, it is to be observed, that they who so warmly recommend the strictest adherence to justice, seem not fully to understand the duty which they urge. To do justice, my lords, is to act with impartiality, to banish from the mind all regard to personal motives, and to consider every question in its whole extent, without suffering the attention to be restrained to particular circumstances, or the judgment to be obstructed by partial affection.
This rule, my lords, seems not to have been very carefully observed, by the most vehement advocates for justice in the case before us; for they appear not to be solicitous that any should receive justice, but the person mentioned in the bill; they do not remember, that the publick has cried out for justice more than twenty years; for justice, which has not yet been obtained, and which can be obtained only by the method now proposed.
It is necessary, my lords, for those who are so watchful against the breach of justice, to prove that any means can be unjust which have no other tendency than the detection of wickedness, of wickedness too artful or too powerful to be punished by the common rules of law.
The introduction of new methods of prosecution, is the natural consequence of new schemes of villany, or new arts of evasion; nor is it necessary that precedents should be produced, when the wisdom of the legislature concurs in acknowledging the necessity of extraordinary measures. Though our constitution is in the highest degree excellent, I never yet heard that it was perfect, and whatever is not perfect may be improved. Our laws, however wise, are yet the contrivance of human policy; and why should we despair of adding somewhat to that which we inherit from our ancestors? Why should we imagine, that they anticipated every contingency, and left nothing for succeeding ages?
I think, my lords, with the highest regard both of our laws, and those by whom they were enacted, but I look with no less veneration on this illustrious assembly; I believe your lordships equal to your progenitors in abilities; and therefore, since you cannot but outgo them in experience, am confident that you may make improvements in the fabrick which they have erected; that you may adorn it with new beauties, or strengthen it with new supports.
It cannot, at least, be denied, that your lordships have all the power of your ancestors; and since every law was once new, it is certain they were far from imagining that there was always a necessity of inquiring after precedents. If the argument drawn from the want of precedents be now of any force, let it be proved that its force was less in any former reign; and let it be considered how our government could have attained its present excellence, had this house, instead of applying to every grievance its proper remedy, been amused with turning over journals, and looking upon every new emergence for precedents, of which it is certain that there must have been a time in which they were not to be found.
In all regulations established by the legislature, it is sufficient that they do not produce confusion by being inconsistent with former laws, that they unite easily with our constitution, and do not tend to the embarrassment of the machine of government. This consideration, my lords, has been in a very remarkable manner regarded by those who drew up the bill before us; a bill of which the noble duke has proved, that it will be so far from perplexing our judicial proceedings, that it will reconcile the law to itself, and free us from the necessity of obeying one precept by the neglect of another.