The arguments of the noble duke are such as, in my opinion, cannot be answered, or heard impartially without conviction. The maxims quoted by him are each of them incontestably true; they are, on this occasion, incompatible; and this is the only method by which they can be reconciled.
Nor has he only shown the propriety of the bill by irrefragable reasons, but has proved, likewise, that it is consistent, not only with the constitution of our government, but with the practice of our ancestors; he has shown, that it may be supported not only by reason, but by bills of the same kind, enacted on occasions of far less importance.
He has proved, my lords, all that the most scrupulous inquirer can wish; he has made it evident, that the bill would be proper, though it were unprecedented; he has produced many precedents in support of it, and has thereby evinced, that the only present question is, whether it is just? To the precedents alleged by him, it has been objected, that they differ in some particulars. But when, my lords, did any two actions, however common, agree in every circumstance? Relations may be complicated without end, and every new complication produces new appearances, which, however, are always to be disregarded, while the constituent principles remain unvaried.
If we consider the difficulties in which the opponents of the bill have involved themselves, it will not be easy to think well of a cause, which gives birth to such wild assertions, and extravagant opinions. They have first, by requiring precedents, determined, that our constitution must be henceforward for ever at a stand; and then, by declaring that no precedents are of any weight, in which every circumstance is not parallel to the case in debate, have debarred us from the repetition of any occasional law; they have declared, almost in plain terms, themselves useless, and destroyed that authority at once, which they seem so much afraid of communicating to the commons.
But, by none of their arts of subtle distinction, my lords, have they been able to evade the argument which arises from the conformity of this bill to the common practice of our courts; an argument, which has produced no other answer than loud declamations; against the indecency of comparing with pickpockets and highwaymen, a noble person, a minister of acknowledged merit, long graced with the favour of his sovereign, and long invested with the highest trust.
I, my lords, am very far from pleasing myself with licentious or indecent language; I am far from envying any man that exaltation which he obtains either by good or by bad actions; and have no inclination of levelling the person, whose conduct I desire to see examined, with the profligate or infamous. Yet I cannot forbear to observe, that high rank is an aggravation of villany; that to have enjoyed the favour of his sovereign, is no defence of him that has abused it; and that high trust is an honour only to that man, who, when he lays down his office, dares stand an inquiry.
Had there been no precedent in our judicial proceedings, my lords, which bore any resemblance to this bill, there would not from thence have arisen any just objection. Common proceedings are established for common occasions; and it seems to have been the principle of our ancestors, that it is better to give ten guilty persons an opportunity of escaping justice, than to punish one innocent person by an unjust sentence. A principle which, perhaps, might not be erroneous in common cases, in which only one individual was injured by another, or when the trial was, by the law, committed to a common jury, who might easily be misled.
They might likewise imagine, my lords, that a criminal, encouraged by a fortunate escape to a repetition of his guilt, would undoubtedly some time fall into the hands of the law, though not extended on purpose to seize him; and, therefore, they constituted their proceedings in such a manner, that innocence might at least not be entrapped, though guilt should sometimes gain a reprieve.
But in the present case, my lords, every circumstance requires a different conduct. By the crimes which this bill is intended to detect, not single persons, or private families, but whole nations, and all orders of men have long been injured and oppressed; and oppressed with such success, that the criminal has no temptation to renew his practices; nor is there any danger of an erroneous sentence, because the trial will be heard by this house, by persons whose integrity sets them above corruption, and whose wisdom will not be deceived by false appearances.
This consideration, my lords, affords an unanswerable reply to those who represent the bill as ill-concerted, because the evidence to be procured by it, is the testimony of men, partners, by their own confession, in the crimes which they reveal.