Rebuilding Britain: A Survey of Problems of Reconstruction After the World War

by Sir Alfred Hopkinson

CHAPTER III

LEAGUE OF NATIONS—THE SCHEME

If any peace after the War is to be permanent there must be a settlement not only between territorial claims but an arrangement with regard to the machinery by which peace will be maintained in the future.

Perhaps the most convenient way to gain a more definite idea of what the proposal for a League of Nations really means, to understand both its advantages and the difficulties involved in it, may be to follow the debate on the subject initiated by Lord Parmoor in the House of Lords in March of 1918. It shows that the idea of a League of Nations to prevent war is taking definite shape, and is not regarded by practical men—statesmen with experience of the actual conduct of international affairs, and lawyers who as members of the judicial committee of the Privy Council have had to devote their attention to questions of international law—as outside the range of practical politics. It shows also that the idea will stand the test of discussion and calm criticism.

Lord Lansdowne—to whom, whatever may be thought of some recent utterances, the country owes a debt of gratitude too little recognised, especially for his conduct of foreign affairs at a most difficult period during the Boer War—stated his opinion that "in a league pronouncing a sentence of international outlawry upon any one country that broke away from its obligations you would have a material guarantee for the maintenance of peace." He pointed out how "the existence of such a league might perhaps have prevented the War in July of 1914, as it was impossible in that time of clamour and confusion when one suggestion after another made by those who, like Sir

Edward Grey, were working for peace was rejected, to put forward a definite proposal for dealing with the dispute in a manner provided for by previous agreement." Lord Parker, whose authority carries the greatest weight with jurists everywhere, having the true lawyer's instinct for putting vague proposals into definite shape, actually presented a draft of heads of agreement for the establishment of a League.[^[1]] These heads would, to say the least, form the basis for discussion leading to practical results. One or two of his proposed clauses may be quoted as expressing in definite language the fundamental principles which must be the basis of any such League. The first may appear perhaps only a "pious opinion." It is really very much more. Assent to it means the complete repudiation of the ideas which have guided German policy—the ideas which made world war inevitable, and which will inevitably lead to war in the future unless they are abandoned. Any nation which assents to the clause tells the world that it expressly rejects those ideas and agrees that its action shall be guided by principles diametrically opposed to them. Assent to a declaration of the kind suggested would certainly affect the spirit in which international questions are approached in future, and probably the resulting action also. It runs:

"The League to recognise that war from whatever cause is a danger to our common civilisation, and that international disputes ought to be settled on principles of right and justice and not by force of arms." The last clause dealing with the admission of new members of the League is the complement of this. There is to be power "to admit a nation as a member of the

League, if satisfied in each case that the nation bona fide accepts the principle on which the League is founded, and bona fide intends that international disputes shall thereafter be settled by peaceful means." It is contemplated, and rightly contemplated, that there should be a possibility for the Central Empires to join the League sooner or later, but it can only be on terms of their rulers at the time saying expressly, "We abjure in the sight of the world and of our own people those principles of action which German rulers and leaders of thought have been inculcating for two generations." The choice for Germany would be either to stand excommunicated from the brotherhood of nations for ever, or to say plainly, "I declare what my professors and schoolmasters have for half a century had to teach to be false; the doctrines of Treitschke and of his disciple von Bernhardi are anathema; it is infamous to adopt the statement of the German writer that 'It is of no importance to me whether an action is just or unjust,' or that 'If I am powerful enough to perform any deed, then I am justified in doing it.' I renounce such leaders and teachers and all their words and works, so that I will not follow or be led by them." It may be urged that the recantation might not be sincere, but it would discredit the authority of those who attempt to revive the damnable doctrines.[^[2]]

The great difficulty, of course, arises as to the means of enforcing the agreement against war, of finding some proper and effective sanction to secure its observance. It may be well to note that throughout this discussion the word sanction is used in the strict legal sense, meaning some definite penalty or punishment to be inflicted on a wrong-doer. It is the existence of such a "sanction" which is the clearest way of enforcing

obedience, and gives a rule of conduct the force of law.