Rebuilding Britain: A Survey of Problems of Reconstruction After the World War

by Sir Alfred Hopkinson

Two definite proposals are made in Lord Parker's scheme. (1) "If an act of war be committed against any member of the League, the Council is to notify it, and thereupon every member should (a) break off diplomatic relations with the nation guilty of such act; (b) prohibit and take effective steps to prevent all trade and commerce between itself and the guilty party; (c) place an embargo upon all ships and property of the guilty nation found in its territorial waters or within its territories."

A very similar suggestion, though not quite so definite, was made by the present writer in an article on "Sanction in International Law," which appeared in the Italian Journal "Scientia" in 1916. "The nations might agree that any belligerent which wilfully violates or invades neutral territory shall be treated as a moral leper. Without actually going to war they should cease to have dealings with the invader, forbid all intercourse of their subjects with the country which violates the neutral territory."

For the sake of brevity this may be called the "economic boycott," but it is really very much more than simply economic pressure. It is a common habit in political discussions to confuse very different things, to which the same name is given, and the term "economic boycott" is being used to cover three proposals of very different character. (a) It may mean a permanent exclusion of Germany from the markets of the world to punish its people for supporting the crimes of its rulers and incidentally to secure for ourselves a valuable extension of trade by reason of the exclusion of a rival. (b) It may mean a temporary measure to insure that agreed terms of peace are observed by those who disregard "mere scraps of paper," to act as a guarantee that restitution shall be made for wrongs done, to check the revival and extension of the enemy's armaments, to make the German people feel the disadvantages and loss caused by their action, and the

desirability of joining with others in repudiating war as a means of settling disputes or asserting national claims. (c) It may mean a sanction for breach of the stipulations contained in the agreement on which the League of Nations is founded, i.e., a punishment to be inflicted on anyone who infringes the agreement he has made—a means of insuring performance of its terms. It is in this last sense that it is used in the present discussion.

(2) The second sanction proposed in the scheme is of a still more serious character. The clause to embody it runs as follows:

"Certain members of the League specified in a schedule and to consist of the chief military and naval powers, should agree, if required to do so by a resolution of the League, to commence war against the guilty nation, and to prosecute such war by land and sea until the guilty nation shall have accepted terms which shall be approved by the League."

This proposal might more effectually prevent wrong-doing, but, even if carefully guarded as Lord Parker proposes, appears open to serious objections. There seems grave reason to fear that while intended to prevent war, it might really be the cause of disputes, and possibly of war of the most deadly kind. Such a stipulation might cast a terrible burden on a strong naval power like Great Britain, and have most disastrous consequences. We are bound to maintain a strong navy to keep open communication between the different parts of the Empire and also to protect our food supplies. Without sea power Britain could in a few months be starved into submission to any terms in case of war, but to maintain a large navy to be at the beck and call of a Council representing all the nations who cared to join the proposed League would be intolerable. Suppose, for example, the United States demanded satisfaction for some outrage on American subjects, or suppose American subjects were threatened with massacre in some unsettled country such as Mexico, and in order to obtain satisfaction or to protect its

subjects sent some warships to a Mexican port and landed an armed force, not with any object of aggression, but to prevent irreparable injuries. Suppose Great Britain was of opinion that the American demand was amply justified, but that a majority of representatives of the League, or even, as Lord Parker's scheme suggests, a majority of the powers named in the Schedule, took a contrary view and called on Great Britain to fulfil the agreement to use her naval force and commence and prosecute to the bitter end a war against the United States because its Government had acted at once instead of waiting while the representatives of a score of other nations were discussing whether any action was permissible. Would not the alternative between breaking the engagement and undertaking a bitter and ruinous war against a powerful and friendly nation put us in an intolerable position? Half a dozen States in the League might for one reason or another wish to resist the claim of the United States for redress. Names of States which might possibly so combine could be given, but it is better to refrain. It is not inconceivable that German penetration and intrigue at some future time might promote a combination of the kind. All sorts of influences might be brought to bear on certain of the States and on their representatives. Dynastic claims might even affect them.

Unless it be with some country which she can trust and whose Government and its aims she can thoroughly rely upon, and then only for some limited and specific purpose, Great Britain, or any other naval or military power, ought not to bind itself to go to war and employ its forces. We must be free to reduce those forces or to refrain from employing them in making war. An engagement which might in circumstances, the real character of which no one can foresee at present, compel us to undertake a war at the bidding of others is a thing to which we ought never to consent. Engagements to make war are not a safe way of promoting peace. They may possibly be justified where there is some clearly specified object, some defined case in which

nations ally themselves to prevent some particular wrong, such, for example, as guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. Even for a single specific agreement of this kind a very strong case is required, but that is a totally different thing from agreeing to provide a kind of world police to enforce and execute the orders of a Council of heterogeneous States under conditions the nature of which no one can predict now. We cannot tell beforehand with any certainty what will be the real character of the proposed League Council, nor what motives may inspire its members at some future time, nor whom the majority of them will in fact represent. It does not necessarily follow that there can be no sanction of any kind to enforce the rules of International Law or the decisions of a League of Nations to prevent a breach of international peace, no penalty attaching to those who disregard those rules or are guilty of breaking that peace. As already stated, the economic boycott, every member of the League agreeing to treat an aggressor as an outlaw, and without actually going to war ceasing to have any dealings with him, and forbidding all intercourse of its subjects with the peace-breaker, is likely to be really effective. Lord Shaw, whose interest in the subject is no new thing, and who has devoted long and careful consideration to it, later in the debate gave the weight of his authority as to the efficacy of such measures. "Let it," he said, "be known once and for all that from the moment a nation becomes a traitor to the League it becomes, ipso facto, an economic outlaw, then the motive both for being included within and for remaining within the League will be increased a hundredfold, and wholly for the benefit of mankind."