Aviation in Peace and War

by Sir Frederick Hugh Sykes

The Military Wing.

In accordance with this scheme I received instructions to organize, recruit, train and command the Military Wing of the Royal Flying Corps. The functions of the Military Wing were quite clear: it was to meet the air requirements of the Expeditionary Force primarily for reconnaissance purposes, but its organization was framed so that it could easily be expanded and the scope of its duties widened. Headquarters were established at Farnborough on May 13th, 1912: Barrington-Kennett, an officer of the Grenadier Guards who had been attached to the Air Battalion, was appointed, and made the best of all possible adjutants; and the nucleus of the Corps, consisting at first of the cadres of an airship squadron under Edward Maitland, of two aeroplane squadrons under Burke and Brooke-Popham, and a flying depôt (later the aircraft park) under Carden, who was a little later greatly assisted in the complex matter of technical stores by Beatty, came into existence. At the same time the construction of the Central Flying School was started at Upavon, under Captain G. Payne, R.N. With regard to the other squadrons provided for, the nucleus of No. 4 Squadron was formed the same year, and that of No. 5 Squadron the following year, of Nos. 6 and 7 Squadrons in 1914, while No. 8 Squadron was not started until after the outbreak of war.

Records of the progress and growth of the Corps were left at Farnborough when the Headquarters and four squadrons went to France in August, 1914, and have been lost. This is particularly unfortunate because without them it will be difficult for the historian of the Corps adequately to describe the beginnings and to assess the value of the work then carried out.

The task of forming the new service, which was to do much to assist the Army in saving England, was begun. The time was very short. A great energy had to be brought to the work. As with all things new, it had to contend with apathy and opposition on all sides. There was no precedent to help. The organization of the Corps to its smallest detail of technical stores, supply and transport had to be thought out. The type of machine required; the method of obtaining it from a struggling industry; its use and maintenance; the personnel, its training and equipment; these, and a thousand other aspects of the question, required the employment of a large staff of experts. But the experts did not exist and the duties were carried out almost entirely at Farnborough, where in addition time had to be found to compile the official training and other text books and regulations required for an entirely new arm.

In addition to the innumerable problems inherent in the organization, growth and training of the Military Wing, the two years between its inception and the outbreak of war were strenuously applied to solving the problems of air tactics and strategy. Until the South African War the British Army had been drilled under the influence of stereotyped Prussian ideas. Perhaps the South African War led too far in an opposite direction, but it taught us one thing, which was to prove of such importance in 1914—the value of mobility; and we realized in aircraft the advent of the most mobile arm the world has yet seen.

All was new. A new Corps. A new element in which to work. New conditions in peace akin to those in war. And there had to be developed a new spirit, combining the discipline of the old Army, the technical skill of the Navy, and the initiative, energy and dash inseparable from flying. There were the inevitable accidents, but training had to be done. We existed for war and war alone would show whether we had thought and worked without respite aright. We had to prove our value to the other arms, many of the leaders of which, owing to a long period of peace, found difficulty in differentiating between the normal usages of peace and war and in understanding the right use of aircraft. Somehow or other time was found during 1912, 1913 and 1914 to write to reviews, to lecture at army and other centres of training, to attend Staff rides, and to endeavour in every way possible to learn how best to work in with the army commands and to teach those commands the usefulness and limitations of aircraft.

As Ruskin wrote:

"Man is the engine whose motive power is the soul and the largest quantity of work will not be done by this curious engine for pay, or under pressure, or by the help of any kind of fuel which may be supplied by the cauldron. It will be done only when the will or spirit of the creature is brought to its own greatest strength by its own proper fuel, namely the affection."

I was intensely proud of my command and often thought of the time when, as I had been promised, I should, in the event of war, command it in the field. We worked at white heat believing that war was coming soon; believing that our efforts would have a real effect on the result; and determined that the new arm should rank second to none among the forces of the Crown. Esprit de Corps was of vital importance, but as officers and non-commissioned officers were drawn from every branch and every regiment of the army this was no easy matter and was only achieved by the splendid example and precept of such men as Herbert, Becke, Longcroft, Chinnery and Barrington-Kennett. We selected our motto: "Per Ardua ad Astra." It was in this atmosphere that the Military Wing grew in peace. It was in this atmosphere that the soul was formed which later under the great strain of war impelled our pilots forward cheerfully to face every duty and every danger in the true spirit of manliness and fearless confidence.

As in framing the original scheme on paper, so in giving it life it was our aim to organize the Corps, so that, whatever its future strength, it would be sound and efficient, and its continuity of growth effected without even temporary dislocation or waste. The tactical unit of the Military Wing—the squadron, consisting of three flights, each of four machines with two in reserve—had the advantage that it was of sufficient size to act independently, while it was not too unwieldy for a single command. It was equally suitable for independent or co-operative action, and the full complement of seven squadrons would, in addition to a reserve, furnish one squadron for each division of an Army Expeditionary force of the size then contemplated, though no definite allotment of aeroplanes to the lower commands was at first intended. The French and Germans, on the other hand, were building up their organizations with smaller units, with the result that they found even greater difficulties than ourselves in obtaining sufficient experienced officers to command them. It is probable that the consequent lack of concentration, knowledge and determination to stick to sound principles of action was one of the causes underlying the non-success of the German air service in the opening phases of the war.