Recollections of a Military Life

by Sir John Adye

It will be observed that the proportion of seniors to juniors in 1884 was nearly 1 to 2, whereas in 1894 it is about 1 to 3. Again, the annual cost of pensions in 1884 was about £737,000, but in 1894 it has risen to about £1,000,000. So that not only are the prospects of promotions less, but at the same time the cost to the country in pensions is greater. There remains one more point connected with the subject which must be mentioned—namely, that of selection. The principle is a valuable one, and should be carefully carried out in the higher ranks. It will affect individuals and be beneficial to the army; but it will not in itself have much bearing on promotion generally.

Speaking of retirement, it is related that some years ago the late Lord Airey went to the German manœuvres, and on being introduced to the old Emperor William, his Majesty said: 'I hear, Lord Airey, you are going to retire. What is your reason?' Lord Airey replied that, being seventy years old, by the regulations he had no option in the matter. 'Retire at seventy!' said the Emperor; 'why, all my best generals are over that age!' 'Oh yes, your Majesty,' said Airey, 'I quite agree with you, but in England they get tired of us at seventy, and get rid of us.'

Expedition to Egypt

At the beginning of 1882 the War Office in Pall Mall had for a time to put aside what may be called its domestic reforms, and, in concert with the Admiralty, to prepare for an expedition to Egypt, in which our naval and military forces were destined before the close of the year to take a leading and a successful part. The causes of the revolution in Egypt (which commenced in 1881) appear to have been a complicated mixture of intrigues, military discontent, and a sham national uprising; and it is difficult now to understand how a man like Arabi Pasha, who had neither political experience nor military skill, could, even for a time, have become the virtual master of the situation. But if the local causes are somewhat obscure, the diplomatic action, or rather inaction, of the various Powers of Europe is almost equally strange. England alone from the first seems to have perceived the true issue, and by denouncing Arabi as a mere mutinous adventurer, and by insisting on the necessity of crushing the rebellion and restoring the authority of the Khedive, she protected not only her own interests in the country, but also those of Turkey, and, indeed, of Europe generally. The Government of France at the outset appeared to be quite in accord with our own. In January a joint assurance was given to the Khedive of adequate support, and in May the French and English fleets accordingly arrived at Alexandria for the maintenance of order. It is further to be observed that the other European powers, recognising the superior interests of France and England, acquiesced in their proposed intervention. So far unanimity apparently prevailed. And yet, when an insurrection headed by Arabi occurred in Alexandria the following month, France for some reason withdrew her ships and left England alone. And again, when it became evident in July that a military force could alone restore order, notwithstanding the oft repeated desire of the British Government that the two nations should act in concert, the French Chamber, which on the 19th of July had voted the necessary supplies for their part of the expedition, on the 29th reversed their policy, and by a majority of 375 declined to take any part in the campaign.

Judging by the debates in the French Chamber at the time, it would appear that their Ministers were disinclined to embark on a distant expedition on two grounds: (1) that they had anxieties nearer home and wished to keep themselves free; (2) that the people of France were really sick of campaigns, and would not therefore give their support to a policy of distant adventure—not perhaps an unnatural view on their part. So uncertain, indeed, was the policy of the French Government up to the last moment that towards the end of July, when I was appointed Chief of the Staff to the expedition, I received instructions to proceed to Paris, to discuss with the French military authorities as to the place of landing, and to ascertain their views on the joint operations. The vote of the Chamber on the 29th, however, of course rendered my visit unnecessary.

The policy of Turkey as to Egypt was still more uncertain. It would naturally have been supposed that when one of its tributary States had broken out into insurrection, and when the power of the local ruler had been subverted, the Sultan's Government would have been anxious to quell the revolution, as we invited them to do, and would have welcomed the assistance of allies like ourselves who had a similar object in view. Instead of that the Turkish Government not only hesitated, but after the outbreak at Alexandria in June actually conferred the Grand Cordon of the Medjidi on Arabi Pasha, the rebel leader. The Sultan, however, must be a man of great impartiality and discrimination, for when I arrived at Cairo in September, after the short desert campaign, he also conferred on me the Grand Cordon of the Medjidi. Whether he was under the impression that I was a friend or an enemy of Arabi I never cared to inquire.

Before proceeding to give details of the preparations for the expedition to Egypt, it will be as well to allude shortly to certain misconceptions which appear to prevail as to the supposed want of concert between the navy and army in war. Even as recently as 1890 these misconceptions were prominently alluded to, and indeed endorsed in the report of Lord Harrington's Commission.[123] Whilst pointing out that the two services are 'to a large extent dependent on each other,' the report goes on to say that 'little or no attempt has ever been made to establish settled and regular relations between them.' This, if correct, would be serious. My experience in the Crimea, in Egypt, and at the War Office does not lead me at all to the conclusion stated by the commission. The two professions are so distinct in themselves that they require separate administration, but that does not necessarily entail any want of co-operation in war. On the contrary, they thoroughly understand their relative positions; and whether as regards preparations for national defence, or in operations for the expansion of the empire in various parts of the world, our success has been remarkable, and the results are due to the united efforts of the navy and army. The present arrangements are, in my opinion, efficient, and should be left alone.

The Egyptian expedition of 1882 affords the most recent proof of what I have urged. No sooner was it determined on, than the Minister for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty, with their chief advisers, held constant meetings, and discussed and decided difficulties and details day by day, and nothing could be more complete than the cordial co-operation of the two departments—a co-operation which was not limited to the authorities at home, but was equally conspicuous at the seat of war. Throughout the operations the naval and military authorities on the spot fully appreciated their relative positions; and it was due to their combined efforts, backed by the discipline and courage of the officers and men of both services, that the campaign was carried to a speedy and successful conclusion.

Although the Egyptian expedition of 1882 bears no comparison either as to its duration, difficulties, or hard fighting with that of the Crimea, still in respect to the number of troops embarked at the outset the two closely approximate. The force sent to Egypt from England, and from the Mediterranean garrisons, amounted to about 26,000 men, with 54 field guns and 5,000 cavalry and artillery horses. To these were shortly added about 8,000 men from India, consisting of the Seaforth Highlanders, a battery of artillery, and several regiments of native cavalry and infantry. The troops from home commenced embarking towards the end of July; and so complete and satisfactory were the arrangements of the Admiralty, due in great measure to the energy and experience of Admiral Sir William Mends, the Director of Transports, that after a voyage of 3,000 miles they arrived at Alexandria without a contretemps of any kind.

The general outline of the campaign and of the movements to be undertaken had been discussed before the departure of the expedition, and it was virtually decided to take temporary possession of the Suez Canal; Ismailia becoming the base of operations with a view to an advance upon Cairo. There were obvious political and strategical reasons for the decision. In the first place the occupation of the canal would secure its safety, and prevent its being blocked or injured by the enemy—a most important European interest in itself; and it is curious that the late Monsieur de Lesseps, who was in communication with Arabi and who was at Ismailia at the time of our arrival, was violently opposed to our action in this respect. In the next place Cairo was then the centre of disaffection, and as it was known that the Egyptian army, reinforced by Bedouins, was in considerable strength and entrenching at Tel-el-Kebir, on the verge of the desert, it was probable that a rapid advance from Ismailia and a severe defeat of the enemy would cause a general collapse, and thus save Cairo from fire and pillage. These various considerations determined the general plan of the operations, and the result amply justified the anticipations formed. To have advanced from Alexandria, or from the neighbouring Bay of Aboukir, would have entailed a long and difficult march south, through the Delta of the Nile, a country without roads and intersected by irrigating canals. Further, the distance to Cairo was about 120 miles, as compared with 75 from Ismailia. In short, no striking or rapid result could be anticipated by an advance from Alexandria, and in the meantime Cairo would have been left at the mercy of a mutinous army, and of other elements of disaffection and disorder.