3. 'Telegram of three pages from Arabi Pasha, complimenting Rashid Pasha Husni, the Commander of the Eastern Division, on his frequent defeats of the English, who are the enemies of religion and of humanity. Hopes the honour of the Egyptian nation may be written with the blood of the English.'
Speaking of telegrams, towards the end of September, when the British army had arrived at Cairo a rather bewildering message was received by us from Kaffir-Zoyat. 'Atrocity has taken place in all the stations from the inhabitants and immigrants. The station master is helpless, and now is the time for the arrival of local train. The station master requires help soon. A copy has been sent to Sultan Pasha.'
Notwithstanding the congratulations which the Egyptian generals in the desert had received on their imaginary victories, they became gradually alive to the necessity of making an effort to recover their lost positions, and on August 28, Arabi Pasha having arrived, they seriously attacked Kassassin with about 10,000 men and 12 guns. The battle lasted all day, with occasional intervals, but General Graham (who had rather less than 2,000 men under his command), supported by the cavalry and horse artillery from Mahsamah under Sir Drury Lowe, at length drove off the enemy, and their retreat was hastened by a brilliant cavalry charge after dark in the desert. Our losses on the occasion in killed and wounded were 97.
Subsequent to this attack on Kassassin there was a lull in active operations for about a fortnight. Although the rapidity of our earlier movements had gained us possession of the fresh-water canal and railway, still, as both had been blocked with large dams and embankments, they were for the moment of limited service for transport, and in reality we had, as it were, out-run our commissariat. Consequently for a few days the troops suffered some hardships, although their general health was not apparently affected, the sick list being less than six per cent. There were no resources, of course, in the desert, and it was calculated that we had to send forward about sixty tons a day of food and forage. By incessant exertions, however, the obstructions were removed, and early in September many barges were placed on the fresh-water canal; and, the single line of rail and the telegraph having been repaired, the chief difficulties were thus overcome, and we were able to send up about 250 tons of supplies daily. From that moment we became masters of the situation, and gradually accumulated a large reserve of food, forage, munitions, medical and other stores.
The Highland Brigade of four battalions, with Sir Edward Hamley and Sir Archibald Alison, had arrived at Ismailia on September 1, and by the 12th the British forces were concentrated at Kassassin in readiness for decisive action. Previously, however, on September 9, a considerable portion of the Egyptian army from Tel-el-Kebir again attacked the position at Kassassin at daylight; but we were too strong for them, their opportunity was gone, and under the orders of General Willis our troops advanced boldly across the desert, and drove the enemy back, capturing three of their guns.
Our losses on the occasion were: killed, 3; wounded, 77; total, 80.
Arabi's estimate was very different. In his telegram, September 12, to the Ministry of War, Cairo, he says: 'Moreover, from true observation it has been proved to us that the number of the enemy killed and remaining on the field of battle is about 2,500, and their carts were insufficient for carrying off the wounded.'
During the early part of September, reconnoissances were made with a view of ascertaining the general position of the enemy's defences, and, as far as possible, their armament and progress. Our reconnoitring parties consisted of one or two officers with a small mounted escort, who approached the Egpytian entrenchments at daylight and made careful observations from different parts of the desert; the enemy taking little or no notice of their appearance. Indeed, it was rather remarkable that, although the Egyptian leaders must have been aware of the near approach of the British army, they apparently sent out no cavalry at night, and even their infantry pickets were, as a rule, lying about close to their works and only roused themselves at dawn. The right of the enemy's earthworks rested on the fresh-water canal, and then stretched away northerly for nearly four miles across the desert, their left being en l'air. Their very extent was a great weakness. So far as could be ascertained before the battle, the entrenchments towards the canal, which were subsequently stormed by the Highlanders, were the most complete and formidable, being armed with many Krupp field-guns, and supported by retrenchments inside. About 1,000 yards in advance of that part of the defences the Egyptians had constructed and armed a detached outwork, which, curiously enough, escaped the observation of our reconnoitring parties. Most fortunately when we advanced on the 13th, and when a portion of our troops must have passed close to it just before daylight, they were not discovered; otherwise our great object of reaching the main line of works unperceived might have been prematurely divulged at a critical moment. The Egyptian forces were estimated as being about 38,000 men, with 60 guns, of which we captured 59.
