The Sniper sniped—an enemy sniper disposed of by an Australian Sharp-shooter, August 22nd, 1918.
In earlier years it had been the custom to attack barbed wire with our lighter guns, using shrapnel shell. This shell is, however, essentially a "man-killing" projectile, and has no great destructive power against field works. On the other hand, our heavier guns were scarcely more useful for wire cutting, because the great craters which were made by the explosion of their shells destroyed the wire only very locally, and, by upheaving the ground, increased rather than reduced the difficulties of the Infantry.
This was due to the employment of fuses, which permitted the projectile, after striking, to bury itself in the ground for a small fraction of time before igniting the explosive charge which it contained. Hence the great shell craters. It was a very proper fuse to use for destroying trenches, dug-outs, gun-pits and emplacements, but of little use for cutting wire.
In due course the British service evolved an "instantaneous" fuse, which became known to the gunners as the "106 Fuse." This had the merit of being perfectly safe to handle, up to the moment of firing the gun, but by means of a most ingenious mechanism it became highly sensitive while the projectile was in flight between the gun and the target. The result was that the very slightest obstacle met with, even a strand of wire, was sufficient to set off the fuse and explode the shell. Even if the shell met no obstacle before striking the earth, the explosion would take place above instead of below the surface of the ground, and would exert so great a horizontal force in all directions that great bands of wire entanglements would be bodily uprooted, over considerable areas, and literally blown to one side in a jumbled mass.
Our heavy guns, therefore, using 106 Fuses, became ideal wire cutters, and it was in this way that much of the Artillery action during the forty-eight hours prior to the battle was applied.
The Infantry and Field Artillery plan, which I prepared, was very similar in its general character to the battle plan of August 8th. It differed only in subordinate details due to local topographical variations from the former conditions.
Of the five Divisions available, one—the Second Australian—was to remain in Corps reserve, but handy. For that purpose it was brought up from its rest near Cappy, by motor bus, to the vicinity of Péronne, the move being completed by nightfall on September 27th.
The battle Divisions and their prior dispositions were as follows: