The Australian Victories in France in 1918

by Sir John Monash

My decision was forthwith to abandon the original plan which had taken so many days and so much labour to prepare, to take immediate measures for securing our gains for the day, and to organize a continuation of the battle next day on totally different lines. These were to conquer the remainder of the main Hindenburg trench system, in which the ruin of the village of Bony was the key position, by attacking it from the south towards the north, instead of from the west towards the east.

The first step in this plan was to ensure effective tactical contact between the right flank of the Third Division and the left flank of the Fifth Division. I framed an order that both Divisions should take immediate steps to such an end. Telephone communication with both Gellibrand and Hobbs being momentarily interrupted, I was about to forward written orders by dispatch rider to each of them to the effect mentioned.

Before the messenger had time to leave, however, messages came in from both Divisional Commanders, each reporting that he had just secured tactical touch with the other in exactly the way which I wanted. I consider this a remarkable example of unity of thought. Each, without being able to consult the other or myself, had taken the very course which each correctly anticipated that I should decide to have taken. The German General Staff used to boast in their writings that no other Army approached theirs in this capacity for initiative by subordinates on lines in thorough unison with each other and with the policies of the higher command.

That the situation on my front, now held exclusively by Australians, would have been secure that night against a determined counter-attack I did not doubt, even though the fourteen Australian Battalions now holding a line of some 9,000 yards would scarcely average 400 rifles apiece. However, nothing more than small local counter-attacks was attempted, and the hold which I had gained upon the main defences was not slackened. I feel sure, nevertheless, that the success of the Ninth Corps on my right in swarming across the canal from Bellenglise to Bellicourt had much to do with my immunity from interference; the enemy probably found himself with quite enough to do there in trying to re-establish his line further in rear, and this forbade him to materialize sufficient troops for any general counter-attack.

While I have felt obliged to state the facts in regard to the partial failure of the two American Divisions to carry out their part of my battle plan, I desire, nevertheless, to do full justice to these troops. I have no hesitation in saying that they fought most bravely, and advanced to the assault most fearlessly; that the leaders, from the Divisional Generals downwards, did the utmost within their powers to ensure success. Nor must the very bad conditions under which the 27th Division had to start be forgotten. Our American Allies are, all things considered, entitled to high credit for a fine effort.

But it is, nevertheless, true that in this battle they demonstrated their inexperience in war, and their ignorance of some of the elementary methods of fighting employed on the French front. For these shortcomings they paid a heavy price. Their sacrifices, nevertheless, contributed quite definitely to the partial success of the day's operations, and although the comprehensive plan, which was to have carried my front beyond Beaurevoir on the very first day, had to be abandoned, the day's fighting ended with the two Australian Divisions in quite a satisfactory position for a continuance of the operations on the next day.

To this there was, however, one important qualification. Air observers continued to report the presence of American troops between the Hindenburg Line and Le Catelet, and also in the latter village. Late that night an Australian Artillery liaison officer managed to make his way back into our lines with the story that he had actually advanced with a battalion of Americans into Le Catelet, and that they were still there, although practically surrounded.

The 27th Division made many attempts to get into communication with them, but without avail. Beyond the report previously alluded to that they had subsequently been made prisoner, I have no information of their ultimate fate; but when patrols of the Third Division entered the village forty-eight hours later, there was no longer any sign of them. A number of small parties of Americans were, however, encountered and relieved as the further advance of the Third Division progressed during the next two days.

The situation was profoundly embarrassing. With the mass of Artillery at my disposal, it would have been a simple matter to cover the further advance of the Third Division so amply as to make it easy to master the northern half of the tunnel defences, especially if attacked end on. But so long as American troops or wounded were presumed to be lying out in front, I dared not use Artillery at all, except on a very restricted scale. I felt justified, however, in bombarding isolated localities which patrols had definitely ascertained to be still in enemy hands; but nothing in the shape of adequate artillery support to the Infantry could be attempted.