The Australian Victories in France in 1918

by Sir John Monash

During the night of September 29th orders were issued to the Second American Corps to withdraw all advanced troops that could be reached, and to concentrate their regiments for rest and reorganization, so as to be ready as soon as possible for re-employment. Very considerable numbers of American soldiers had become mixed up with the Australian Battalions, and, in their eagerness, had gone forward with them, regardless of the particular rôles or objectives which had been originally assigned to them. It was found to be a matter of some difficulty to induce these men to withdraw from the fighting and to rejoin their own units, so keen were they to continue their advance.

I also ordered the Second Australian Division to be brought up by bus from the Péronne area, and to take up a position of readiness just west of the Hindenburg Line. I foresaw that with the nature of the fighting before the Third and Fifth Divisions, it would not be very long before they would have to be relieved, and there was still the Beaurevoir line of trenches to be overcome before the Hindenburg system could be claimed as taken in its entirety. This move was duly carried out, and the Second Division became available by the evening of October 1st in close support of the battle front.

The orders to the two line Divisions for September 30th were to attack generally in a north-easterly direction. The immediate objectives of the Third Division were Bony village, the "Knob" and the northern entrance to the tunnel. The flanks of the two Divisions were to meet on the Railway Spur, and the right of the Fifth Division was to swing forward in the direction of Joncourt, in sympathy with any advance made by the Ninth Corps to the south of them.

There was, as explained, no possibility of attempting anything like a methodical advance covered by a co-ordinated Artillery barrage. Progress would depend upon the tenacity and skilful leading of the front-line troops, and reliance must be had more upon the bayonet and the bomb than upon external aids. It was, in a peculiar degree, a private soldier's battle.

The night of September 29th brought steady rain, and everybody was drenched to the skin. September 30th was a day of intense effort, slow and methodical hand-to-hand fighting, in a perfect tangle of trenches, with every yard of the advance vigorously contested; but by nightfall the line of the Third Division had advanced fully 1,000 yards. Its left had pivoted on the "Knoll," to the west of the Hindenburg Line. Gillemont Farm was by then securely in their hands; they had reached the southern outskirts of Bony village. Their right was well across the line of the canal, and joined the left flank of the Fifth Division on the Railway Spur. The Fifth Division had cleared the Le Catelet trench line of the enemy, and its right was by now well to the east of Nauroy.

Another day's fighting was still before both Divisions, but the effect of the successful efforts of September 30th was speedily felt on October 1st. Overnight the enemy must have made up his mind that it was hopeless to try to retain any further hold upon the tunnel line, and his further resistance melted rapidly away. On October 1st events moved quickly; by 10 a.m. the Fifth Division reported the capture of Joncourt. By midday the whole of the village of Bony was in our hands, and at the same hour the air observers reported our patrols rapidly approaching the "Knob" and Le Catelet village.

By nightfall of October 1st the whole operation had been successfully completed. The northern entrance to the tunnel, the "Knob" and the whole of the Railway Spur were in our hands; our line ran just west of Le Catelet and east of Estrées and Joncourt; all isolated parties of Americans and all American wounded had been gathered in, and the whole situation had been satisfactorily cleared up from an Artillery point of view.

Later the same night our patrols entered Le Catelet, which lay in a hollow below us, and found the village deserted except for a number of enemy wounded. The enemy, during that day, relinquished his last hold upon the famous tunnel defences, and withdrew precipitately eastwards to the Beaurevoir hill and northwards towards Aubencheul. Our total captures during the three days' operations amounted to 3,057 prisoners and 35 guns.

It had been a stiff fight, and the endurance of the Infantry had been highly tested. The skill displayed by the Third Division in the course of the close trench fighting of September 30th was particularly noteworthy. The stress upon Major-General Gellibrand and his Staff and Infantry Brigadiers had been severe. The several Brigades and Battalions had unavoidably become seriously mixed up. Control became very difficult, but was never completely lost.

This was illustrated by the following incident of the day's fighting. I had ascertained that the whole of the Infantry of the Division had been committed, and there were no reserves in the hands of the Divisional Commander. One Battalion of the 9th Brigade was fighting under the orders of the 11th Brigade, another under that of the 10th Brigade. I took exception to this, and directed that a Divisional reserve should be immediately reconstituted. In spite of the difficulties of communication, Gellibrand contrived to carry this intricate order into effect during the very climax of the fight.