German Prisoners—taken by the Corps at Hamel, being marched to the rear.
Visit of Monsieur Clemenceau—group taken at Bussy on July 7th, 1918.
My last executive work with the Third Division was the process of putting this Division back into the line, this time in the Villers-Bretonneux sector of our front. After handing over the Division and all its outstanding current affairs to Major-General Gellibrand, I assumed command of the Australian Army Corps on May 30th, with Brigadier-General Blamey as my Chief-of-Staff.[7]
I very soon became aware that, as Corps Commander, I was privileged to have access to a very large body of interesting secret information, which was methodically distributed daily by G.H.Q. Intelligence. This comprised detailed information of the true facts of all happenings on the fronts of all the Allies, the gist of the reports of our Secret Service, and very full particulars from which the nature and distribution of the enemy's military resources could be deduced with fair accuracy.
The numberings and locations of all his Corps and Divisions actually in the front line, on all the Allied fronts, was, of course, quite definitely known from day to day. The numberings of all Formations lying in Reserve were known with equal certainty, although their actual positions on any date were largely a matter of deduction by expert investigators. Of particular importance were the further deductions which could be drawn as to the condition of readiness or exhaustion of such reserve Divisions, from known facts as to their successive appearance and experiences on any active battle front.
Our experts were thus able to classify the enemy Divisions, and to determine from day to day the probable number, and even the probable numberings, of fit Divisions actually available (after one, or after two, or after three days) to reinforce any portion of the front which was to be the object of an attack by us. They could also compute the number of fit Divisions which the enemy had at his disposal at any time for launching an offensive against us.
All such data had a very direct bearing, not only on the probable course of the campaign in the immediate future, but also upon the responsibility which always weighed upon a Corps Commander of keeping his own sector in preparedness to meet an attack or to prevent such an attack from coming upon him as a surprise. He must therefore be alert to watch the signs and astute to read them aright.