One striking feature of the information at our disposal during the early part of June was the steady melting away of the enemy reserves as the consequence of his resultless, even if locally successful, assaults during the preceding two and a half months, against Amiens, in Flanders, and on the Chemin des Dames. But it was apparent that he still held formidable Reserves of Infantry, and a practically intact Artillery, which he was bound to employ for at least one great and final effort to gain a decision.
The junction of the French and British Armies still offered a tempting point of weakness. As mine was now the flank British Corps, in immediate contact with General Toulorge's 31st French Corps, I could not afford to relax any of the precautions of vigilance or preparation which had been initiated by my predecessor for meeting such an attack. Consequently, during June, 1918, I ordered on the part of all my line Divisions a maintenance of their energetic efforts to perfect the defensive organizations. I also undertook out of other Corps labour resources the development of further substantial rear systems of defence, so that Amiens need not, in the event of a renewed attack, be abandoned to its fate without a prolonged struggle.
The First Australian Division was not yet a part of my new Command, its continued presence in the Hazebrouck and Merris area, under the Fifteenth Corps, being still considered indispensable. My Corps front now extended over a total length of ten miles, and I had but four Divisions at my disposal to defend it. Three Divisions held the line, one to the north and two to the south of the Somme. Only one Division at a time could therefore be permitted a short rest, and this Division formed my only tactical reserve.
All this added to the anxieties of the situation, and focussed the energies of the whole command on a constant scrutiny of all signs and symptoms that the enemy might be preparing to deliver his next blow against us. Active patrolling was maintained and continued to yield a steady stream of prisoners. A well conceived and planned minor enterprise by the Second Division, which was carried out on June 10th, and was Rosenthal's first Divisional operation, gave us possession of a further slice of the important ridge between Sailly-Laurette and Morlancourt. It gained us 330 prisoners and 33 machine guns. But no sign of any preparations on the part of the enemy for an attack upon us, in this zone, emerged from the careful investigations which followed this operation.
The days passed and evidences increased that the enemy was now beginning to devote his further attentions to the French front far to the south of us. At any rate, he continued to leave us unmolested, and the interrogations of our numerous prisoners all confirmed the absence of any preparations for an attack.
The defensive attitude which the situation thus forced upon us did not for long suit the present temper of the Australian troops, and I sought for a promising enterprise on which again to test their offensive power, on a scale larger than we had yet attempted in the year's campaign. There had been no Allied offensive, of any appreciable size, on any of our fronts, in any of the many theatres of war, since the close of the Passchendaele fighting in the autumn of 1917.
It was high time that the anxiety and nervousness of the public, at the sinister encroachments of the enemy upon regions which he had never previously trodden, should be allayed by a demonstration that there was still some kick left in the British Army. It was high time, too, that some Commanders on our side of No Man's Land should begin to "think offensively," and cease to look over their shoulders in order to estimate how far it still was to the coast.
I was ambitious that any such kick should be administered, first, at any rate, by the Australians. A visit which I was privileged to pay to General Elles, Commander of the Tank Corps, when he gave me a demonstration of the capacities of the newer types of Tanks, only confirmed me in this ambition. Finally, the Hamel re-entrant had for two months been, as I have already explained, a source of annoyance and anxiety to me. It was for these reasons that I resolved to propose an operation for the recapture of Hamel, conditional upon being supplied with the assistance of Tanks, a small increase of my Artillery and an addition to my air resources.
I thereupon set about preparing a general plan for such a battle, which was to be my first Corps operation. Having mentioned the matter first verbally to Lord Rawlinson, he requested me to submit a concrete proposal in writing. The communication is here reproduced, and will serve to convey an idea of the complexities involved in even so relatively small an undertaking:
Australian Corps.
21st June, 1918.Fourth Army.
HAMEL OFFENSIVE
1. With reference to my proposal for an offensive operation on the front of the "A" and "B" Divisions of this Corps, with a view to the capture of Hamel Village and Vaire and Hamel Wood, etc., the accompanying map shows, in blue, the proposed ultimate objective line. This line has been chosen as representing the minimum operation that would appear to be worth undertaking, while offering a prospect of substantial advantages.
2. These advantages may be briefly summarized thus:
(a) Straightening of our line.
(b) Shortening of our line.
(c) Deepening our forward defensive zone, particularly east of Hill 104.
(d) Improvement of jumping-off position for future operations.
(e) Advancement of our artillery, south of the Somme.
(f) Denial to enemy of observation of ground near Vaux-sur-Somme, valuable for battery positions.
(g) Facilitating subsequent further minor advances north of the Somme.
(h) Disorganization of enemy defences.
(i) Disorganization of possible enemy offensive preparations.
(j) Inflicting losses on enemy personnel and material.
(k) Improvement of our observation.
(l) Maintenance of our initiative on this Corps front.
3. The disadvantages are those arising from the necessity of bringing into rapid existence a new defensive system on a frontage of 7,000 yards and also the particular incidence, at the present juncture, of the inevitable losses, small or large, of such an operation in this Corps.
4. In view of the unsatisfactory position of Australian reinforcements, any substantial losses would precipitate the time when the question of the reduction in the number of Australian Divisions would have to be seriously considered. It is for higher authority to decide whether a portion of the present resources in Australian man-power in this Corps would be more profitably ventured upon such an operation as this, which is in itself a very attractive proposition, rather than to conserve such resources for employment elsewhere.
5. Detailed plans can only be prepared after I have had conferences with representatives of all Arms and Services involved, but the following proposals are submitted as the basis of further elaboration:
(a) The operation will be primarily a Tank operation—at least one and preferably two Battalions of Tanks to be employed.
(b) The whole battle front will be placed temporarily under command of one Divisional Commander—by a temporary readjustment of inter-Divisional boundaries.
(c) The infantry employed will comprise one Division plus a Brigade, i.e., 4 Infantry Brigades, totalling, say, 7,500 bayonets; about one-half of this force to be employed in the advance and the other half to hold our present front defensively, taking over the captured territory within 48 hours after Zero.[8]
(d) The action will be designed on lines to permit of the Tanks effecting the capture of the ground; the rôles of the Infantry following the Tanks will be:
(i) to assist in reducing strong points and localities.
(ii) to "mop up."
(iii) to consolidate the ground captured.
(e) Apart from neutralizing all enemy artillery likely to engage our troops, our artillery will be employed to keep under fire enemy centres of resistance and selected targets—in front of the advance of the Tanks. Artillery detailed for close targets will work on a prearranged and detailed time-table which will be adjusted to the time-table of the Tank and Infantry advance. Sufficient "silent" field artillery supplied before the battle should be emplaced in advanced positions, to ensure an effective protective barrage to cover consolidation on the blue line,[9] and to engage all localities from which enemy counter-attacks can be launched. It is estimated that, in addition to the resources of the Corps, four Field Artillery Brigades will be required for, say, four days in all.
(f) Engineer stores in sufficient quantities to provide for the complete organization of the new defences will require to be dumped beforehand as far forward as practicable.
(g) No additional machine guns, outside of Corps resources, will be required,
(h) Contact and counter-attack planes and low-flying bombing planes prior to and during advance must be arranged for.
(i) Artillery and mortar smoke to screen the operations from view of all ground north of the Somme in the Sailly-Laurette locality are required.
6. As to the date of the operations, the necessary preparations will occupy at least seven days after authority to proceed has been given. As an inter-Divisional relief is planned to occur on June 28th-29th and 29th-30th, it would seem that this operation cannot take place earlier than the first week in July. The postponement of this relief would not be desirable for several reasons.
7. Valuable training in the joint action of Tanks and Infantry can be arranged, probably in the territory west of the Hallue Valley—provided that one or two Tank Companies can be detached for such a purpose. Thorough liaison prior to and during the operation between all Tank and all Infantry Commanders would have to be a special feature. For this reason only Infantry units not in the line can be considered as available to undergo the necessary preparation.
(Sgd.) John Monash,
Lieut.-General.
Cmdg. Australian Corps.