(a) Straightening of our line.
(b) Shortening of our line.
(c) Deepening our forward defensive zone, particularly east of Hill 104.
(d) Improvement of jumping-off position for future operations.
(e) Advancement of our artillery, south of the Somme.
(f) Denial to enemy of observation of ground near Vaux-sur-Somme, valuable for battery positions.
(g) Facilitating subsequent further minor advances north of the Somme.
(h) Disorganization of enemy defences.
(i) Disorganization of possible enemy offensive preparations.
(j) Inflicting losses on enemy personnel and material.
(k) Improvement of our observation.
(l) Maintenance of our initiative on this Corps front.
(a) The operation will be primarily a Tank operation—at least one and preferably two Battalions of Tanks to be employed.
(b) The whole battle front will be placed temporarily under command of one Divisional Commander—by a temporary readjustment of inter-Divisional boundaries.
(c) The infantry employed will comprise one Division plus a Brigade, i.e., 4 Infantry Brigades, totalling, say, 7,500 bayonets; about one-half of this force to be employed in the advance and the other half to hold our present front defensively, taking over the captured territory within 48 hours after Zero.[8]
(d) The action will be designed on lines to permit of the Tanks effecting the capture of the ground; the rôles of the Infantry following the Tanks will be:
(i) to assist in reducing strong points and localities.
(ii) to "mop up."
(iii) to consolidate the ground captured.
(e) Apart from neutralizing all enemy artillery likely to engage our troops, our artillery will be employed to keep under fire enemy centres of resistance and selected targets—in front of the advance of the Tanks. Artillery detailed for close targets will work on a prearranged and detailed time-table which will be adjusted to the time-table of the Tank and Infantry advance. Sufficient "silent" field artillery supplied before the battle should be emplaced in advanced positions, to ensure an effective protective barrage to cover consolidation on the blue line,[9] and to engage all localities from which enemy counter-attacks can be launched. It is estimated that, in addition to the resources of the Corps, four Field Artillery Brigades will be required for, say, four days in all.
(f) Engineer stores in sufficient quantities to provide for the complete organization of the new defences will require to be dumped beforehand as far forward as practicable.
(g) No additional machine guns, outside of Corps resources, will be required,
(h) Contact and counter-attack planes and low-flying bombing planes prior to and during advance must be arranged for.
(i) Artillery and mortar smoke to screen the operations from view of all ground north of the Somme in the Sailly-Laurette locality are required.
(i) to assist in reducing strong points and localities.
(ii) to "mop up."
(iii) to consolidate the ground captured.
Approval to these proposals was given without delay; the additional resources were promised, and preparations for the battle were immediately put in hand. As I hope, in a later context, to attempt to describe the evolution of a battle plan, and the comprehensive measures which are associated with such an enterprise, it will not be necessary to do so here.
It was the straightening of the Corps front, as an essential preliminary to any offensive operations on a still larger scale, to be undertaken when the opportune moment should arrive, that made the Hamel proposal tactically attractive; it was the availability of an improved type of Tank that gave it promise of success, without pledging important resources, or risking serious losses.
The new Mark V. Tank had not previously been employed in battle. It marked a great advance upon the earlier types. The epicyclic gearing with which it was now furnished, the greater power of its engines, the improved balance of its whole design gave it increased mobility, facility in turning and immunity from foundering in ground even of the most broken and uneven character. It could be driven and steered by one man, where it previously took four; and it rarely suffered suspended animation from engine trouble.
But, above all, the men of the Tank Corps had, by the training which they had undergone, and by the spirited leadership of Generals Elles, Courage, Hankey and other Tank Commanders, achieved a higher standard of skill, enterprise and moral; they were now, more than ever, on their mettle to uphold the prestige of the Tank Corps.
All the same, the Tanks had become anathema to the Australian troops. For, at Bullecourt more than a year before, they had failed badly, and had "let down" the gallant Infantry, who suffered heavily in consequence; a failure due partly to the mechanical defects of the Tanks of those days, partly to the inexperience of the crews, and partly to indifferent staff arrangements, in the co-ordination of the combined action of the Infantry and the Tanks.
It was not an easy problem to restore to the Australian soldier his lost confidence, or to teach him the sympathetic dependence upon the due performance by the Tanks of the rôles to be allotted to them, which was essential to a complete utilization of the possibilities which were now opening up. That the Tanks, appropriately utilized, were destined to exert a paramount influence upon the course of the war, was apparent to those who could envisage the future.