[199] “Yar Mahomed is one of the most persuasive talkers I have met. It is scarcely possible to talk with him and retain anger. He is ready in a surprising degree, and is so patient under rebuke, that I never saw him fail to quiet the most violent of his countrymen, when he thought it worth his while. A person who disregards truth, and thinks nothing of denying what he has asserted a few minutes before, is a most puzzling person to argue with. Until you have thought over what has been said, you cannot understand the changeable colours which pass before you.”—[Eldred Pottinger’s MS. Journal.]
[200] Eldred Pottinger’s MS. Journal.
[201] “It is my firm belief that Mahomed Shah might have carried the city by assault the very first day that he reached Herat, and that even when the garrison gained confidence, and were flushed with the success of their sorties, he might have, by a proper use of the means at his disposal, taken the place in twenty-four hours. His troops were infinitely better soldiers, and quite as brave men, as the Afghans. The non-success of their efforts was the fault of their generals. We can never again calculate on such, and if the Persians again return, they will do so properly commanded and enlightened as to the causes of their former failure. Their material was on a scale sufficient to have reduced a powerful fortress. The men worked very well at the trenches, considering they were not trained sappers, and the practice of the artillery was really superb. They simply wanted engineers, and a general, to have proved a most formidable force.”—[Eldred Pottinger’s Report on Herat: Calcutta, July, 1840. MS. Records.]
[202] It will have been perceived that I have described the operations of the siege of Herat, almost entirely as from within the walls. I have done this partly, because I believe that the interest of such descriptions is greatly enhanced when the reader is led to identify himself more particularly with one contending party; and partly because the outside movements of the Persian army have been already detailed in the published letters of Colonel Stoddart and Mr. M’Neill, whilst no account has ever yet been given to the public of the defensive operations of the Heratees. I have already stated that my information has been, for the most part, derived from the Manuscript Journals of Eldred Pottinger.
[203] Draft of a Note to be presented by the Marquis of Clanricarde to Count Nesselrode. Published Papers.
[204] It is not very clear, however, that the Russian Government, though doubtless discredited by the failure, regarded it as “a fatal enterprise.” Russia had a double game to play. In the familiar language of the turf, she “hedged.” Whether the Persians won or lost, she was sure to gain something. The views of Russian statesmen have been thus set forth, not improbably in the very language of one of them:
“Russia,” it is stated, “has played a very successful, as well as a very safe, game in the late proceedings. When she prompted the Shah to undertake the siege of Herat, she was certain of carrying an important point, however the expedition terminated. If Herat fell, which there was every reason to expect, then Candahar and Caubul would certainly have made their submission. Russian influence would thus have been brought to the threshold of India; and England, however much she might desire peace, could not avoid being involved in a difficult and expensive war, in order to avert more serious dangers. If, on the other hand, England interfered to save Herat, she was compromised—not with the mere court of Mahomed Shah, but with Persia as a nation. Russia had contrived to bring all Persia to Herat, and to identify all Persia with the success or failure of the campaign; and she had thus gravelled the old system of partisanship, which would have linked Azerbijan with herself, and the rest of the nation with her rival.”—[Calcutta Review.]
[205] Count Nesselrode’s Instructions to Count Pozzo di Borgo: November 1, 1839.
[206] Sir John Hobhouse’s answer is worth giving. “Very probably, Baron; but however much I should regret the collision, I should have no fear of the result.” I give this on the authority of a distinguished writer on “Our Political Relations with Persia,” in the Calcutta Review.
[207] For a very interesting and ably written summary of the progress of Russia in the East, and an elaborate investigation of the question of the possibility of a Russian invasion of India, see Mr. Robert Bell’s excellent “History of Russia.” It was written before the British crossed the Indus—before Russia entangled herself in the steppes, and England in the defiles of Central Asia. Neither country now, remembering these disasters, thinks of the meeting of the Sepoy and the Cossack without a shudder.