[208] I may as well mention here that the chasm between Persia and Great Britain, created by the events narrated in this chapter, was not bridged over until the spring of 1841, when Ghorian was given back to the Heratees. Before the close of that year, Mahomed Shah was collecting a great army, and contemplating extensive operations, the object of which, according to Sir John M’Neill, though disguised under the name of operations against Khiva, was another assault upon Herat.—[Sir John M’Neill to Sir Alexander Burnes: January 5, 1842. MS.] This letter was written more than two months after Burnes had fallen a victim to the policy which I am now about to elucidate. Sir John M’Neill wrote: “I have now to inform you, that since the arrival of Count Medem, the new Russian Minister, about a month ago, the Shah has given orders for collecting an army in the spring, about two months hence, which is intended to be numerous, and to be accompanied by two hundred pieces of Artillery; and he announces his intention to march in the direction of Meshed, for the purpose of attacking Khiva. The advance of the Shah with such an army to Meshed, may produce some commotion in Afghanistan, as you will no doubt hear of his proposing to go to Herat; and I conclude, therefore, that you will be prepared to put down any movements that may be caused by the rumour of his approach, and for any ulterior measures that may be necessary.” But in a postscript, dated January 6, the very day on which the British commenced their lamentable retreat from Caubul, he added: “Since writing the preceding lines, some circumstances which have come to my knowledge, lead me to think it quite possible that the Shah may not follow out his intention of going with an army into Khorassan, and it is even possible that no army may be sent in that direction; but I am still of opinion, that it is considerably more probable that a force will be sent, than that it will not; and if a large army should march to Meshed, its objects will, I think, have reference rather to Herat than to Khiva.”—[MS. Correspondence.]
[209] Mr. M’Neill to Captain Burnes. MS. Records.
[210] Id. ibid.
[211] Count Simonich’s letter was intercepted, and taken to M’Neill by one Meer Mahomed, whom M’Neill subsequently placed at the disposal of Burnes.
[212] “Captain Wade to J. R. Colvin” Esq., June 27, 1837. MS. Records.
[213] Private Correspondence of Sir A. Burnes.
[214] See Harlan’s account of the reception of these presents. I see no reason to question its veracity.
[215] Lord William Bentinck is said to have exclaimed, “What! Lord Auckland and Macnaghten gone to war! The very last men in the world I should have suspected of such folly!”
[216] In the preceding year he had written to Sir Charles Metcalfe, “You are quite right in believing that I have not a thought of interference between the Afghans and the Sikhs. I should not be sorry to see strong, independent, and commercial powers established in Afghanistan; but short of Persian or Russian occupation, their present state is as unsatisfactory as possible, with national, family, and religious feuds so inveterate as almost to make one party ready to join any invader against another. It is out of the question that we can ever gain direct power or influence amongst them.”—[Life of Lord Metcalfe, vol. ii. p. 307.] It was upon the basis of this assumption that he subsequently reared the delusive project of re-establishing “the integrity of the Douranee Empire.”
[217] “Of plans, of this nature, that of granting our aid or countenance in concert with Runjeet Singh, to enable Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk to re-establish his sovereignty in the Eastern division of Afghanistan, under engagements which shall conciliate the feelings of the Sikh ruler, and bind the restored monarch to the support of our interests, appears to me to be decidedly the most deserving of attention. Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk and Maharajah Runjeet Singh would probably act readily upon such a plan, it being similar to that in which they were before engaged, but which failed principally from the want of pecuniary aid, and the absence of our active sanction and support. In such an enterprise (which both from past experience, and from the circumstance that it would be undertaken in resistance of an attempt to establish Sheeah supremacy in the country, would, we believe, have many partisans in Afghanistan) Runjeet Singh would assist by the employment of a portion of his troops, and we by some contribution in money, and the presence of an accredited agent of the government, and of a sufficient number of officers for the direction of the Shah’s army.”—[Minute of Lord Auckland’s, Simlah, May 12, 1838—MS. Records.] A portion of this minute is given in the published correspondence. The passage quoted, and indeed, all the latter and more practical portion of it, is omitted.