Reminiscences of Travel in Australia, America, and Egypt

by Sir Richard Tangye

It is impossible for anyone to pass through the Canal without being impressed with the urgent necessity for vastly increased accommodation for the constantly augmenting traffic. The delays occasioned by the difficulties in coaling, the blocks in the Canal—caused sometimes by the enormous traffic, and sometimes by the sinking of a ship across the narrow channel—are most vexatious. No less than five days elapsed between the time of the arrival of our steamer at Port Saïd and of its departure from Suez, a distance of less than one hundred miles.

In every way it is most unfortunate for English commerce that—thanks to the mulish obstinacy of Lord Palmerston—the management of the Canal should have been thrown into the hands of Frenchmen; for, while according the highest meed of praise to M. de Lesseps for his genius, tenacity of purpose, and energy, in designing and carrying out such a vast undertaking in the teeth of obstacles which would have daunted most men, it is impossible to ignore the fact that, as compared with English traffic-managers, the French officials responsible for the working of the Canal are vastly inferior in capacity. The spirit of officialism as displayed by a liberal use of red tape, and a certain non-elasticity in carrying out the laws, so familiar to all travellers in France, exists in an intensified form in the local management of the Canal. To the ordinary traveller through the Canal, for example, it seems absurd that vessels should be stopped for the night while some hours of light remain, yet as soon as the sun goes down no further advance can be made. Again, although daylight comes long before sunrise, it is forbidden to move till the sun is up. Then again, experience shows that by the use of the electric light the largest vessels can be handled with the utmost ease. An electric light fixed in the foremast of a ship sweeps the Canal from bank to bank, and for all practical purposes gives a light equal to that of day; it seems strange, therefore, that vessels possessing such appliances should not be permitted to proceed during the night. If one ventures to make such a suggestion to a Canal official, he at once replies that the rules laid down for the regulation of the traffic forbid night passages, and if one further ventures to remind him that the said rules were made before the introduction of electric lighting, he shrugs his shoulders and plainly intimates that you have tried his patience long enough.

A little delegation of authority from the chief office to the pilot or other Canal official on board the ships would at once result in a vast diminution of delay, and consequently in an increase to the capability of the Canal, but the genius of French administration appears to be opposed to the granting of any latitude or freedom of action to inferior officials, and so in the administration of the Canal everything is done by the official at the chief office in Ismailïa, who transmits his orders by telegraph.

But, after all the practicable improvements in the navigation of the present Canal have been made, the necessity for a new one will be no less urgent, and it is especially unfortunate that the Conservative party should have made negotiations with M. de Lesseps so difficult by openly suggesting that we should use our accidental supremacy in Egypt to advance the national interests, without regard to the rights possessed by him. Whatever the actual status of M. de Lesseps, under his concession, may be, it is clear that he has always considered he had a monopoly. At the outset he endeavoured to enlist British sympathy and capital in his undertaking by demonstrating that the bulk of the traffic must necessarily come from English sources. Was it probable, therefore, he would have spent the Company’s capital in making the Canal if, after having demonstrated its success, an English company were at liberty to make another, alongside, and take away four-fifths of its traffic?

In business matters the French are proverbially short-sighted. They fail to see that “three sixpences are better than one shilling,” and are consequently unwilling to surrender present advantages without an absolute certainty of an early and great benefit arising from their doing so. They are much more truly a nation of retailers or shopkeepers than the English are, notwithstanding Napoleon’s famous epithet. What is wanted is a greater breadth of view in the administration of the Canal, and it is in this respect that it is particularly unfortunate there is not a larger English representation on the Board of Management. If we had a representation equal to our share of the capital, the result would soon be apparent in the adoption of a line of policy giving the utmost facilities to the Canal’s customers, to the great advantage of both.

The recent discussions upon the Suez Canal question cannot fail to be of the greatest use to the Government when they reopen negotiations with M. de Lesseps, and if the latter finds it impossible to make another canal without a further concession of land, he may probably think it advisable to conciliate his partner and chief customer by making greater concessions in return for the influence of the British Government with that of the Khedive and the Sultan on his behalf.

But even if no further advantages for British commerce be obtained from the Canal Company, this country occupies a unique position as regards communication with the East. In less than fifteen years the whole of the original cost of the British shares, both principal and interest, will have been paid out of profits, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the day will have to decide as to the destination of the revenue which the shares produce. It appears to me that, after making provision for the necessary expenses attending the administration of the property, it would be both just and politic to return the balance to the owners of the ships whose use of the Canal has been the means of creating the revenue. If this course be adopted British commerce will be immensely benefited, for our ships will be able to use the Canal at a little more than half the expense falling upon those of other nations, and this great advantage will have been obtained without having cost the British taxpayer a single penny. The money will simply be returned into the hands which contributed it, and the proposal, therefore, does not in any way partake of the character of a bounty.

What is known as the Dual Control was established in 1879. By it the British and French Controllers-General were invested with considerable powers over the administration of the finances, in addition to which the Khedive undertook to assign a certain portion of the revenue for the discharge of the national obligations.

In the following year a Law of Liquidation, as drawn up by the Commissioners appointed for the purpose, was issued with the agreement of all the interested European Powers.

In return for these concessions, the Foreign Bondholders made a compromise with the Egyptian Government involving the surrender of a considerable portion of their claims. This settlement, while relieving the country from an enormous burden, placed it in a position to meet its liabilities and to progress in the development of its resources, and, in the language of Lord Granville in his despatch to Lord Dufferin, “it was undoubtedly working well for the material prosperity of the country, and promised to do so for the future;” and in a subsequent despatch the Foreign Secretary declared that, through the action of the Control, great advantages had been secured for the natives, such as “the spread of education, the abolition of vexatious taxation, the establishment of the land-tax on a regular and equitable basis, and the diminution of forced labour.”