The Dutch, in deliberating upon the measure of abandoning the trade, in the year 1744, trace all their disasters in this commerce, to their having tamely submitted, in the first instance, to take the kobang of reduced value at the same rate as the old one. It then occurred to them, that if serious remonstrances had been made in the beginning, their firmness might have prevented the subsequent losses. "In the first instance," says Mr. Imhoff, "our commerce was carried on as by a people groping in the dark, neither knowing the actual price of purchase or sale; because the kobang being the standard coin of the country, that kobang ought to have been calculated in proportion to the value of the tahil, and it would have appeared that since 1710 for forty stivers inferior silver, thirty stivers superior silver were received, and all articles of trade not disposed of with a profit of sixty-three per cent. rendered a loss. And this being the case with most of the cargoes that were sent to Japan after the period above mentioned, we ought either to have relinquished that commerce, or had recourse to such means as might have tended to re-establish the affairs of the Company. Instead, however, of so doing, fruitless remonstrances and solicitations were employed, which finally produced this effect, that the Japanese, during the latter years, granted us, by way of charity, an additional sum of six thousand tahils upon the sale of our cargoes."
From the deliberations which took place at this period, it appears that the proposal then under consideration of relinquishing the trade, was rather intended as a provisional and political measure, to induce the Japanese to admit them to more favourable terms in future, than brought forward with the view of finally abandoning or relinquishing the trade altogether.
The public opinion of the time was, that the Japanese had recourse to these measures of restriction for no other purpose, but to oblige the Dutch to depart from the country; but it occurred to the Dutch government, that a nation which treated strangers in so despotic a manner, had no need to resort to such shifts to dislodge them. Another opinion was, that the restrictions laid on the trade proceeded from political motives, of which the first and most important was their hatred against all the different persuasions of the Christian religion without exception;[287] but the government were inclined to consider these reasons as deserving of little notice. "There is no probability," observes Mr. Imhoff, "that, in the present enlightened age, it can be a consideration, even with the Japanese, of what persuasion merchants are, who neither attempt to propagate their religion with a view to promote their interest, nor to endanger the safety of the state, of neither of which they appear ever to have been suspected." The governor-general was further of opinion, that the Japanese could derive no advantage from the expulsion of the Dutch, as they would thus be cut off from all correspondence with Europeans, and thereby become subject to greater inconveniences than at present, being exposed to the visits of others, whose great increase in those regions was not unknown to them; for, as he states, it is notorious that the Japanese government took annual information of all that passed in the world, and that the Dutch servants had orders to answer their queries faithfully, in order that contrary reports might not injure their credit, by which the Japanese were well aware that if the Dutch withdrew, others would soon settle in the country.[288] Instead, therefore, of attributing the conduct of the Japanese to either of these causes, the governor-general laid it entirely to the account of their interested desire to take every possible advantage of the weakness of the Dutch, who, by admitting the first imposition, laid themselves open to all that followed.
In his very able and interesting memoir "On the Trade of Japan and the Causes which occasioned its Decline,"—"It is by no means surprizing," says Mr. Imhoff, "that the Japanese, when they altered the kobang, likewise made a change in the delivery of the copper, observing that our exchange remained always the same, and the prices of our merchandize unalterably fixed. We cannot pass unnoticed, that this wrong calculation has been the cause that, on our part, many valuable articles of commerce, which were from time to time tendered to us by the Japanese, were declined. Among those articles was yellow copper or brass, Japan porcelain, of which musters were sent in 1736, and camphor, which we might have exported from thence, if our return cargoes had not been complete. Whether the sovereign right to regulate the trade of their country is not equally vested in the government of Japan with any other nation, I will leave undecided. Seeing us patiently submitting to all kinds of restrictions, inattentive in keeping our accounts in a regular order, they were encouraged to put us to the last shift. I am not inclined to dwell upon our surprising indifference, which was concealed at the same time under the cloak of mystery, from whence so many evil consequences resulted. I am of opinion, that it cannot be either the interest or inclination of the Japanese to oblige us to relinquish all intercourse with their country, provided our trade be carried on within narrow bounds, and they are not losing upon the articles delivered to us in payment for our cargoes. It is not possible that they can have any profit on the copper, if it is sold for less than one kobang. The mines certainly cannot be worked at a cheaper rate than formerly; and what profit do the venders of the copper derive from our merchandize, after it has fallen into the hands of the interpreters to government and others? Nothing is more natural, therefore, than that our exportation of copper from Japan should have become a burden to that class of people, and that their complaints contributed to the restrictions to which we are now subject. There is no doubt, that if the Japanese could keep up the communication without allowing us a single chest of copper, they would willingly grant us six thousand tahils as a gratification, over and above the stipulated price for our cargo."
In considering the reforms to be introduced into the management of the trade in future, the first point which attracted attention was a better calculation of the coin, with reference to the intrinsic value, and a calculation being made upon a new basis, allowed a higher price to be paid for the copper than before. It was estimated, that if the Dutch could annually procure twenty thousand pikuls of copper at twenty tahils, the Japan trade would still be lucrative, allowing the profits on the outward-bound cargoes to be merely sufficient for the support of the factory.
But in order to purchase and to pay for such a quantity of copper, the governor-general observes, "it is necessary that government should strictly comply with the requisitions from Japan, because our failures therein have brought us into such discredit with the Japanese, that they do not any longer place confidence in our promises. We have passed our word from year to year, that the quality and the quantity of our merchandize should be better assorted, without ever attending to it. Even at this moment, the supply differs so very much from the quantity required, that it will be extremely difficult to convince the Japanese that they shall be better served in future; and still it must be done, because if we wish to obtain the value of eight hundred or four hundred thousand tahils of copper annually, besides camphor and other articles, different measures must be resorted to. We are hardly able, at present, to supply one-third of that amount, and load the ships with coarse goods.
"We have no doubt but other productions of Japan might also be procured at a cheaper rate than at present. Camphor may be purchased in abundance at thirty tahils the pikul, and it is probable the same could still be obtained on more favourable terms, if we advert to what it cost formerly; in which case it would become a profitable remittance to Holland, and render one hundred per cent., or thereabouts.
"The white copper (tutenague) has been tendered to us at sixteen tahils per pikul, but has not been accepted, the price being considered too high. If, however, we can dispose of it merely at the same price as the yellow copper (brass), which yields according to the price current before us 41-43 f. per 100 lb., it will not only be acceptable, but even render a reasonable profit of fifty per cent.
"Iron was formerly imported here from Japan, and might perhaps be procured at a moderate price, which for the sake of the small distance between us and that country would be very desirable.[289]
"Sulphur was also declined in 1726, on account of its being charged too high; yet it might still become an article worth attention, especially if it were purified in Japan. And who knows how many other valuable productions might be drawn from that extensive country, besides those already mentioned, and which would be very acceptable, in an economical as well as a mercantile point of view?"[290]