The History of Java, v. 1-2

by Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles

The following facts are collected from the considerations at this time.

That in former times the commerce of foreign nations at Japan amounted to ten millions of florins, and since then for many years to 3,150,000 florins, of which the Chinese share was two-thirds, and the Dutch one-third; and it was consequently presumed, that in so extensive a country as Japan, merchandize might still be disposed of to the value of one million, especially if it was paid for in the productions of the country.

That one of the causes of the decline of the trade was the conduct of the Company's servants, and the extent to which the private trade of individuals was carried. The directors of the trade at Japan had been selected from a very inferior class of society, and the peculations on overweight of the copper, &c. formed the subject of a regular complaint made by the Japanese to the Dutch government.

That the trade of the Chinese to Japan had been reduced from eighty to twenty junks in the year, the number then allowed.

In concluding his valuable and interesting Memoir, the Baron Van Imhoff declares it to be his firm belief, that Japan was, in every respect, what it had been formerly; that the same quantity of merchandize might be disposed of there as in former times, and that returns of equal value might be obtained; that although the profits should be less at present, there could be no reason to relinquish that trade; that the means of the Dutch were certainly inferior at that moment to what they had been, yet that if they adhered to the measures proposed (namely, clear accounts, correctness and honesty of conduct, and a good assortment of cargoes), which were easy, and could not expose them to any risk or danger, they might hope for a favourable issue.

In the course of all these deliberations, the Dutch seem to have concluded that the debasement of the coin was resorted to by the Japanese, solely with the view of affecting their trade, and never to have reflected that so important a change in the intrinsic value of the standard coin of the country, might have been occasioned by political causes, of far greater magnitude to the Japanese than the paltry gain to be obtained on the traffic of the Dutch cargoes. It is most probable that the empire of Japan, at the periods when these changes took place, wished to check the exportation of the precious metals of the country. In the first instance, we perceive a prohibition against the exportation of silver. The loss of this metal was first felt, because the principal exports were at first made in this coin; but it is never hinted that this prohibition was occasioned by any desire to take an undue advantage of the Dutch: on the contrary, this measure was not found to affect the Dutch trade at all. The same causes, however, which first led to a prohibition regarding silver, operated afterwards in an equal degree with respect to gold; and it is easy to account for the rise in the value of this metal, and the consequent changes in the coin, by the scarcity which ensued. Let us but reflect on the enormous exportation of the precious metals, which took place from Japan at the period when the trade was unlimited, and we shall find abundant cause for these changes in the coin, without accusing the Japanese of resorting to the measure as an imposition on the foreign merchant. "The exports at one period," says Mr. Imhoff, "amounted to ten millions of florins." These were principally made in the precious metals and in the coin of the country; and when the trade fell exclusively into the hands of the Dutch, it had been usual to export at first from one hundred to one hundred and fifty chests of silver, and subsequently the trade admitted of no less than two hundred chests of gold coin being exported instead of the silver. On a moderate calculation, therefore, the exports of the former period were about one million sterling, and those continued by the Dutch could not be less than from half a million to a million sterling in each year; so that, during a period of sixty years, the total export would have amounted to from thirty to sixty millions of pounds sterling, and this does not include what found its way to China and other neighbouring countries.

The discovery of the mines of America reduced, in the sixteenth century, the value of gold and silver in Europe to about one-third of what it had before been:[291] and might not the extensive drain on Japan have produced in that country an opposite effect of the same magnitude? If the gold and silver annually imported into Spain and Portugal, which did not commonly exceed six millions pounds sterling, produced this effect on the circulating medium, and the price of the precious metals throughout all Europe, in one country of which alone the circulating gold and silver amounted, by some accounts to eighteen, and by others to thirty, millions.[292] Is it not easy to conclude, that a directly contrary and equally extensive effect must have been felt in Japan? and that this effect must have been felt in a still higher degree, while operating on the confined circulating medium of one nation, than while operating on that of the numerous nations of Europe, who again found means to dispose of large quantities by remittances to the eastern world?

The extensive circulation of money throughout the populous and rich empire of Japan, and the facility with which the drains upon it could be supplied from the mines, was perhaps the cause that, in the first instance, the exportation of the precious metals was not sensibly felt; but afterwards, when probably the mint could not keep pace with the demand, and what is not unlikely, the demand was even too heavy for the mines, the intrinsic value of the coins increased in proportion to the scarcity; and it is not surprising that the Japanese should have entertained an apprehension lest the mines would become exhausted. Whether there were any immediate grounds for such an apprehension is uncertain; but it is generally believed that an edict was issued to discontinue working, first the silver, and afterwards the gold mines, but not until the nominal, and perhaps the real, value of both metals, and particularly of the latter, had been nearly doubled, as in the instance of the kobang of the original value being offered to the Dutch for two kobangs.

That the Dutch perhaps owe the loss of this valuable trade, in a great measure, to the incapacity and worthlessness of their own servants, cannot but be admitted; for had they, on these continued reductions in the value of the current coins, adverted to the political cause, and calculated their commercial transactions according to the intrinsic, instead of the nominal, value, they would not have subjected themselves, unknowingly, to a loss of sixty per cent. upon the proceeds of all their exports: nor would they have shewn their weakness and ignorance to the Japanese, but they would immediately have devised the advantage of other returns from Japan, in articles, the exportation of which might, at the same time, have improved the industry and prosperity of that empire; and the Japanese, finding them equally intelligent and enterprising under all circumstances, while they felt an interest in the continuance of the trade, would have respected the nation by whom it was carried on. If, however, by these means, the European character and the value of foreign trade thus declined in the estimation of the Japanese, how much lower must that of the Dutch nation have fallen, when after once dictating the prices of all articles both bought and sold, we find them obtaining at last an advance on their proceeds of the outward cargo, by way of charity, and the Japanese themselves appealing against the peculations and corruptions that were carried on! When we see the Dutch, without power and without respect, dictating in the mighty empire of Japan an arbitrary and extravagant price for their commodities, in the same manner as they did at home, is it surprising that we should find the Japanese having recourse to a fixed valuation? When we observe the illicit trade to Japan carried on by private individuals, to such an extent, that Valentyn, a Dutch author of the highest authority, says it was so interwoven with the constitution of the Company, and so extensive, that it formed the principal part of the trade, and could never be prevented, and that the Dutch ships were frequently lost by being overladen with cargoes of this kind, we cannot be astonished at the decline of the prosperity of the Company, or the degradations which were imposed upon its agents. The Dutch factory was, and is, in fact, a sink of the most disgraceful corruption and peculation which ever existed. The factor to obtain his own ends, submits to every possible degradation, and the government of Batavia knows only just as much of what is going on at Japan, as it is his interest to tell them. In this work it has become a painful duty to advert occasionally to the shameful scenes of fraud and corruption carried on under the very eyes of the government of Batavia, and in the dependencies in the more immediate vicinity of that metropolis, where their residents enjoyed such extensive powers, and were so removed from controul and responsibility, that their interests constantly interfered with their duties, and the struggle between principle and opportunity generally ended in a resolution to make fortunes, to connive at each other's peculations, and keep their own secret. If this was the case on the island of Java, the seat of government, what must it not have been in a country so remote as Japan, where the connection and intercourse were so peculiar? It is not surprising, that in the accounts of such a factory, the government at home should find nothing but intricacy and obscurity. It was the interest of the factor to keep every thing involved in mystery, and no where was there a better opportunity for doing so.

But had the shameful and disgraceful conduct of these people been felt only in its effects upon the past, it would be trifling, compared to what they are calculated to produce on the future. The unmanly degradation to which these factors have submitted at the caprice, and often for the amusement of the Japanese, in order to gain their own ends, seem to have established an effectual bar against the future extension of the trade by the Dutch nation, who will find it difficult, if not impracticable, ever to be again respected in Japan. Unless, therefore, the Dutch have magnanimity enough to abandon this trade, when they find it of little comparative value to them, or when they see it must be conducted on principles derogatory to the dignity of the illustrious House of Orange, it is to be feared, that the day is far distant, when the opportunity will be afforded of opening a liberal and honourable communication between Europe and this interesting and important empire. Perhaps this will not happen until, according to Humboldt, the two great oceans shall be united by means of a channel across the Isthmus of Darien, when the productions of Nootka Sound and of China will be brought more than two thousand leagues nearer to Europe and the United States, and when alone any great changes can be effected in the political state of Eastern Asia; "for this neck of land," observes that writer, "the barrier against the waves of the Atlantic Ocean, has been for many ages the bulwark of the independence of China and Japan."[293]