Canada; its Defences, Condition, and Resources / Being a third and concluding volume of "My Diary, North and South"

by Sir William Howard Russell

The Americans can find no fault with us for taking steps, in view of contingencies which they have threatened, to obviate, as far as possible, the disadvantages to which distance from the mother country exposes the Provinces. It was enough that before the days of steam, which has greatly increased the disparity between us, Great Britain submitted to conditions in regard to the Lakes which could only be justified by the supposition that Canada was the western shore of Great Britain. By the articles of the Treaty of 1817, the United States of America and Great Britain are limited to one vessel with one 18-pounder and a crew of one hundred men each on Lake Ontario, Lake Champlain, and the upper lakes. No other vessels of war are to be built or armed, and six months’ notice is required to terminate the treaty obligations.

It will have been observed that the Americans of the Northern States are spoken of as the only enemies whom Canada has to fear. They are the only people who threaten from time to time the conquest and annexation of the Provinces, and who have declared by the mouths of their statesmen, that they intend to insist, when they are strong enough, on the fulfilment of the doctrine that the whole continent is theirs; for the natural basis of the Monroe dogma is, the right of the Americans to lay down the doctrine at all, and if they can say to the nations of Europe, “You shall make no further settlements on this soil,” they can say, when it pleases them, with just as much right, “You who are now occupying this soil must either leave it or own allegiance to the Union.” The Union is now, what it never was before, a sovereignty, and Americans in its name fancy that they can do what they please. The Canadians are by no means well-disposed towards their neighbours’ institutions, manners, and customs, and do not desire to be incorporated with them. The annexation must, therefore, be effected by force, sufficiently great to overpower the resistance of the inhabitants, whether singly, or supported by the British army and navy.

It fortunately happens that the freedom of speech and writing prevalent in the United States are safety-valves for the popular steam, and that words are not always indicative of immediate or even of remote action. It would be difficult to estimate the nature of the influences which shall prevail when the American civil war is over. If the North succeeds in overcoming the South, no great danger of war with Great Britain or of invasion of Canada will exist. It will need every man of the Federal army to occupy the Southern States. If, on the other hand, the North should be obliged to abandon her project of forcing the carcase of the South back into the Union by the sword, she will suddenly find herself with a large army on her hands, with a ruined exchequer, and an immense fund of mortified ambition and angry passion to discount.

It is possible that the sober and just-minded men who form a large part of American society may be able to avert a conflict, if the American soldiery and statesmen entertain the views attributed to them; but that is just the point on which no information exists. It is not easy to ascertain the actual weight of the classes who would naturally oppose the press and the populace in a crusade against Great Britain. My own experience, limited and imperfect as it is, leads me to think that there is in the States a very great number, if not an actual majority, of people whose views are not much influenced by violent journals or intemperate politicians, who rarely take part in public affairs, but exercise, nevertheless, their influence on those who do. There is not a community in the Northern States which does not contain a large proportion of educated, intelligent, and upright men, who shrink from participation in party struggles and intrigue; and I regret that they are not more largely known. Their existence is marked by no outward sign which foreign nations can recognise. It is on them, however, that the safety and reputation of the Federal Government depends; it will be on them that their country’s reliance must be placed when the legions return home.

If the war were over in 1865 there would probably be 600,000 men under arms, and there would be at least 200,000 more men in the States who had served, and would take up arms against England with alacrity. A considerable proportion of that army would indeed seek their discharge, and go quietly back to their avocations; but the Irish, Germans, &c., to whom the license of war was agreeable, would not be unwilling to invade Canada, and a percentage of Americans would doubtless eagerly seek for an opportunity of gaining against a foreign enemy the laurels they had not found whilst contending with their fellow countrymen. Commerce indeed would suffer—the Americans would find for the first time what it was to enter upon a quarrel single-handed with the British nation. They have hitherto met only the side blows and stray shots of the old mother country—and they believe they have encountered the full weight of her arm, and the utmost extent of her energies. The wicked men who are striving to engage the two States in a quarrel which would cover the seas of the world with blood and wreck, cannot be deterred from their horrible work by any appeals to fear or conscience; but the influence of the past, and of the Christian and civilised people of the ex-United States will, it is to be hoped, defeat their efforts, seconded though they may be by the prejudice, religious animosity, and national dislike of a portion of the people. If the war party prevail they will have no want of pretexts—the San Juan question alone would suffice them if they had not a whole series of imaginary wrongs to resent arising from the incidents of the present war, and a multitude of claims to prefer to which England can never listen.

At some day, near or remote, Canada must become either independent in whole or in part, or a portion of a foreign state. It will be of no small moment for those then living in Great Britain whether they have alienated the affections or have won the hearts of the newly-created power. Those who doubt this may consider how a Gaul now rules over the ruler of Rome, and how all that remains of an evidence of the occupancy of this Island by the masters of the world for four hundred years, are tumuli, ruined walls, stratified roads, and bits of tile and pottery. The climate of Canada is not more severe than that of Russia—her natural advantages are much greater—her inland seas are never frozen—her communications with Europe are easy—she offers a route to all the world from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The United States will be no longer a country for the poor man to live in; the load of taxation will force emigration to Canada, and the States lying on the left banks of the lakes and of the St. Lawrence will be enriched by the demands of America for her produce, in proportion as the waste lands are occupied, and the Union is filled with a tax-paying swarming population. It is astonishing how soon a man liberates himself from the traditions and allegiance of his native country in the land of his adoption, when his interests and his pride are touched. The attitude of our immediate colonies in face of the transportation question will at once satisfy us that the mother country has little to expect from old associations, whenever her interests are made to appear antagonistic to those of her colonies. Canada has the most liberal institutions in the world—her municipal freedom is without parallel—education is widely disseminated—religious toleration restrains the violence of factions. The cold is by no means as great as that which is borne by the inhabitants of the greater part of northern Europe, and is far less dangerous to health than the more temperate climates of lower latitudes, where rain and tempest are substituted for snow and hard frosts.

The frontier of Canada is assailable at all points. In some places it is constituted by a line only visible on a map, in others it is a navigable inland sea, in others a line drawn in water, in others the bank of a river or the shore of a lake. Coincident with it runs the frontier of the United States.

The best guarantee against invasion would be, complete naval supremacy on the lakes and rivers, because they constitute the most accessible roads for the invaders, and the most serviceable barriers for defenders if they have the proper means of defence. To give any chance of successful resistance, some equality of naval force on the part of the invaded is almost indispensable. The question arises, who shall provide this naval force? Canada cannot. She is prevented by Imperial treaties, by want of means, and even if she had them, she is forbidden to use the means, by the principle which forbids a dependency equipping ships of war in times of peace. Great Britain has no doubt a powerful fleet, but the far inferior navy of the United States, close at hand, contains more vessels suitable for warlike operations in inland waters and canals than we possess, 4000 miles away. In fact we ought to have a very great preponderance of small vessels to give us a fair start, and even then it would be difficult to begin hostilities on equal terms. Lake Michigan, with the enormous resources of Chicago, is entirely American, and the possession of such a base is an advantage which is by no means counterbalanced by our position on Lake Huron. To prevent the enemy clearing all before them on the lakes, by an energetic naval sortie from their ports, it would be necessary to have the means of furnishing a flotilla as soon as hostilities became imminent, and to watch every point, particularly such as that of Sorel, where communication from Richelieu to the St. Lawrence might be interrupted. But it is thought we cannot hope to cope with the Americans on equal terms in all the lakes, and that we must be content with concentrating our strength on Lake Ontario and in the St. Lawrence. All our water-ways are very much exposed. Whilst Great Britain retains her supremacy, the St. Lawrence is open during the summer, and can be kept free by iron-plated vessels as far up as Montreal. The day of wooden gunboats has passed, and it becomes requisite for the Government to take immediate steps to secure an adequate supply of armoured vessels on the spot as soon as hostilities become probable. It is gratifying to know that the Canadian Legislature is about to fortify the harbour and arsenal at Kingston, so as to cover the infant naval force. Under any circumstances, it is not possible to defend a canal by guarding the locks, or by placing forts at particular places, and yet the canals are of vital importance to us. The Beauharnais Canal runs on the right bank of the St. Lawrence, and is peculiarly unfortunate in its military position. The Welland Canal is of consequence, but it would be better to destroy it than permit an enemy to hold it. The Rideau Canal, which runs from Lake Huron to Kingston, is a very valuable communication, but it needs to be deepened and enlarged at the Rapids. All the canals require to be enlarged and improved, but they are far better placed, bad as their state and position are, than the roads and railways. The Grand Trunk Railway is open to attack for many miles at different parts of its course, and in some places trains could be fired upon from American territory! Our reinforcements last winter were sent through New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, in sleighs, along a route which for miles could be cut across at any time by the enemy from Maine, and it would be necessary, to make all safe, for us to follow the Metapodliac road, or to construct the intercolonial railway.

The harbours of Halifax and of St. John’s are not closed in winter, and the mode which was adopted of sending troops into Canada by those points would no doubt be reverted to till some better means shall be provided. From St. Andrew’s, in New Brunswick, there is a railroad to Woodstock, which lies near the state boundary of Maine. Here the route from St. John’s meets the St. Andrew road, and united the line follows the course of the St. John River, and may be divided into four days’ marches—to Florenceville, 1; to Tobique, 2; to Grand Falls, 3; to Little Falls, 4. All this route lies close to the American frontier, and is therefore quite unfit for the march of troops in detachments. The St. John’s route also takes four days to Woodstock. Even with the advantages afforded by the line of railroad, it must be remembered that the snows of winter may often mar all combinations;—our first detachments suffered considerably from cold in the railway carriages, and it may be readily conceived that the course of an army in sleighs to Rivière du Loup on the St. Lawrence, where the Grand Trunk Railway begins or terminates, might be rendered very unsafe by no more formidable agencies than violent snow-storms alone.

Our military authorities do not, it is said, fear a winter campaign, but the Americans have already shown that they are not to be deterred by frost and snow from moving troops into Canada. To ensure moderate security the Metis road, notwithstanding its greater length, should be improved and adapted for military purposes, and the railway should be constructed to complete the work. In considering the three modes of invasion of which I shall speak, it may be inferred that Montreal will be the most likely point of attack, and that Quebec will be comparatively safe at first, but it would not be wise to act on the hypothesis as if it were an absolute certainty.