Canada; its Defences, Condition, and Resources / Being a third and concluding volume of "My Diary, North and South"

by Sir William Howard Russell

In the State of New York, at its capital of Albany, the Americans possess an admirable base of operations against us. Except in winter, the Hudson is an open highway between Albany and New York, and the sea and railways connect it with the shores of the lakes and with the vast centres of American resource and industry. Albany is specially capable of serving as a base against the very places most likely to be assailed, Montreal and Quebec. There is no necessity for any argument to show that the loss of these places would be equivalent to the overthrow of the British in Canada. From the Hudson there is a canal to Lake Champlain, on the upper extremity of which, and almost on the railroad connecting Montreal with New York, is situated a casemated work popularly known as Rouse’s Point, about two days’ march from the commercial capital of Canada. Rouse’s Point would serve as an immediate base for the collection of supplies and the concentration of an army, whilst Albany would become the great dépôt for the war. It is probable that the Americans would try to strike several blows at once. They might direct one expeditionary force from Rouse’s Point against Montreal, and others from Albany and Rouse’s Point against Quebec. They might also menace, or actually attack, the frontier at Detroit or at Niagara. As a war with Great Britain would be popular, and no lack of men would be found, it would also be practicable for them to direct from either of those points an expedition to attack Ottawa, or the towns west of the river Ottawa.

Kingston would also be a point of attack, as much from its importance to us as from its value to the enemy, who would, by the possession of it, command the Rideau Canal, which connects the river Ottawa with Lake Ontario. It is plain that if the points liable to attack were left in their present state, there would be little hope of our ability to defend them by fighting in the open field. United, the Americans are to the Canadians as about eight to one. The State of New York alone is as populous, and is richer, than the Canadas. Great Britain, thousands of miles away, could not hope, by any expenditure of money, or by any display of military skill, to equalise the conditions of the assailants and the defenders of her sovereignty. The engineers are right, therefore, in the argument, that the only way of enabling the Canadians and their British allies to make way against the Republicans, is to establish fortified works supported by or supporting a naval force. The Americans have an idea that it is possible to carry on operations during winter. Our engineers start with the assumption that it is impossible to do so on any large scale, and that it is out of the question for some five months of the year in Canada. The obstructions to siege operations might not be so serious, but they would be so considerable as to render the undertaking of them exceedingly hazardous, and little likely to succeed. The question, then, presents itself whether Canada can be defended for the time in each year during which operations are practicable, and if so, in what manner the defence is to be conducted. Our military authorities are of opinion that Canada can be defended. The Americans, as far as I could judge from their remarks on the subject, and from conversations with several of their officers, conceive that Canada lies at their mercy whenever they choose to attack it. As a chain of great frontier fortresses could not be established or maintained, the means suggested for the purposes of defence are principally of a provisional character. To meet the flood of invasion, it is proposed to cover the approaches to the vulnerable points. Ottawa, Montreal, and Quebec would be defended by forces posted in earthworks, and covered by entrenched camps at Prescott and Richmond, and other suitable places.

If we examine the modes of proceeding to which the enemy would probably resort, we shall find them classified under five heads. First, a naval descent on Goderich. Second, the descent of a force between Detroit and London. Thirdly, the descent of a force on Niagara. Fourthly, the passage of a force between the St. Lawrence and Ogdensburg. Fifthly, an attack by several columns converging in concert on a point between Derby and Huntingdon, with a view of concentrating on Montreal, and cutting the communications with Kingston as well as with Quebec. Let us take a glance at the present state of the principal points, and consider what is needed to improve their condition.

If we look at the map of Upper Canada, the position of Paris at once attracts the eye as a favourable site for the main body of the defensive force; whilst Stratford and London, being points of railway junction, would naturally be held as long as possible. Guelph would serve as a point of concentration for troops obliged to fall back from London or from Stratford, according to the direction from which the enemy came. Toronto would become the natural point of concentration for troops obliged to retire from Guelph, and under the conditions necessitating such a retreat the force defending the Niagara frontier would be obliged to fall back upon Hamilton to the entrenched position covering that town. If the Americans attack the western settlements near Georgian Bay, it seems impossible to oppose them with assured advantage. A calm consideration of the subject has led the best authorities to the conclusion that we cannot hope at present to establish a naval force on either Lake Huron or Lake Erie. The Welland Canal is, in its present state, unsuited to the purposes of modern naval warfare, and a canal is at all times, and under the most favourable circumstances, very little to be depended upon. With the aid of fortified harbours there is, however, no reason to fear for our naval supremacy on Lake Ontario, and it is to that object our best efforts should be directed. It would of course be impolitic to leave Toronto and Hamilton open to naval demonstrations, but the principal efforts of the authorities should be directed to establish permanent works to protect Ottawa, Montreal, Kingston, and Quebec, and to prepare positions for entrenched camps and earthworks on the points most likely to be assailed.

It is plain that a navy alone can prevent descents on the land line of such extensive waters, and that the possession of Rouse’s Point enables the Americans to turn the line of the Richelieu and threaten Montreal. Let us run rapidly over the positions, beginning with the west. If works were thrown up at Goderich and Sydenham on points there which are suitable for defensive positions, it might be possible to check any adventurous force intent on speedy victory and conquest; but no fortifications could be maintained on those remote points for permanent occupation, as the enemy could operate on the flanks and rear and turn them from Huron or Georgian Bay.

A permanent work on Point Edward Sarnia, to command the St. Clair River, has been suggested, and it has been recommended that the defences of Fort Maldon and Bar Island should be made permanent works, but other engineers have considered it unwise to erect fortifications at Sarnia or Amherstburg, and contend that the Niagara and Detroit frontiers are too much exposed to be tenable by any works. Guelph should also be rendered worthy of its important position. London, being a railway station, is, in event of a war, an important point to hold for the carriage of troops; and although there is no ground close at hand admitting of tenacious grip, there is a tolerably good line of defence at Konoska, which the spade could convert into a fair position.

When we come to consider the condition of the Toronto district it becomes apparent that two points require especial attention—Fort Dalhousie and Port Colborne. It is unwise to leave these places without defences to cover the garrisons, and to enable them to protect the shore against desultory operations and isolated detachments. Domville and Maitland are open to predatory attacks which might be prevented by ordinary fortifications or earthworks on eligible sites. It is impossible to defend a canal; but much good might be done by enlisting the employés on the Welland as a sort of guard, whose local knowledge would be available in time of danger. Although, as I have said, strong reasons are urged against any outlay for the defence of the Niagara frontier, on the ground of its exposure, there are distinguished authorities who insist that a permanent work is required at Fort Erie; and who contend that another fort should be erected at Niagara, in support of an entrenched camp, which would exercise a most powerful influence over the movements of an invading force, particularly if there were gunboats placed on the Chippewa. One of the painful necessities of war between the United States and Great Britain would be the destruction of the suspension bridges over the river. Hamilton is generally considered as incapable of defence, but it lies in a district which presents two lines of hills capable of being adapted to defensive purposes, and earthworks there might be stiffly held, in case of attack, by the troops of the district, to enable the forces to concentrate and retire along routes previously determined. Toronto itself may be regarded as an open place equally incapable of defence by ordinary works; but it should not be left open to such a coup by a single cruiser, as might be obviated by the erection of a fort on the site of the new barracks: and it would be necessary to construct a strong entrenched camp to cover it and protect the troops retiring before the enemy. A chain of earthworks might be placed on the elevated ridges which run from the Don River towards Humber Bay. A casemated fort on the island is also most desirable. Toronto has something more than its mere strategical importance to recommend it. It has special claims to consideration as an important centre of civilised life, commerce, enterprise, and learning.

The defences of Kingston are more worthy of its ancient importance. In fact, the only works in Canada suited to modern warfare are those at Kingston and Quebec. The latter are capable of much improvement, as has been already pointed out. Both need to be strengthened, and to be extended. If the Americans have beaten us by treaty, why should we not at all events have iron-plated vessels sent up the St. Lawrence as far as treaty will allow them to go, and prepare naval establishments and encourage naval volunteers for times of danger at Kingston? Port Henry, Fort Frederick, an earthen work, and the Market Battery, are in good condition, but much must be done before the place can be regarded as being in a satisfactory state. The Shoal Tower, the Cedar Island Tower, and the Murney Tower, constructed of stone, are placed on points covering the water approaches to Kingston. But all the guns in these works, with one exception, are en barbette, and to render Kingston safe it would be necessary to erect strong works to resist the advance of an enemy landing either above or below the town. It is estimated that £390,000 would be sufficient for the purpose of erecting the permanent forts absolutely indispensable for the safety of the harbour and dockyard establishment. The position of these works should be chosen with a due regard to all possible conditions of attack. Wolfe Island, Abraham’s Head, Snake Island, Simcoe Island, and Garden Island, should be provided with adequate forts to support the new scheme of defence. The Navy Yard should be removed, and the points now open to attack at once fortified. Belleville and Prescott both afford admirable ground for works of great importance: the former possesses a most advantageous site for temporary works and for a line of defence; and the latter has such a commanding situation that a permanent work, with casemates, should be constructed there to guard what is, according to some of our engineers, one of the most valuable positions in the province.