NIGHT.—The influence of England and of France on the destinies of the Republic is greater than any American patriot would like to admit. It must not be expected, therefore, that there will be any proof of excessive anxiety afforded by the leaders of either party in reference to the course which may be taken by the European Governments in the present crisis; but it is not the less to be apprehended, that an immediate recognition of the confederated independence of the South, or of the doctrine of absolute individual sovereignty on the part of those States, may precipitate the hostile action which, in the event of absolute final separation, seems to be inevitable. To the North it would be a heavy blow and great discouragement, the consequences of which could only be averted by some very violent remedies. Separation without war is scarcely to be expected. The establishment of an independent Republic in the South may, indeed, be effected peaceably; but it is not, humanly speaking, within the limits of any probability that the diverse questions which will arise out of conflicting interests in regard to revenue and State and Federal rights can be settled without an appeal to arms. At the present minute there is nothing to induce a stranger to believe that an effectual resistance could be offered to a vigorous aggressive movement from the South, supposing the means to make it existed either in the adhesion or permission of the Border States. The North, however, is strong in its population, in its wealth, and in its calm. In the hands of the Border States are all the arbitraments of revolution or union, of war or peace. By an unmeaning euphemism the revolution of the South has been called Secession; but the confusion and mischief caused by the euphemistic timidity of statesmen disappear, when the acts of the South are tested by the standard applicable to revolutionary crises; and by that standard alone are those acts intelligible and coherent. Measured in that way, the seizure of property, the deeds and the language of the leaders of the movement, and the acts of the masses, can be properly estimated. Mr. Douglass, whose mental capacity is a splendid justification of his enormous political activity, and of a high political rank—unattached—is understood to be engaged on a vast system for establishing duties all over the North American continent in the nature of a Zollverein. It is his opinion that the North, in case of separation, must fight the South on the arena of free trade; that the tariff must be completely altered; and that the duties must be lowered from point to point, in proportion as the South bids against the North for the commerce of Europe, till the reduction reaches such a point that the South, forced to raise revenue for the actual expenses of Government, and unable to struggle against the superior wealth of the North in such a contest, is obliged to come to an understanding with its powerful competitor, and to submit to a treaty of commerce which shall include all the States of the North American continent, from the Isthmus of Panama to the ice of the Arctic Seas. The Canadas are, of course, included in such a project; indeed, it is difficult to say where the means of escaping from their present embarrassment will not be sought by the leading statesmen of America. But on one point all are agreed. Whatever may happen, the North will insist on a Free Mississippi. It is the very current of life for the trade of myriads of people hundreds of miles from New Orleans. If Louisiana, either as sovereign State or representative agent of the Southern Confederation, attempts to control the navigation of that river, we shall see a most terrible and ruinous war. Let England look to the contingencies.
APRIL, 5.—One month and one day have elapsed since Mr. Lincoln and his Cabinet were installed at Washington. Long previous to their accession to power or rather to office, the revolution of the South had assumed the aspect of an independent Government. When the new Administration tried to direct the horses’ heads, they found the reins were cut, and all they could do was to sit on the State coach, and take their chance of falling in a soft place, or of the fiery steeds coming to a standstill from exhaustion. A month ago and the State Treasury was nearly exhausted; only some £370,000 was forthcoming to meet demands and requirements four times as large. The navy was scattered all over the world at stations by no means readily accessible, the army posted along frontier lines, between which and the Northern States was interposed the expanse of the Southern Confederation; the officers disaffected to the Government, or at all events so well affected to their individual sovereign States as to feel indisposed to serve the United States; the whole machinery of Government in the hands of the revolutionary leaders, every trace of Federal existence erased in the South, wiped away by acts which, unless justified by successful revolt, would be called treasonable, or by force or stratagem, and only two forts held on the seaboard, weekly garrisoned, and unhappily situated with reference to operations of relief. In addition to these sources of weakness, came the confusion and apprehension caused by divided counsels, want of cohesion, the disorders of a violent national contest, mistrust of adequate support, and above all the imperious necessities of the place-seekers, whose importunate requisitions distracted the attention of the Government from the more important business which presented itself for adjustment. It was, of course, necessary to fill the posts which were occupied by enemies with men devoted to the interests of a Government which could little brook any indifference or treacherous tendencies on the part of its subordinates. But had the Administration been as strong in all respects as any United States Government ever could or can hope to be, in reference to such emergencies as the present, it really could have done little except precipitate a civil war, in which the Border States would have arranged themselves by the side of the Cotton States. A considerable portion of the North would have been hostile to coercion, and the theories which have been propounded with much apparent approbation respecting the actual uses of Government, its powers and jurisdiction, show that European doctrines on such points are not at all accepted by statesmen, politicians and jurists in North America. Without the means of enforcing an authority which many of its own adherents, and most of the neutral parties denied to it, Mr. Lincoln’s Administration finds itself called upon to propound a policy and to proceed to vigorous action. The demand is scarcely reasonable. The policy of such men suddenly lifted to the head of affairs, which they cannot attempt to guide, must be to wait and watch, and their action must be simply tentative as they have no power to put forth with moderate hope of success any aggressive force.
Be satisfied of this—the United States Government will give up no power or possession which it has at present got. By its voluntary act it will surrender nothing whatever. No matter what reports may appear in the papers or in letters, distrust them if they would lead you to believe that Mr. Lincoln is preparing either to abandon what he has now, or to recover that which he has not.
The United States Government is in an attitude of protest; it cannot strike an offensive blow. But, if any attack is made upon it, the Government hopes that it will be strengthened by the indignation of the North and West, to such an extent that it cannot only repel the aggression, but possibly give a stimulus to a great reaction in its favor.
On these principles Fort Sumter and Fort Pickens are held. They are claimed as Federal fortresses. The Stars and Stripes still float over them. Whatever may be said to the contrary, they will remain there till they are removed by the action of the Confederate States. The Commissioners of Mr. Jefferson Davis’s Government “have reason to say that if any attempt be made to throw reënforcements into Fort Pickens, unless they receive previous notice of it as promised, it will be a breach of good faith.” From all I can learn, no intention of strengthening the fort is at present entertained; but it may be doubted if the attempt would not be made should any favorable opportunity of doing so present itself. All “the movements of troops,” of which you will see accounts, are preparations against—not for—aggression. At most they amount to the march of a few companies and guns to various forts, now all but undefended. Fort Washington, of which I shall have a few words to say hereafter, was till lately held by a very inadequate force. As a member of the Cabinet said to me, “I could have taken it last week with a little whisky,” that potent artillery being applied to the weak defences of the aged Irish artilleryman who constituted “the garrison.” The “formidable military force concentrated in Washington,” of which you may read in the American journals, consists of about 700 men of all arms, as far as I can see, and four brass field guns. There is a good deal of drumming, fifing, marching, and music going on daily. I look on and see a small band in gay uniforms, a small body of men in sombre uniforms, varying from fifteen to thirty rank and file, armed, however, with excellent rifles, and a very large standard, pass by; and next day I read that such and such a company had a parade, and “attracted much admiration by their efficient and soldierly appearance, and the manner in which,” &c. But these military companies have no intention of fighting for the Government. Their sympathies are quite undetermined. Formidable as they would be in skirmishing in the open country, they would be of comparatively little use against regular troops at the outset of the contest, as they have never learnt to act together, and do not aspire to form even battalions. But their existence indicates the strong military tendencies of the people, and the danger of doing anything which might turn them against the Government. Mr. Lincoln has no power to make war against the South: the Congress alone could give it to him; and that is not likely to be given, because Congress will not be assembled before the usual time, unless under the pressure of and imperious necessity.
Why, then, hold these forts at all? Why not give them up? Why not withdraw the garrison, strike the flag, and cease to keep up a useless source of irritation in the midst of the Southern Confederation? The answer to these questions is: These forts are Federal property. The Government does not acknowledge the existence of any right on the part of the people of the States to seize them as appertaining to individual States. The forts are protests against the acts of violence to which the Federal authority has yielded elsewhere. They are, moreover, the points d’appui, small as they are, on which the Federal Government can rest its resistance to the claims of the Southern Confederation to be acknowledged as an independent republic. If they were surrendered without attack, or without the existence of any pressure arising from the refusal of the Southern authorities to permit them to get supplies, which is an act of war, the case of the United States Government would be, they consider, materially weakened. If it be observed that these forts have no strategic value, it may readily be replied that their political value is very great. But, serious as these considerations may be, or may be thought to be, with respect to foreign relations, there are in reference to domestic politics still more weighty inducements to hold them. The effect produced in the North and Northwest by an attack on the forts while the United States flag is floating over them, would be as useful to the Government at Washington as the effect of abandoning the forts or tamely surrendering them would be hurtful to them in the estimation of the extreme Republicans. A desperate attack, a gallant defense, the shedding of the blood of gallant men, whose duty it was to defend that intrusted to their keeping, and who yielded only to numbers—the outrage on the United States flag—would create an excitement in the Union which the South, with all its determination and courage, is unwilling to provoke, but which the Government would be forced to use in its own service. Such an event must lead to war, a very terrible and merciless war, and both parties pause before they resort to that court of arms. Unless the Border States join the South, Mr. Jefferson Davis could scarcely hope to carry out the grand projects which are attributed to his military genius of marching northward, and dictating terms on their own soil to the Republicans. He could scarcely venture to leave the negro population unguarded in his rear, and his flanks menaced by the sea-born northerners on the one side, and by such operations as the water-sheds significantly indicate on the other. It is idle to speculate on the incidents of that which may never occur, and which, occurring, may assume the insignificant aspect of border skirmishes, or the tremendous proportions of a war of races and creeds, intensified by the worst elements of servile and civil conflict. The Government of Mr. Lincoln hope and believe that the contest may be averted. The Commissioners of the South are inclined to think, also, there will be a peaceful solution, obtained, of course, by full concession and recognition. But inaction cannot last on the part of the South. Already they have begun the system of coercion. The supplies of the garrison at Sumter will be cut off henceforth, if they are not already forbidden. They do not fear the moral effect of this act, for some of their leading men actually believe that nothing can stop the progress of a movement which will, they fondly think, absorb all the other States of the Union, and leave the New England States to form an insignificant republic of its own, with a possible larger destiny in Canada. Their opponents in the North are as fully satisfied that the direst Nemesis will fall on the Montgomery Government in the utter ruin of all their States the moment they are left to themselves.
The Government is elated at the success of the loan, and Mr. Chase has taken high ground in refusing offers made to him yesterday, and in resolving to issue Government securities for the balance of the amount required to complete the amount. Mr. Forsyth, one of the Southern Commissioners, who has just returned from New York here, is equally satisfied with the temper of parties in that city, and seems to think that the New Yorkers are preparing for a secession. But, though States may be sovereign, it has never been ascertained that cities or portions of States are so, and in the western and northern portions of the State of New York there is a large agricultural population, which, with the aid of Government, would speedily suppress any attempt to secede on the part of the city, if men are to be believed who say they know the circumstances of the case. Virginia is claimed by both sides, but accounts this morning are to the effect that the Secessionists have been defeated on a division by a vote of two to one in favor of the Union; and although General Houston appears to be forced to accept the situation for a time, there are many who think he will organize a strong reaction against the dominant Secessionists.
Whatever may be these result of all the diverse actions, the Great Republic is gone! The shape of the fragments is not yet determined any more than their fate. They may reunite, but the cohesion can never be perfect. The ship of the State was built of too many “platforms,” there were too many officers on board, perhaps the principles of construction were erroneous, the rigid cast-iron old constitution guns burst violently when tried with new projectiles—any way, those who adhere with most devotion to the vessel, admit that it is parted right amidships, and that its prestige has vanished. The more desperate of these would gladly see an enemy, or go out of their way to find one, in the hope of a common bond of union being discovered in a common animosity and danger.
The naval preparations, of which you will hear a good deal, are intended to make good existing deficiencies and to meet contingencies. At any other time the action of Spain in St. Domingo would create a cry for war. Now all the Federal Government can do is to demand and receive explanations. In reply to Mr. Seward’s inquiries, the Spanish Minister has possibly stated that the recent events in St. Domingo have been caused by the acts and threats of Hayti, which forced the Dominicans to call in the aid and claim the protection of Spain. There have been several attempts from time to time to induce France to assume the dominion of its former possession, and it is not unlikely that an excellent understanding exists between the Court of Madrid and the Emperor Napoleon in reference to the subject. The report that the Mexicans have made, or contemplate making, an attack on Texas, is scarcely worthy of credence.
As to the Morrill tariff, I can only repeat what I have already said. It must be borne till results show that it cannot be persisted in. Then only will it be repealed or modified. The theory of the Government is, that the United States always takes far more from Europe than it can pay for. “If the revenue is collected, there is no ground for complaint. The English and French manufacturer will be satisfied, as well as the northern population. If the revenue is not collected, then the tariff must be repealed, and that will be done within the year, if the mischief is serious.” Birmingham, Wolverhampton, and Manchester must make the best they can out of the doctrine.