The Civil War in America / Fuller's Modern Age, August 1861

by Sir William Howard Russell

LETTER III.

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1861.

THE critical position of the Federal Government has compelled its members to preserve secrecy. Never before under any Administration was so little of the councils of the Cabinet known to the public, or to those who are supposed to be acquainted with the opinions of the statesmen in office. Mr. Seward has issued the most stringent orders to the officers and clerks in his department to observe the rules, which heretofore have been much disregarded, in reference to the confidential character of State papers in their charge. The sources of the fountain of knowledge from which friendly journalists drew so freely are thus stopped without fear, favor, or affection, toward any. The result has been much irritation in quarters where such “interference” is regarded as unwarrantable, or, at least, as very injurious. The newspapers which enjoyed the privilege of free access to despatches are hatching canards, which they let fly along the telegraph wires with amazing productiveness and fertility of conception and incubation. Hence the monstrous and ridiculous rumors which harden into type everyday—hence the clamors for “a policy,” and hence the contending accusations that the Government is doing nothing, and that it is also preparing to plunge the country into civil war. Each member of the Cabinet has become a Burleigh, every shake of whose head perplexes New York with a fear of change; every Senator is watched by private reporters, who trace “the day’s disasters in his morning’s face.” If a weak company of artillery is marched on board a ship, its movements are chronicled in columns of vivid description, and its footsteps are made to sound like the march of a vast army. The telegraph from Washington has learnt its daily message about Fort Sumter and Fort Pickens by heart, and the world has been soothed daily by the assurance that General Braxton Bragg is ready, and that the South Carolinians can no longer be restrained. But there is always a secret understanding that Generals Bragg and Beauregard will be more ready still the next day, and that the people will be more unrestrainable by next telegram. When I landed in New York, the first news I learnt was that Fort Sumter would be evacuated next day; and if not, that the supplies would be cut off, and that the garrison would be starved out. I have learnt how to distrust prophecy, and I am going South in the hope that the end is not yet. The Southern Commissioners state that the Government here has promised them that no efforts shall be made to reënforce Fort Pickens without previous notice to them—a very singular promise. The Government, however, denies that it has been in communication with them. Fort Sumter must be considered as gone, for there is no disposition, apparently, on the part of the Government to hazard the loss of life and great risk which must inevitably attend any attempt to relieve or carry off the garrison, now that the channels are under the fire of numerous heavily armed batteries, which the people of South Carolina were permitted to throw up without molestation. The operations of a relieving force would have to be conducted on a very large scale by troops disembarking on the shores and taking the batteries in reverse, in conjunction with an attack from the sea; and, after all, such an expedition would be futile, unless it were intended to occupy Charleston, and try the fortune of war in South Carolina—an intention quite opposed to the expressions and, I believe, the feelings of the Cabinet of Washington, not to speak of the people of the Border States and of large remnants of the Union. From your correspondent at New York you will receive full particulars of the movements of troops, and of the naval preparations which are reported in the papers, which create more curiosity than excitement among the people I meet. My task must be to describe what I see around me.

It may be as well to state in the most positive terms that the reports which have appeared in the American papers of communications between the English Minister and the American Government on the subject of a blockade of the Southern ports, are totally and entirely destitute of foundation. No communication of any kind has passed between Lord Lyons, on the part of the English Government, and Mr. Seward, or any one else, on behalf of the Government at Washington. It would be a most offensive proceeding to volunteer any intimation of the course to be pursued by a European Power respecting a contingency of action on the part of the United States; nor would it be necessary, in case a blockade were declared, to formulate a supererogatory notice that it must be such a blockade as the law of nations recognizes. The importance of a distinct understanding on that point is all the greater in connection with the stories which are afloat that the naval preparations of the hour are intended to afford the Federal Government the means of blockading the mouths of the Mississippi and the Southern ports, with the object of collecting the Federal revenue. If anything is clearer than another, in the doubt and perplexity which prevail, it is that the Government will do nothing whatever to precipitate a conflict. It would ill become me, in such a crisis, to hazard any authoritative statements as to the conduct of the Administration under the very great variety of complications which may arise hereafter. Of this, however, be assured, not a ship, or a gun, or a man will be directed to make any attack, or to begin an offensive movement against the Confederate States. If any promise was made by the Buchanan Administration to inform the members of the Southern Government or its representatives of their course of action, it will not be considered binding on the consciences of Mr. Lincoln’s Cabinet, composed as it is of men who look on their predecessors as guilty of treason to the State. An attempt may be made to reënforce Fort Pickens, and neither that nor any position occupied by the Federal authorities will be voluntarily abandoned.

Once for all, let it be impressed on the minds of the English people that whatever reports they hear, and however they may come—no matter whence, or in what guise—there is no truth in them if they indicate the smallest intention on the part of Mr. Lincoln to depart from the policy indicated in his Inaugural Address. As strongly as words can do it, I repeat that the forces which have been assembled are only intended for the reënforcement of the strong places at Tortugas and Key West, which have been left short of every necessary of occupation and defence, and for the establishment of posts of observation, which are essential in case of hostility and to guard against surprise or treachery. I have dwelt in previous letters on the obvious policy of the Government of the United States, and I beg your readers to have firm faith that there will be no departure from it. By concentrating forces at Key West and Tortugas very valuable political results are obtained in face of the present disputes, and material strategical advantages in case those disputes should lead to a rupture, which will not be initiated by the Cabinet at Washington. These places are within a few hours’ sail of the coast; they are healthy, and can be easily supplied, as long as the United States fleet can keep the sea and cover the movements of its transports. Their occupation in force cannot be taken as an act of open war, while it is undoubtedly an alarming menace, which will keep the Confederates in a state of constant apprehension and preparation, leading to much internal trouble and great expense. By a confusion of metaphor which events may justify, the eye to watch may be turned into an arm to strike.

The Southern Commissioners are still here, but they are still unable to procure even a semi-official recognition of their existence, and all their correspondence has been carried on through one of their clerks.

It is, perhaps, not necessary to add that Mr. Seward has no intention of resigning, as has been stated, and that there is no dissention in the Cabinet.

LETTER IV.

Norfolk, Va., April, 15, 1861.

SUMTER has fallen at last. So much may be accepted. Before many hours I hope to stand amid the ruins of a spot which will probably become historic, and has already made more noise in the world than its guns, gallant as the defence may have been. The news will produce an extraordinary impression at New York—it will disconcert stock-jobbers, and derange the most ingenious speculations. But, considerable as may be its results in any part of the Union, I venture to say that nowhere will the shock cause such painful convulsions as in the Cabinet at Washington, where there appeared to exist the most perfect conviction that the plan for the relief of Sumter could not fail to be successful, either through the force of the expedition provided for that object, or through the unwillingness of the leaders at Charleston to fire the first shot, and to compel the surrender of the place by actual hostilities. The confidence of Mr. Seward in the strength of the name and of the resources of the United States Federal Government must have received a rude blow; but his confidences are by no means of a weakly constitution, and it will be long ere he can bring himself to think that all his prophecies must be given up one after another before the inexorable logic of facts, with which his vaticinations have been in “irrepressible conflict.” It seems to me that Mr. Seward has all along undervalued the spirit and the resolution of the Southern Slave States, or that he has disguised from others the sense he entertains of their extent and vigor. The days assigned for the life of Secession have been numbered over and over again, and Secession has not yielded up the ghost. The “bravado” of the South has been sustained by deeds which render retreat from its advanced position impossible. Mr. Seward will probably find himself hard pushed to maintain his views in the Cabinet in the face of recent events, which will, no doubt, be used with effect and skill by Mr. Chase, who is understood to be in favor of letting the South go as it lists without any more trouble, convinced as he is that it is an element of weakness in the body politic, while he would be prepared to treat as treason any attempts in the remaining States of the Union to act on the doctrine of secession. But the Union party must now prevail. As yet I do not know whether the views I expressed relative to the destination of the greater part of the troops and stores sent from the North were correct, for it cannot be learned how many ships were off Sumter when it surrendered; but, notwithstanding what has occurred, I reiterate the assertion that the Washington Cabinet always said and say they had no intention to provoke a conflict there, and that had the authorities at Charleston continued their permission to the garrison to procure supplies in their markets, there would have been no immediate action on their part to precipitate the fight, though they were determined to hold it and Fort Pickens, as well as Tortugas and Key West, and to victual and strengthen the garrison of the former as soon as they were able. Fate was against them. The decision and power of their opponents were against them. But their defence will be that they could not do anything till they got troops, and ships, and munitions of war together, and that they did as much as they could in a month. Sumter, in fact, was a mouse in the jaws of the cat, and the moment an attempt was made to release the prey by external influence, the jaws were closed and the mouse disposed of. The act will produce, I believe, in spite of what I see, a very deep impression throughout all the States, and will tend to bring about an immediate collision between the high-minded parties on both sides. When Mr. Lincoln came into office it was discovered that a promise had been made by outgoing members of the preceding government to surrender the Southern forts. The promise was ignored by the incoming ministry. The Southern Commissioners insist on it that, apart from the compact of Mr. Buchanan’s Cabinet, a pledge had been given to the South that no attempt would be made to reënforce the forts without notice to the Government at Montgomery; and so far as can be ascertained the authorities at Washington did cause to be conveyed to the Southern Confederation the expression of their intention to victual Sumter: but whether they do so in respect to their pledge, if it existed, or in consequence of the decision at Charleston to prevent the issuing of further supplies to the garrison, is uncertain. The withdrawal of the permission to market was all but an act of war. If the United States Government would act on the hypothesis that the Southern Confederation was an independent power, it would surely have considered the proceeding as a prelude to immediate hostility. But the course thus adopted arose out of the preparations made by the United States Government in fitting out expeditions, the object of which was scarcely dubious. The Commissioners of the Southern States at Washington, never acknowledged, at last met with a decisive rebuff just as Virginia saw her representatives from the Convention on the way to ask Mr. Lincoln to explain his intentions. The Commissioners were given to understand that their presence was useless, and that the forts would be reënforced; and on the intelligence thus furnished to the Government at Montgomery it was resolved to act by summoning Major Anderson to surrender before succor could arrive, and in event of refusal by compelling him to yield in the sight of the would-be relieving squadron. As soon as the Commissioners found that Mr. Lincoln had made his decision, they departed in no very yielding temper, and washed their hands in a valedictory paper of the results. It was my intention to have left Washington early in the week, and to have reached Charleston before these gentlemen had departed, but the heavy storms and floods which washed away part of the railway between Washington and Richmond at the other side of the Potomac prevented my departure, and not only arrested the mails from the South and the journey of the Virginian delegates for several days, but obliged the Commissioners to take the round-about course by rail to Baltimore, thence by steamer to Norfolk, Virginia, and then on by rail to Charleston, which I am now pursuing one day later.