[224] It would unnecessarily weary the reader to detail these raids at any length. Some of them were against other and hostile branches of the very Christian tribes that had fought at the Bridge and at Boweib on the Moslem side; some were to obtain supplies for the army, which was reduced at one time to great extremities for food; but most were for the double purpose of striking terror into the people, and at the same time gaining plunder. On one occasion the Beni Bekr ransomed a great company of prisoners from the Taghlib tribe, by relinquishing their own share of the booty. One of these minor actions is called ‘Anbâr the second’; and another ‘Allîs the second.’
A somewhat remarkable incident shows that Omar had spies in all quarters, and also that he dreaded the outbreak of ancestral quarrels between the different Arab tribes. The garrison of Siffîn, in Mesopotamia, composed of the Beni Namr and Taghlib, were attacked by the Beni Bekr and driven out of their stronghold, over the banks into the river. In their terror they cried out, We are drowning! and the Beni Bekr answered, Yea, drowning for burning! in allusion to an occasion in former days in which the Beni Taghlib had burned alive some of the Beni Bekr tribe. Omar, learning the circumstance from his spies, demanded what this threat—founded on a pre-Islamite feud, and therefore alien from the spirit of Islam—should mean. He was told that the threat was used, not in a spirit of retaliation, but of punishment and example, and in the interests of the faith; and the explanation was accepted.
[225] There is a tradition that the reason given by Omar why he set aside both Khâlid and Mothanna was ‘his fear lest their influence should become too great, and lead the people to put their trust in them instead of in the Lord of Hosts.’ There may, no doubt, have been some jealousy of Khâlid’s influence; but there could hardly have been any of Mothanna’s. Again, Omar is said to have changed his mind both in respect of Mothanna, on learning his gallant stand at the Bridge, and in respect of Khâlid, on account of his bravery at Kinnisrin—adding that, in both, Abu Bekr had proved a better judge of character than he. Whatever foundation there may be for the tradition so far as Khâlid is concerned, it can hardly apply to Mothanna, for it was not till after the battle of the Bridge that Omar finally superseded him, by appointing Sâd to the supreme command.
[226] The ancient Gaulonitis.
[227] The landscape between the Haurân and the Jordan is well described by Laurence Oliphant, Land of Gilead, p. 62. See also Chesney’s Euphrates Expedition (London, 1850), vol. i. pp. 512–515, where he speaks of the nightingale in these parts.
[228] The effect of Omar’s order depends on the nature of Abu Bekr’s commission. It is usually held that the commanders of the several columns were at the first independent, and that Khâlid held a similar position in respect of the Irâc contingent, till on the eve of the great engagement, he persuaded the rest to come temporarily under his supreme command—a fact, of course, unknown to Omar when issuing his order of deposition. If so, Abu Obeida would, by Omar’s order, have simply superseded Khâlid in taking command of the Irâc troops in addition to his own. On the other hand, it is held by some that the commission given by Abu Bekr to Khâlid was that of generalissimo; and that to this supreme command Abu Obeida succeeded, in addition to that of his own proper column and of Khâlid’s. This is the more probable, since Abu Obeida was certainly recognised thereafter as commander-in-chief in Syria. It is, however, inconsistent with the story of separate commands; but, see previous note, p. 111.
Tradition is still very shifty and uncertain. According to Belâdzori, it is even held that the order of supersession was not received till the siege of Damascus; but this seems improbable.
[229] It is said by some that Abu Obeida, though he received the order on the Yermûk, yet held it back till after the siege of Damascus. But this is out of the question. Had Abu Obeida not been supreme on that occasion, Damascus would not have been allowed to capitulate. It was with difficulty that Khâlid, even in his subordinate position, was prevented from treating the city as taken by storm, which he certainly would have done had he been supreme; and in that case all the property, as well as the inhabitants and buildings, would have been at the mercy of the captors.
[230] Gen. xv. 2. ‘The steward of my house is this Eliezer of Damascus.’
[231] The window from which St. Paul was let down, no doubt stood in one of these military structures, or casemates, upon the wall. Tradition still points out the window, ‘although the wall itself has been several times rebuilt.’ (Robinson’s Palestine, p. 466. Damascus is described, pp. 443 et seq.) There is an admirable account of the city given by H. von Kremer, in his vol. i. ch. iv., Damascus und der Hof der Omejjaden.