The Eastern gateway here mentioned is built of great masses of reddish sandstone, well polished. The arch is rounded, and there are two portals at the sides for foot-passengers. The main archway, intended for camels, &c., is now closed. The ‘Straight street,’ only fifteen feet wide, still runs right across the city, from this gate to the Jâbia gate, on the west. There are several other similar gateways in the great wall.
[232] For the Eastern gate invested by Khâlid, see Von Kramer, p. 210. Amru sat before the Bâb Tûma, to the N.E.; Shorahbil before the Bâb Farâdîs, to the north; and Yezîd patrolled from ‘the Lesser Gate to the gate Al Heisan.’
[233] The length of the siege is variously given at seventy days by Tabari, and six months by Wâckidy. The latter, indeed, places the capitulation in autumn, a month or two before the battle of Câdesîya, which was fought in November; but this leaves too little time for intervening events. The order of events was as follows. The city was first invested probably early in the spring; it capitulated in the summer; then followed the battle of Fihl; after which Khâlid’s contingent was sent back to Irâc, and appeared on the field of Câdesîya just as the contest was proceeding.
[234] He is called by some Nastûs, by others Bahân. The latter is the name of the general who inflicted on Khâlid ibn Saîd his severe defeat.
[235] Von Kremer describes the moat surrounding the walls as still from ten to fifteen feet in breadth. It is filled with water from the Barada.
[236] Madzûr.
[237] The ordinary account is that Khâlid, hearing the merriment of the feast, stormed the city on his side, unknown to the rest of the army, and that the garrison, when overcome, hastened to conclude a capitulation with Abu Obeida on the other side. But this is incredible. When the victorious column, in possession of the eastern quarter, were pushing their way through the city, it would have been altogether too late. It is of course possible that Khâlid, knowing that the treaty was impending, sought thus to anticipate the consequences of capitulation, by which the city was lost as a prey, and its inhabitants as prisoners of war. On the other hand, some traditions ascribe the acceptance of the surrender and the treaty to Khâlid himself. But the account I have given is the most probable and consistent.
Later authorities tell of treachery on the part of a bishop, who, from the walls, held converse with Khâlid, and having obtained for himself terms, pointed out the place for an escalade, &c.; also that Khâlid was supplied with scaling ladders by a monastery in the Ghûta. Such tales rest generally on weak and unreliable authority; but as regards the last, the monks, we are told, obtained a permanent reduction of the land-tax for the service now rendered. (See Belâdzori, p. 121.)
[238] From every jarîb, or local acre.
[239] It has been supposed that the column of Khâlid had reached the Cathedral and taken possession of one half, before he was recalled, and hence this arrangement. But it is not so; the surrender of one half was stipulated irrespective of his attack, and (in conformity with the treaty in other matters) as a fair concession to the conquering army. Corresponding arrangements were made for the division of the churches in other cities of Syria, which capitulated without an assault; but it was only in Damascus that the difficulty as to disposing of the Cathedral occurred.