They drive in our Picquets now and then. They have a great superiority of Cavalry, but nothing of any consequence has taken place. But if the greatest part of their powder is not destroyed, we may expect something every day. I cannot think they will let Crawfurd with the advance Guard remain so near them. Their and our vedettes are 400 to 500 paces from each other and we overlook their camp, which is very extensive, I suspect more so than they have any occasion for, considering the number of men they have. They are quite up to all this sort of humbug. If our Portuguese do as we expect, we are not uneasy as to the result, and if we lick them what a glorious day for Old England! I like this place better than Fornos, though we are not very well off either, and have a large Brigade of Infantry with us in the town. I am very well, the only annoyance is my face, which as well as my lips always peel and are very sore. By the end of the campaign I daresay we may pass ourselves off for Portuguese Indians, or any other tawny gentry you please. Adieu, etc.
Francoso, July 9, 1810.
July 2.—Hardinge and myself left Francoso about 6 in the evening to visit the advanced guard and outposts of the Army under Br. Genl. Crawfurd stationed in front of Gallegos, in New Castile, with his Hd. Qrs. at Almeida, about 4 miles in the rear. We arrived late in the evening at Pinhel, where we remained the night. Next morning set out after breakfasting with our friend Major Murphy of the 88th, (the Bishop of Pinhel being absent from Pinhel,) having dined at Francoso the day we left it for Almeida, the direct road to which we missed, and proceeded by an almost impassable path down to the Coa, which here on either side presents a most formidable position, totally impracticable for cavalry and artillery except over the bridge and high road leading to Almeida from Freixedas, Guarda, Pinhel, etc. According to the reports of its whole course from its confluence into the Douro to near Alfaiates, with the exception of two leagues beyond Almeida towards its source, it presents, from the very great steepness and rocky soil of its banks, a most formidable barrier to any army attempting to advance towards Vizeu, Celorico, Guarda, or Francozo, from the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. It is, however, liable to be turned by Sabugal, or Castello Branco, and opposed to a superior army its great extent is a very serious inconvenience, as any part of the line being forced must oblige the rest to retire.
While Almeida, which is about a mile and a half from the river on the Spanish side, holds out, I consider any attack by that road as not to be feared. Though the greatest part of the descent to the bridge is out of sight of the town, the enemy’s movements would be very much impeded in attempting to advance. Considering all circumstances, the great superiority of the enemy and nature of a great part of our troops, I have much doubt in my own mind of any position being attempted to be defended on the Coa, as a general one for the Army, but this a few days must show, and I am no way in the secret.
We crossed the Coa at a very bad ford called Veia, about a mile below the bridge, and arrived at Almeida, waited on Governor Cox; and, after walking round the works (which from their nature I do not at all envy him the defence of, considering the troops he has, mostly Militia,) continued our march to Fort Conception to see our friend Lt. Col. Sutton, who had been appointed Governor, when there was an intention to defend it. But since the great superiority of the enemy rendered it impossible to attempt to relieve the brave Spaniards in Ciudad Rodrigo, it has been resolved to blow it up, and it has for that purpose been mined all round. When the enemy seriously advance this beautiful Fort will be entirely destroyed. It is a thousand pities. I never saw a more complete or perfect fortification with every part bomb-proof, even stabling for 200 horses. Its outworks are admirably adapted to defend the approaches, which are all round a perfect natural glacis to several hundred yards. Of the necessity of the measure I am no judge, but fear it will much vex the Spaniards.
We arrived about 3 o’clock at Almeida, and dined with Genl. Crawfurd, with whom after dinner we rode out to look at the French posts beyond the little river Azara, over which there is a bridge of stone leading to the village of Marialva, and about a mile beyond Gallegos. Along this line were about 3 squadrons of the German 1st Hussars doing the outpost duty, their reserves in Gallegos. I went down to the bridge and endeavoured to persuade two French Officers to come down and speak to me. They were, however, very shy, and only came near enough for me to tell them that some friends of theirs, who were taken prisoners near Chaves a year and a half ago, were well. I observed they were constructing a wooden bridge a short distance to the left of the former, and from the exhausted appearance of the Forage on the other side, their having removed the cars from blocking up the stone bridge, and certain reports of deserters, it appeared very probable they would drive in our posts next morning, the 4th July. They had there and near Carpio about 5 or 6 Regts. of Cavalry and some Infantry, 4 to 5000 men I should guess in all. Our Infantry, consisting of the 43rd, 52nd, Rifle Corps, and two Portuguese Caçadores Battns., one very good and the other very bad, were stationed in the woods in front of Alumeda, about 3 or 4 miles in our rear.
At daybreak they crossed the little river Azara over their two bridges, and drove in our Picquets. They had 12 squadrons and 2 Brigades of Infantry, but our three squadrons were supported by a troop of Horse Artillery, which kept them in check and enabled our little body to retreat in safety on the Infantry though close pressed and skirmishing very sharply the whole way. It was the prettiest thing, en fait de guerre, I ever saw. The retreat was very well conducted. Their Artillery could not come up till near the end of the affair, and ours killed a great many of their men and horses, while our Cavalry were in comparative safety. Their numbers enabled them constantly to turn our flanks, and the superiority of our horses as often to get out of the scrape.
A party of the German Hussars under Capt. Kranckenberg behaved particularly well, charging at the passage of a small bridge a very superior number of the enemy, though supported by four Squadrons within pistol shot on the other side. It was very well done. Two French Officers were severely wounded and some men, and one prisoner was taken, though, poor devil, he was covered with wounds, 6 in the head, and his arm nearly cut off, also run through the body, and wonderful to say, he is expected to recover. The French seemed much irritated at this check, and kept up a very brisk fire up the road we retreated by, within about 50 yards from us. Nor were they sparing in abuse, and confident of still cutting us off, when we arrived at our Infantry which checked them, and a Squadron of their 3rd Hussars coming unexpectedly on the 3rd P. Caçadores (an excellent Corps commanded by Lt.-Col. Elder) received a very warm salutation which dispersed them. The Battalion behaved very steadily and well, and give us hopes of the Portuguese troops, on whose conduct the issue of this Campaign must in a great measure depend.
The Division commenced its retreat towards Fort Conception covered by the Cavalry, whom I here quitted, having offered myself to act as aide-de-camp to Genl. Crawfurd. The Infantry returned in very good order through Alumeda towards Fort Conception, and General Carrera with his Spaniards, who were in our rear, by the fords of Algardon to a very strong position covering the roads that way. These Spaniards are remarkably fine men, about 3000 well clothed, though not uniformly, and armed. I did not, however, think much of their discipline or regularity. Hardinge placed them, and seemed to be much pleased with General Carrera’s appearance and manner.