The French gave up the pursuit about half a league from Fort Conception, and retired again to Gallegos, on this side of which place they established their vedettes, having attained, what I suppose was their intention, a new ground to forage on, and having reconnoitred our force, to ascertain whether or not Lord Wellington had come up with the army. Our loss was about 4 or 5 men wounded and as many horses. That of the French, so far as we could see, and have since heard from deserters, several Officers and about 30 or 40 men killed and wounded. After halting about two hours near the Fort, our advanced guard took up a position at Val de la Mula, on the Portuguese frontier, with the Cavalry about a league in front, leaving a space of about a league between their vedettes and ours. And this ended this little affair which Hardinge and myself had so much wished to see, and which was certainly very instructive. Au reste a great deal of firing to very little purpose. A strong proof of how ineffectual the skirmishing of Cavalry is, except to cover the retreat of larger bodies, and prevent the columns being fired into. Our people and theirs were constantly within 30 yards of one another firing with no effect, though neither party had any idea of fear. When it can possibly be avoided the less powder wasted this way the better. The best arm for Cavalry is the sword or sabre, a well broken horse and firm presence of mind, reserving the pistol or carbine merely for the purpose of vedettes, or covering some movement.
At Val de la Mula Col. Pakenham asked us to breakfast and afterwards to dinner, and during the whole of our stay we are much indebted to his civility, as also to Capt. Rowan and Wm. Campbell, brother to Augustus, who prevented our ever wanting a meal or forage for our horses during our stay. General Crawfurd was also very civil to us. While retreating he sent me with some letters to Governor Cox at Almeida, whom, however, I was fortunate enough to meet at Val de la Mula, which saved me a very tiresome ride, and enabled me to return immediately, but everything was over, and I was so tired that I was very glad to lay down in the guard-room of the Fort, which was evacuated, to take a nap, which was not of long duration, as I had taken possession of the mattress of a Spanish shepherdess of no very gentle nature, who was so clamorous and violent in claiming her property, that I was forced to yield it up for fear I might not escape so well from her gentle paws, as I had from the French. Besides, poor things, I could not but pity them. It was most distressing to see them abandoning their habitations, and flying away from the miscreants, loaded with what little property they could carry away, crying and lamenting, followed by their helpless children, while the men drove away their cattle, and all uncertain where they might find a place of safety. In Portugal the natural animosity which exists so violently on the frontiers, and which even the similarity of their misfortunes and distress cannot do away, they had but a dismal prospect of meeting with a friendly reception. I pitied them from my heart, to relieve was not in my power. How little does the independent happy English Peasant know how to value the peace and security in which he lives! And how would those miscreants who preach discontent and faction through the country, giving them ideas of wants and liberties which are incompatible with society and government, how would they blush if they were to witness the sufferings and oppression which these poor people undergo! They would see that in England alone the peasantry are now happy and free, and would see their own infamy in sowing the seeds of discord and civil dissension among that happy people, when every mind should be united and heart joined to resist the oppressor of mankind! If reform is necessary let us wait for moments of peace with foreign enemies, when we do not risk, by dividing amongst ourselves, the entire ruin of the most perfect fabric of government that ever existed, even with all its faults, and give every advantage to our enemies by exposing as some of our Senators do, by way of opposition to Ministers, or to get themselves in, our forces, intentions, weakness, faults, etc., etc., in fact, for the sake of a popular speech in the House, tell the enemy everything they ought most to conceal, even the stations and exact numbers of the troops, of ourselves, or of our allies. This conduct leads us half way to our ruin, and we shall repent it when it is too late.
On the 5th, early in the morning, Hardinge and myself rode out beyond Alumeda, towards Gallegos, till near the enemies posts, to see what damage we had done them the day before and what they were about. We found in the road two of their dead and some horses, evidently from the effects of our Artillery, as they were much mangled, and we also saw some more to the right and left of the road at a distance. A very large flight of vultures of very large size were flying about them, and on the ground, which added much to the disgust of the scene, and after ascertaining the positions of their vedettes, we hastened to return. Being but indifferently mounted, and at a great distance from our outposts, we were very much afraid of being cut off by some of their patrols, and, returning through Alumeda, I was just observing to Hardinge that we should look very foolish if we were to be taken, when I turned my head and saw a French Hussar close to us. Hardinge had not even his sabre, having broken it the day before, and I saw nothing was to be done but to charge him, for which purpose I drew my pistol and galloped at him, when he surrendered, a no very glorious prize, as his horse was so tired that he could not move out of a very slow pace, and it was with difficulty and anxiety we got him into one of our picquets. He was a French lad, and told me he had deserted that morning, owing to the ill-treatment of his chief, and the want of everything they experienced in their Camp, and said he intended to go to England and work at his trade, a cabinet maker, as he had a cousin there, whom he intended to enquire for at the Commune (police office), though he had not heard of him for 4 years. I have great doubts of his being a deserter at all, and rather think he was as much surprised to see us, as we were to see him. He is quite a Frenchman, and contradicted himself twenty times!
We arrived at our quarters at 8 o’clock, and breakfasted with Col. Pakenham. After which we set out, 5 in number, well armed and mounted, to reconnoitre the enemy on our left, and proceeded without meeting any as far as Villa de Porco and Barcilha, from the heights above which we distinctly saw with our glasses Ciudad Rodrigo, which was keeping up a very heavy fire, and defending itself as if it were manned by heroes. Let them now surrender when they may. They have done their duty, and it is heartbreaking to think we can in no way assist them.
At Barcilha our party divided. Hardinge, Col. Pakenham, and Capt. Cotton went by the right, and Capt. Shaw, A.D.C. to Genl. Crawfurd, and myself agreed to go and visit Villar de Ciervo, and all that line, and ascertain whether the French had occupied all those places, or Villar de la Egoa, where there are some excellent fords over the Agueda, and which, being in rear considerably of our left on the 4th, gave Genl. Crawfurd no small anxiety. We met nothing, and returned about 4 to dinner, having suffered only from the extreme heat, which fagged me a good deal, being rather bilious, and prevented my accompanying them in the evening, instead of which I paid a visit to my friends in the 52nd, whom I was very glad to see looking as well as ever I saw them at Shorncliff, though perhaps with less pipeclay.
Next day was spent nearly in the same way. In the morning we rode out reconnoitring to Alumeda, dined afterwards with General Crawfurd, and set off on our return to Pinhel, 4 leagues, where we arrived late at night and slept, and next day came home, after a most delightful trip, and having just seen what we wished and expected. The retreat of the advanced guard had for some days appeared inevitable, and it was to see how it would be conducted that we went over.
The desertion continues from the French in great numbers, 8 to 12 of a day while we remained with the advance guard, and they all agree in stating that their Army is badly off for provisions, and the foreigners much disgusted, and would desert in greater numbers but for the vigilant means that are taken to prevent. Junot and Ney with their Corps are before C. Rodrigo, and I believe also Masséna, as are also the traitors Alorna, Pampeluna, Sancos Mezeude, against whom no measures are taken by this Government, and we know they are supplied with money, etc., from their estates in this country, which are not sequestered or disturbed. So much for weakness and infatuation! The count Doidga(?) has been declared infamous and his offspring for three generations, and his property sequestered. He is a poor wretch and can do no harm, though not less a traitor, while these scoundrels, with arms in their hands, known traitors before the Prince embarked, and treated by him with great lenity, are suffered to attack their native country with impunity. It is most disgusting.
I do not think the French will attempt anything till C. Rodrigo falls, which, notwithstanding their heroic conduct, cannot be long delayed. It will enable the French to establish their magazines and hospital. What the plans for the Campaign are I know not. Everything promises a very warm one, and I confess I look with some anxiety to the conduct of the Portuguese troops, on whom much, nay everything, must depend. They promise well, it is true, in every respect, but still they are very young troops and never tried. The force against us is very superior. But on the other hand the greater must be the difficulty of supplying them and means of transport. We retire on our supplies while they advance from them. And everybody has great confidence both in Lord Wellington and Marshal Beresford, and if the native troops fight like men, I have not a doubt we shall succeed, though the loss must be inevitably great on both sides.
My own idea of their attack is that they will keep their principal Corps in our front, leave Regnier with his Corps, and keep Hill in check in the Alemtejo, while with a strong column they endeavour to force the passes near Castello Branco, or by Sabugal, endeavouring to unite near Thomar. By this means if Hill retires and crosses the Tagus, either at Villa Velha or Abrantes, the Alemtejo is left open, and we cannot but feel some anxiety for the Capital, or rather for the opposite side of the river, which would occasion great confusion. Hill must then defend the passage of the Tagus, which abounds in fords as low as Salvaterra, and also endeavour to check the enemy’s advance by the passes of Salhadas, etc., from Castello Branco or Abrantes, and if either of these movements of the enemy succeed, I should imagine the whole Army must fall back from the Upper Beira upon our works round Lisbon, that is Torres Vedras, Bucellas, etc., etc., for fear of its communications with Lisbon and our stores. Or if they do not attempt Alemtejo, I think they will attempt advancing in three columns by Castello Branco from Coria and Placencia, and from Guinaldo, etc., by Sabugal, and in our front by Celorico or Guarda, endeavouring to unite beyond the Sierra de Estrella. In this case we shall come into play immediately. Almeida, I think, they will merely mask by a strong Corps, and leave in their rear. If they succeed, the place must fall of course. If not, there is not force enough in it to annoy them. These are my own private opinions, and, from the very little means I have of information, must be considered as mere speculations, and as such, if erroneous, I may be excused, as I really know not how far they may agree with any others.