"From the standpoint of German interests," continued the Chancellor, "we have no objections to raise to it." No parliamentary reference was made to Morocco until March, 1905, when the Chancellor spoke of the approaching visit of the Emperor to Tangier, and it became evident that the Emperor and his advisers had come to the conclusion that, as France seemed about assuming a full protectorate over Morocco, as she had tried to do in Tunis, and that this, in accordance with French policy, would result in the exclusion of other nationals from commerce and the development of the country, Germany must take action. Prince von Bülow explained that "his Majesty had, in the previous year, declared to the King of Spain that Germany pursued no policy of territorial acquisition in Morocco." He continued:
"Independent of the visit, and independent of the territorial question, is the question whether we have economic interests to protect in Morocco. That we have certainly. We have in Morocco, as in China, a considerable interest in the maintenance of the open door, that is the equal treatment of all trading nations."
And he concluded by saying:
"So far as an attempt is being made to alter the international status of Morocco, or to control the open door in the economic development of the country, we must see more closely than before that our economical interests are not endangered. Our first step, accordingly, is to put ourselves into communication with the Sultan."
The visit came off as announced, and the Emperor, on arriving at Tangier, made a speech which caused a sensation in every diplomatic chancellery; indeed, in all parts of the world. The Emperor's speech, which was addressed to the German colonists on March 31, 1905, was as follows:—
"I rejoice to make acquaintance with the pioneers of Germany in Morocco and to be able to say to them that they have done their duty. Germany has great commercial interests there. I will promote and protect trade, which shows a gratifying development, and make it my care to secure full equality with all nations. This is only possible when the sovereignty of the Sultan and the independence of the country are preserved. Both are for Germany beyond question, and for that I am ready at all times to answer. I think my visit to Tangier announces this clearly and emphatically, and will doubtless produce the conviction that whatever Germany undertakes in Morocco will be negotiated exclusively with the Sultan."
The result of these unmistakable declarations was that the Sultan rejected proposals made to him by the French, and shortly afterwards, on the advice of Germany, came forward with suggestions for a European conference. M. Delcassé, the French Foreign Minister, opposed the proposal, and for a time war between France and Germany appeared inevitable; but France was not in a military position to ignore Germany's threatening language, M. Delcassé had to resign, the French Cabinet under M. Rouvier agreed to the conference, and it met at Algeciras in January, 1906. At the conference Great Britain, in consonance with the Entente, supported France; Austria adhered loyally to her Triplice engagements and proved the "brilliant second" to Germany the Emperor subsequently described her; Italy, on the other hand, gave her Teutonic ally only lukewarm support.
In fairness, however, should be quoted here the explanation of Italy's attitude given by Chancellor von Bülow when discussing the conference in Parliament next year. The impression is general, both in and out of Germany, that Italy is only a half-hearted political ally. It is based on the temperamental difference between the Latin and the Teutonic races, on the popular sympathy between the French and Italian peoples, and to the supposedly reluctant support lent by Italy to Germany during the critical time of the conference, the extra-tour, as Prince Bülow, using a metaphor of the ballroom, termed it, she took with France on that occasion. Prince Bülow now endeavoured to dissipate or correct the impression, at any rate, as regarded Algeciras. "Italy," he said,
"found herself in a difficult position there. Various agreements between Italy and France regarding Morocco had come into existence anterior to the conference, but Germany was satisfied that they were not inconsistent with Italy's Triplice engagements; in fact, Germany had, several years ago, officially told Italy she must use her own judgment and act on her own responsibility in dealing with her French neighbour in Africa and the Mediterranean."
When it was settled that a conference should be held, Italy, the Chancellor continued, "gave Germany timely information as to the extent to which her support of Germany could go, and as a matter of fact she supported Germany's views in the bank and police questions." So far the German official explanation, but the impression of Italian lukewarmness as a member of the Triplice has lost none of its universality thereby. How well or ill founded the impression is, it will be for the future to disclose.