William of Germany

by Stanley Shaw

The summoning of the conference had been a triumph for German diplomacy, but its results were disappointing to her; for while the proceedings showed that among all nations she could only fully rely on the sympathy and support of Austria, they ended in an acknowledgment by Germany of the special position of France in Morocco. The Act of Algeciras, which was dated April 7, 1906, stated that the signatory Powers recognized that "order, peace, and prosperity" could only be made to reign in Morocco

"by means of the introduction of reforms based upon the triple principle of the sovereignty and independence of his Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his States, and economic liberty without any inequality."

Then followed six Declarations regarding the organization of the police, smuggling, the establishment of a State bank, the collection of taxes, and the finding of new sources of revenue, customs, and administrative services and public works. For the organization of the police, French and Spanish officers and non-commissioned officers were to be placed at the disposal of the Sultan by the French and Spanish Governments. Tenders for public works were to be adjudicated on impartially without regard to the nationality of the bidder. The effect of the Act was to give international recognition to the special position of France and Spain in Morocco, while safeguarding the economic interests of other Powers.

The attitude taken up by Germany relative to the conference was set forth in a speech delivered by Prince von Bülow in the Reichstag in December, 1905. It was based, he explained, on the provisions of the Madrid Convention of 1880, in which all the Great Powers and the United States had taken part. The Chancellor claimed that Germany sought no special privileges in Morocco, but favoured a peaceful and independent development of the Shereefian Empire. He denied that German rights could be abrogated by an Anglo-French Agreement, and pointing out that Morocco in 1880 had granted all the signatories to the Madrid Convention most-favoured-nation treatment, claimed that if France desired to make good her demand for special privileges, she ought to have the consent of the special signatories to the Madrid pact. Germany had a right to be heard in any new settlement of Moroccan conditions; she could not allow herself to be treated as a quantité négligeable, nor be left out of account when a country lying on two of the world's greatest commercial highways was being disposed of. She had a commercial treaty with Morocco, conferring most-favoured-nation rights, and it did not accord with her honour to give way.

The Act of Algeciras, however, proved to have brought only temporary relief to European tension. Disturbances continued in Morocco, French subjects were murdered at Marakesch in 1907, and France occupied the province of Udja with troops until satisfaction should be given. Owing to riots at Casablanca in 1908, in which French as well as Spanish and Italian labourers were killed, she decided to occupy the place, and sent a strong military and naval force thither. A French warship bombarded the town, and by June, 1908, the French army of occupation numbered 15,000 men. Meanwhile internal commotions and intrigues had led to the deposition of Abdul Aziz and his replacement on the throne by his brother, Muley Hafid, with the support of Germany. France and Spain refused to recognize the new ruler unless he gave guarantees that he would respect the Act of Algeciras. Muley gave the required guarantees, and in March, 1909, France "declared herself wholly attached to the integrity and independence of the Shereefian Empire and decided to safeguard economic equality in Morocco." Germany on her side declared she was pursuing in Morocco only economic interests and, "recognizing that the special political interests of France in Morocco are closely bound up in that country with the consolidation of order and of internal peace," was "resolved not to impede those interests."

The German idea of not impeding French special political interests in Morocco was disclosed little more than two years later by the dispatch of the German gunboat Panther (of "Well done, Panther!" fame) on July 3, 1911, to the "closed" port of Agadir on the south Moroccan coast.

It was as dramatic a coup as the Emperor's visit to Tangier and caused as much alarm. The fact is that the march of French troops to Fez, which had taken place a few months before, convinced the Emperor and his Government that France, relying on the support of her Entente friend England, was bent on the Tunisification of Morocco. The Emperor, Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, and Foreign Secretary Kiderlen-Wæchter met at the Foreign Office on May 21st, and it was decided to send a ship of war, as at once a hint and a demonstration, to Agadir or other Moroccan port. Germany, of course, in accordance with diplomatic strategy, did not disclose the real springs of her action, though they must have been patent to all the world. She notified the Powers of the dispatch of her warship, explaining that the sending of the Panther, which "happened to be in the neighbourhood," was owing to the representations of German firms, as a temporary measure for the protection of German protégés in that region, and taken "in view of the possible spread of disorders prevailing in other parts of Morocco."

In France, on the other hand, it was asserted that the step was not in conformity with the spirit of the Franco-German Agreement of 1909, in which Germany resolved not to impede French special interests, that there were no Germans at Agadir, and that only nine months previously Germany had angrily protested at the calling of a French cruiser at the same port. The reference was to the visit of the French cruiser Du Chaylu in November, 1910, when the captain paid a visit to the local pasha. The German Foreign Secretary eventually said Germany had no objection to France using her police rights even in a closed port, and the admission was taken as a fresh renunciation on the part of Germany of any right to interference. Feeling ran high for a time both in France and Germany, while the German action added to the sentiment of hostility to Germany in England, and English political circles perceived in it a design on Germany's part of acquiring a port on the Moroccan coast. The word "compensation," which afterwards was to prove the solution of Franco-German differences was now first mentioned by Germany.

After England's determination to support France had been made plain by ministerial statements, the entire Morocco episode was closed by the Franco-German Agreement signed on November 5, 1911, as "explanatory and supplementary" to the Franco-German Agreement of 1909. The effect of the new Agreement was practically to give France as free a hand in Morocco as England has in Egypt, with the reservation that "the proceedings of France in Morocco leave untouched the economic equality of all nations." The Agreement further gives France "entire freedom of action" in Morocco, including measures of police. The rights and working area of the Morocco State bank were left as they stood under the Act of Algeciras. The sovereignty of the Sultan is assumed, but not explicitly declared. The compensation to Germany for her agreement to "put no hindrances in the way of French administration" and for the "protective rights" she recognizes as "belonging to France in the Shereefian Empire" was the cession by France to Germany of a large portion of her Congo territory in mid-Africa, with access to the Congo and its tributaries, the Sanga and Ubangi.

While the ground-idea of Germany's policy of economic expansion, and the source of all her trouble with England, is her insistence on her "place in the sun," the difficulty attending it for other nations is to determine the place's nature and extent, so that every one shall be comfortable and prosperous all round.