'May 20th.—One of our first troubles in debate was with regard to Layard's position at Constantinople, we being attacked by our own people on May 20th, who were more Gladstonian than Mr. Gladstone, as to the public insults which Layard had heaped upon him. Mr. Gladstone discussed with me what he was to say, and I have his note which, in addition to the statement about Layard, contains the curiously large one, "Statements made in Opposition not to be taken too literally when in office."'
Next day Mr. Gladstone wrote: "Thank you for the wonderful despatch you kindly made in obtaining for me the particulars about Layard's appointment."
The new Under-Secretary writes of these early days and first impressions:
'The general opinion of the party was that a Liberal policy was being pursued in foreign affairs, and that we had in the Foreign Office carried out that which the country intended us to do. We were able to bring about joint action on the part of Europe, and by means of it to settle the Greek and Montenegrin questions; and Goschen's presence at Constantinople was useful, inasmuch as he fully shared the views of the Liberal party upon foreign affairs, although he differed from them in domestic matters. On the other hand, the party were frightened about India, for, although Lord Lytton had been removed, the Government refused to make any sign as to the immediate evacuation of Kandahar, and, as a matter of fact, it was a long time before the Queen's resistance upon this point could be overcome. She no doubt felt more able to stand out against Hartington, whom she liked, than against Lord Granville.' [Footnote: See Life of Granville, vol. ii., p. 5.]
Lord Lytton's policy is thus described:
'The Allgemeine Zeitung for one of the last days of February contained a remarkable disclosure of the Government scheme for the settlement of Afghan affairs, which, so far as I know, did not appear in the English newspapers. It was quoted from some Indian paper, and revealed the fact that Persia was to occupy Herat, Kabul and Kandahar being capitals of two separate States. I did not at the time believe that it was possible that the Government should have absolutely reversed the past British policy by proposing the cession of Herat to Persia, but when I came into office at the end of April I made immediate inquiry into the subject, and found that it was true, and that they had done so. It was afterwards admitted.'
This proposal, however, had been declined by Persia. Before the fall of the Beaconsfield Ministry—
'The Amir of Afghanistan had written to tell us that he must be the friend of Russia, though he would be our friend too. We had replied (that is to say, the outgoing Government had replied) that Russia had sworn to us to have no dealings with Afghanistan, but that we should in any case evacuate his country in October without conditions, although he must respect our hold on Kandahar. Persia, it was clear from Lytton's despatches, had acted under Russian influence when declining Herat on our conditions.'
Under Lord Ripon, the policy of breaking up Afghanistan disappeared. But although there was a clear intention to abandon all claim to remain in Kandahar, yet the difficulty which attends any retrogressive movement in Central Asia was at this moment intensified, because Russia was threatening to advance on Merv, only 250 miles from Herat; and it seemed as if the Tsar's troops might occupy one Afghan stronghold at the moment when the Queen's forces withdrew from another.
'Lord Granville showed me, 15th May, some notes of language which he intended to hold to Russia as to Central Asia, very strong indeed upon the question of Merv; but the Cabinet afterwards took all this out, not a single man being found in the Cabinet to back up Lord Granville upon this question.'