In the succeeding months Sir Charles maintained a steady correspondence with the new Viceroy, Lord Ripon, who described his task as a hard one. "But I will do my best to perform it faithfully, and trust to you to back me up." In it appears the reason for Lord Ripon's unwilling acceptance of Abdurrahman, whom he called "the most Russian of the candidates" for the Afghan throne, but also the inevitable choice. If Lord Ripon broke with him, no hope appeared of establishing "even a semblance of order" before the Indian Government withdrew the troops, "as," said the Viceroy, "we must, because the service in Afghanistan, especially in winter, is so unpopular with the native troops as to be a serious difficulty if it should continue long. I hate the idea of leaving the Afghans a prey to anarchy, created to some extent, at all events, by our policy, and I shall do all I can to avoid it."
The Eastern Question was still dominant. The Treaty of Berlin had left three sources of discontent in the region affected by its provisions. In Bulgaria, Turkey complained that the Bulgarians had not fulfilled their promise to disarm and to raze fortifications. In Greece, evasive negotiations concerning the promised 'rectification of the frontier' were being deliberately spun out. On the Montenegrin border, territory surrendered and evacuated by the Turks had immediately been occupied by Mohammedan Albanians before the Montenegrin troops could reach it.
'On my first examination of the papers at the Foreign Office, I found that the black spot was Montenegro; the Roman Catholic Albanians on the frontier and the Mahomedan Albanians being equally determined not to become Montenegrin, and the Montenegrins insisting either on the line of the Treaty, which would give them some Mahomedan, or on the lines of the "Corti compromise," which would give them some Roman Catholic Albanian subjects.' [Footnote: The "Corti compromise" was so named after the Italian Ambassador at Constantinople, who advocated a frontier line more favourable to Turkey than those previously proposed (Sir Edward Hertslet's Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. iv.).]
Immediate steps were taken to remove the menace to European tranquillity which arose from what the Austrian Ambassador called "the Porte's long delays and tergiversation."
'May 1st.—Pressure at Constantinople had begun this day, the Cabinet having on the previous day approved an excellent and firm despatch from Lord Granville to Layard, really written from the first word to the last by Tenterden, containing the phrase, "While Her Majesty's Government wish to abstain from anything like menace, any intimation they give will be adhered to to the letter." The weak point about the despatch, however, was that the Russians had written us a despatch in the same sense, and that it might have been made to appear that we were only acting under Russian dictation. At the same time the despatch returned to the position of the circular bearing Lord Salisbury's name, which I have called the April 1st (1878) Circular, and set up that Concert of Europe which was destined to be kept together until the Greek and Montenegrin frontier questions had been settled….
'On May 3rd the Cabinet again considered our circular despatch (calling on the Powers to address an identic and simultaneous note to the Porte to fulfil its Treaty obligations as regards Greece, Montenegro, and Armenia) in its final form…. On May 4th I lunched with Lord Granville, and found that it was finally settled that Goschen would go as Ambassador to Constantinople and Edmond Fitzmaurice in Wolff's place.'
Meanwhile France was vigorously backing the new policy. Lord Granville was deeply engaged in trying to unite Germany with the Powers in carrying out concerted action, which was constantly evaded by Bismarck.
'May 7th.—On this day I had an opportunity of reading quietly a curious despatch of Odo Russell, dated April 29th, recounting the views of Prince Bismarck, who seemed to me to have been laughing at him. The Prince "is even more willing to give his support to any combined policy of England and France, as for instance in Egypt, because he looks upon an Anglo-French alliance as the basis of peace and order in Europe." [Footnote: This despatch is to be found in the Life of Granville, vol. ii., p. 211, where the date is given as May 1st.]
'On Sunday, May 9th, I had to dinner Léon Say, the new French Ambassador; Montebello, his first secretary, afterwards Ambassador at Constantinople; Lord Lyons and his secretary Sheffield; Lord Tenterden, my colleague at the Foreign Office; my secretary Murray; Harcourt, and C. E. D. Black, who the week afterwards became Harcourt's secretary on my recommendation. Léon Say brought with him from the French "bag" Gambetta's answer to my letter. Gambetta informed me that the French Government were unanimous in throwing over Waddington's compromise and giving Greece all that she had been intended to have; and Gambetta was in favour, and said that his Prime Minister' (M. de Freycinet) 'was in favour, of taking active steps to prevent further delay on the part of Turkey.' [Footnote:
"CHAMBRE DES DÉPUTÉS, "PARIS, "le 7 Mai, 1880.