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there is a jug on the ground) is. Both the knowledge of the ground as well as the knowledge of the non-existence of the jug arise there by the same kind of action of the visual organ, and there is therefore no reason why the knowledge of the ground should be said to be due to perception, whereas the knowledge of the negation of the jug on the ground should be said to be due to a separate process of knowledge. The non-existence of the jug is taken in the same act as the ground is perceived. The principle that in order to perceive a thing one should have sense-contact with it, applies only to positive existents and not to negation or non-existence. Negation or non-existence can be cognized even without any sense-contact. Non-existence is not a positive substance, and hence there cannot be any question here of sense-contact. It may be urged that if no sense-contact is required in apprehending negation, one could as well apprehend negation or non-existence of other places which are far away from him. To this the reply is that to apprehend negation it is necessary that the place where it exists must be perceived. We know a thing and its quality to be different, and yet the quality can only be taken in association with the thing and it is so in this case as well. We can apprehend non-existence only through the apprehension of its locus. In the case when non-existence is said to be apprehended later on it is really no later apprehension of non-existence but a memory of non-existence (e.g. of jug) perceived before along with the perception of the locus of non-existence (e.g. ground). Negation or non-existence (abhâva) can thus, according to Nyâya, generate its cognition just as any positive existence can do. Negation is not mere negativity or mere vacuous absence, but is what generates the cognition "is not," as position (bhâva) is what generates the cognition "it is."
The Buddhists deny the existence of negation. They hold that when a negation is apprehended, it is apprehended with specific time and space conditions (e.g. this is not here now); but in spite of such an apprehension, we could never think that negation could thus be associated with them in any relation. There is also no relation between the negation and its pratiyogi (thing negated—e.g. jug in the negation of jug), for when there is the pratiyogi there is no negation, and when there is the negation there is no pratiyogi. There is not even the relation of opposition (virodha), for we could have admitted it, if
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the negation of the jug existed before and opposed the jug, for how can the negation of the jug oppose the jug, without effecting anything at all? Again, it may be asked whether negation is to be regarded as a positive being or becoming or of the nature of not becoming or non-being. In the first alternative it will be like any other positive existents, and in the second case it will be permanent and eternal, and it cannot be related to this or that particular negation. There are however many kinds of non-perception, e.g. (1) svabhâvânupalabdhi (natural non-perception—there is no jug because none is perceived); (2) kâra@nânupalabdhi (non-perception of cause—there is no smoke here, since there is no fire); (3) vyâpakânupalabdhi (non-perception of the species—there is no pine here, since there is no tree); (4) kâryânupalabdhi (non-perception of effects—there are not the causes of smoke here, since there is no smoke); (5) svabhâvaviruddhopalabdhi (perception of contradictory natures—there is no cold touch here because of fire); (6) viruddhakâryopalabdhi (perception of contradictory effects—there is no cold touch here because of smoke); (7) virudhavyâptopalabdhi (opposite concomitance—past is not of necessity destructible, since it depends on other causes); (8) kâryyaviruddhopalabdhi (opposition of effects—there is not here the causes which can give cold since there is fire); (9) vyapakaviruddhopalabdhi (opposite concomitants—there is no touch of snow here, because of fire); (10) kâra@naviruddhopalabdhi (opposite causes—there is no shivering through cold here, since he is near the fire); (11) kâra@naviruddhakâryyopalabdhi (effects of opposite causes—this place is not occupied by men of shivering sensations for it is full of smoke [Footnote ref 1]).
There is no doubt that in the above ways we speak of negation, but that does not prove that there is any reason for the cognition of negation (heturnâbhâvasamvida@h). All that we can say is this that there are certain situations which justify the use (yogyatâ) of negative appellations. But this situation or yogyatâ is positive in character. What we all speak of in ordinary usage as non-perception is of the nature of perception of some sort. Perception of negation thus does not prove the existence of negation, but only shows that there are certain positive perceptions which are only interpreted in that way. It is the positive perception of the ground where the visible jug is absent that
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[Footnote 1: See Nyâyabindu, p. 11, and Nyâyamañjarî, pp. 53-7.]
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leads us to speak of having perceived the negation of the jug (anupalambha@h abhâva@m vyavahârayati) [Footnote ref 1].