The Nyâya reply against this is that the perception of positive existents is as much a fact as the perception of negation, and we have no right to say that the former alone is valid. It is said that the non-perception of jug on the ground is but the perception of the ground without the jug. But is this being without the jug identical with the ground or different? If identical then it is the same as the ground, and we shall expect to have it even when the jug is there. If different then the quarrel is only over the name, for whatever you may call it, it is admitted to be a distinct category. If some difference is noted between the ground with the jug, and the ground without it, then call it "ground, without the jugness" or "the negation of jug," it does not matter much, for a distinct category has anyhow been admitted. Negation is apprehended by perception as much as any positive existent is; the nature of the objects of perception only are different; just as even in the perception of positive sense-objects there are such diversities as colour, taste, etc. The relation of negation with space and time with which it appears associated is the relation that subsists between the qualified and the quality (vis'e@sya vis'e@sa@na). The relation between the negation and its pratiyogi is one of opposition, in the sense that where the one is the other is not. The Vais'e@sika sûtra (IX. i. 6) seems to take abhâva in a similar way as Kumârila the Mima@msist does, though the commentators have tried to explain it away [Footnote ref 2]. In Vais'e@sika the four kinds of negation are enumerated as (1) prâgabhâva (the negation preceding the production of an object—e.g. of the jug before it is made by the potter); (2) dhva@msâbhâva (the negation following the destruction of an object—as of the jug after it is destroyed by the stroke of a stick); (3) anyonyâbhâva (mutual negation—e.g. in the cow there is the negation of the horse and
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Nyâyabindu@tîkâ, pp. 34 ff., and also Nyâyamañjarî, pp. 48-63.]
[Footnote 2 Pras'astapâda says that as the production of an effect is the sign of the existence of the cause, so the non-production of it is the sign of its non-existence, S'rîdbara in commenting upon it says that the non-preception of a sensible object is the sign (li@nga) of its non-existence. But evidently he is not satisfied with the view for he says that non-existence is also directly perceived by the senses (bhâvavad abhâvo'pîndriyagraha@nayogyah) and that there is an actual sense-contact with non-existence which is the collocating cause of the preception of non-existence (abhâvendriyasannikar@so'pi abhâvagraha@nasâmagrî), Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 225-30.]
360
in the horse that of the cow); (4) atyantâbhâva (a negation which always exists—e.g. even when there is a jug here, its negation in other places is not destroyed) [Footnote ref 1].
The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices for the seeker of Salvation.
It is probable that the Nyâya philosophy arose in an atmosphere of continued disputes and debates; as a consequence of this we find here many terms related to debates which we do not notice in any other system of Indian philosophy. These are tarka, nir@naya, vâda, jalpa, vita@n@dâ, hetvâbhâsa, chala, jâti and nigrahasthâna.
Tarka means deliberation on an unknown thing to discern its real nature; it thus consists of seeking reasons in favour of some supposition to the exclusion of other suppositions; it is not inference, but merely an oscillation of the mind to come to a right conclusion. When there is doubt (sa@ms'aya) about the specific nature of anything we have to take to tarka. Nir@naya means the conclusion to which we arrive as a result of tarka. When two opposite parties dispute over their respective theses, such as the doctrines that there is or is not an âtman, in which each of them tries to prove his own thesis with reasons, each of the theses is called a vâda. Jalpa means a dispute in which the disputants give wrangling rejoinders in order to defeat their respective opponents. A jalpa is called a vita@n@dâ when it is only a destructive criticism which seeks to refute the opponent's doctrine without seeking to establish or formulate any new doctrine. Hetvâbhâsas are those which appear as hetus but are really not so. Nyâya sûtras enumerate five fallacies (hetvâbhâsas) of the middle (hetu): savyabhicâra (erratic), viruddha (contradictory), prakara@nasama (tautology), sâddhyasama (unproved reason) and kâlâtîta (inopportune). Savyabhicâra is that where the same reason may prove opposite conclusions (e.g. sound is eternal because it is intangible like the atoms which are eternal, and sound is non-eternal because it is intangible like cognitions which are non-eternal); viruddha is that where the reason opposes the premiss to be proved (e.g. a jug is eternal, because it is produced); prakara@nasama is that
___________________________________________________________________