The jîva in itself as limited by its avidyâ is often spoken of as pâramarthika (real), when manifested through the sense and the ego in the waking states as vyavahârika (phenomenal), and when in the dream states as dream-self, prâtibhâ@sika (illusory).
Prakâs'âtmâ and his followers think that since ajñâna is one there cannot be two separate reflections such as jîva and Îs'vara; but it is better to admit that jîva is the image of Îs'vara in the ajñâna. The totality of Brahma-cit in association with mâyâ is Îs'vara, and this when again reflected through the ajñâna gives us the jîva. The manifestation of the jîva is in the anta@hkara@na as states of knowledge. The jîva thus in reality is Îs'vara and apart from jîva and Îs'vara there is no other separate existence of
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Brahma-caitanya. Jîva being the image of Îs'vara is thus dependent on him, but when the limitations of jîva are removed by right knowledge, the jîva is the same Brahman it always was.
Those who prefer to conceive the relation as being of the avaccheda type hold that reflection (pratibimba) is only possible of things which have colour, and therefore jîva is cit limited (avacchinna) by the anta@hkara@na (mind). Îs'vara is that which is beyond it; the diversity of anta@hkara@nas accounts for the diversity of the jîvas. It is easy however to see that these discussions are not of much fruit from the point of view of philosophy in determining or comprehending the relation of Îs'vara and jîva. In the Vedânta system Îs'vara has but little importance, for he is but a phenomenal being; he may be better, purer, and much more powerful than we, but yet he is as much phenomenal as any of us. The highest truth is the self, the reality, the Brahman, and both jîva and Îs'vara are but illusory impositions on it. Some Vedântists hold that there is but one jîva and one body, and that all the world as well as all the jîvas in it are merely his imaginings. These dream jîvas and the dream world will continue so long as that super-jîva continues to undergo his experiences; the world-appearance and all of us imaginary individuals, run our course and salvation is as much imaginary salvation as our world-experience is an imaginary experience of the imaginary jîvas. The cosmic jîva is alone the awakened jîva and all the rest are but his imaginings. This is known as the doctrine of ekajîva (one-soul).
The opposite of this doctrine is the theory held by some Vedântists that there are many individuals and the world-appearance has no permanent illusion for all people, but each person creates for himself his own illusion, and there is no objective datum which forms the common ground for the illusory perception of all people; just as when ten persons see in the darkness a rope and having the illusion of a snake there, run away, and agree in their individual perceptions that they have all seen the same snake, though each really had his own illusion and there was no snake at all. According to this view the illusory perception of each happens for him subjectively and has no corresponding objective phenomena as its ground. This must be distinguished from the normal Vedânta view which holds that objectively phenomena are also happening, but that these
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are illusory only in the sense that they will not last permanently and have thus only a temporary and relative existence in comparison with the truth or reality which is ever the same constant and unchangeable entity in all our perceptions and in all world-appearance. According to the other view phenomena are not objectively existent but are only subjectively imagined; so that the jug I see had no existence before I happened to have the perception that there was the jug; as soon as the jug illusion occurred to me I said that there was the jug, but it did not exist before. As soon as I had the perception there was the illusion, and there was no other reality apart from the illusion. It is therefore called the theory of d@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâda, i.e. the theory that the subjective perception is the creating of the objects and that there are no other objective phenomena apart from subjective perceptions. In the normal Vedânta view however the objects of the world are existent as phenomena by the sense-contact with which the subjective perceptions are created. The objective phenomena in themselves are of course but modifications of ajñâna, but still these phenomena of the ajñâna are there as the common ground for the experience of all. This therefore has an objective epistemology whereas the d@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâda has no proper epistemology, for the experiences of each person are determined by his own subjective avidyâ and previous impressions as modifications of the avidyâ. The d@r@s@tis@r@s@tivâda theory approaches nearest to the Vijñânavâda Buddhism, only with this difference that while Buddhism does not admit of any permanent being Vedânta admits the Brahman, the permanent unchangeable reality as the only truth, whereas the illusory and momentary perceptions are but impositions on it.
The mental and physical phenomena are alike in this, that both are modifications of ajñâna. It is indeed difficult to comprehend the nature of ajñâna, though its presence in consciousness can be perceived, and though by dialectic criticism all our most well-founded notions seem to vanish away and become self-contradictory and indefinable. Vedânta explains the reason of this difficulty as due to the fact that all these indefinable forms and names can only be experienced as modes of the real, the self-luminous. Our innate error which we continue from beginningless time consists in this, that the real in its full complete light is ever hidden from us, and the glimpse
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