It is now time for us to examine once more the relation of dharmin, substance, and dharma, its quality or appearance.
Dharmin, or substance, is that which remains common to the latent (as having passed over or śānta), the rising (the present or udita) and the unpredicable (future or avyapadeśya) characteristic qualities of the substance.
Substance (take for example, earth) has the power of existing in the form of particles of dust, a lump or a jug by which water may be carried. Now taking the stage of lump for examination we may think of its previous stage, that of particles of dust, as being latent, and its future stage as jug as the unpredicable. The earth we see here to be common to all these three stages which have come into being by its own activity and consequent changes. Earth here is the common quality which remains unchanged in all these stages, and so relatively constant among its changes as particles, lump and jug. This earth therefore is regarded as the dharmin, characterised one, the substance; and its stages as its dharma or qualities. When this dharmin, or substance, undergoes a change from a stage of lump to a stage of jug, it undergoes what is called dharma-pariṇāma or change of quality.
But its dharma, as the shape of the jug may be thought to have itself undergone a change—inasmuch as it has now come into being, from a state of relative non-being, latency or unpredicability. This is called the lakshaṇa-pariṇāma of the dharma or qualities as constituting a jug. This jug is again suffering another change as new or old according as it is just produced or is gradually running towards its dissolution, and this is called the avasthā-pariṇāma or change of condition. These three, however, are not separate from the dharma-pariṇāma, but are only aspects of it; so it may be said that the dharmin or substance directly suffers the dharma-pariṇāma and indirectly the lakshaṇa and the avasthā-pariṇāma. The dharma, however, changes and the lakshaṇa-pariṇāma can be looked at from another point of view, that of change of state, viz. growth and decay. Thus we see that though the atoms of kshiti, ap, etc., remain unchanged, they are constantly suffering changes from the inorganic to plants and animals, and from thence again back to the inorganic. There is thus a constant circulation of changes in which the different atoms of kshiti, ap, tejas, vāyu and ākāśa remaining themselves unchanged are suffering dharma-pariṇāma as they are changed from the inorganic to plants and animals and back again to the inorganic. These different states or dharmas (as inorganic, etc.), again, according as they are not yet, now, or no longer or passed over, are suffering the lakshaṇa-pariṇāma. There is also the avasthā-pariṇāma of these states according as any one of them (the plant state for example) is growing or suffering decay towards its dissolution.
This circulation of cosmic matter in general applies also to all particular things, such as the jug, the cloth, etc.; the order of evolution here will be that of powdered particles of earth, lump of earth, the earthen jug, the broken halves of the jug, and again the powdered earth. As the whole substance has only one identical evolution, these different states only happen in order of succession, the occurrence of one characteristic being displaced by another characteristic which comes after it immediately. We thus see that one substance may undergo endless changes of characteristic in order of succession; and along with the change of characteristic or dharma we have the lakshaṇa-pariṇāma and the avasthā-pariṇāma as old or new, which is evidently one of infinitesimal changes of growth and decay. Thus Vācaspati gives the following beautiful example: “Even the most carefully preserved rice in the granary becomes after long years so brittle that it crumbles into atoms. This change cannot happen to new rice all on a sudden. Therefore we have to admit an order of successive changes” (Tattvavaivśāradī, III. 15).
We now see that substance has neither past nor future; appearances or qualities only are manifested in time, by virtue of which substance is also spoken of as varying and changing temporally, just as a line remains unchanged in itself but acquires different significances according as one or two zeros are placed on its right side. Substance—the atoms of kshiti, ap, tejas, marut, vyoman, etc., by various changes of quality appear as the manifold varieties of cosmical existence. There is no intrinsic difference between one thing and another, but only changes of character of one and the same thing; thus the gross elemental atoms like water and earth particles acquire various qualities and appear as the various juices of all fruits and herbs. Now in analogy with the arguments stated above, it will seem that even a qualified thing or appearance may be relatively regarded as substance, when it is seen to remain common to various other modifications of that appearance itself. Thus a jug, which may remain common in all its modifications of colour, may be regarded relatively as the dharmin or substance of all these special appearances or modifications of the same appearance.
We remember that the guṇas, which are the final substratum of all the grosser particles, are always in a state of commotion and always evolving in the manner previously stated, for the sake of the experience and final realisation of the parusha, the only object or end of the prakṛti. Thus the Bhāshya, III. 13, says: “So it is the nature of the guṇas that there cannot remain even a moment without the evolutionary changes of dharma, lakshaṇa and avasthā; movement is the characteristic of the guṇas. The nature of the guṇas is the cause of their constant movement.”
Although the pioneers of modern scientific evolution have tried to observe scientifically some of the stages of the growth of the inorganic and of the animal worlds into the man, yet they do not give any reason for it. Theirs is more an experimental assertion of facts than a metaphysical account of evolution. According to Darwin the general form of the evolutionary process is that which is accomplished by “very slight variations which are accumulated by the effect of natural selection.” And according to a later theory, we see that a new species is constituted all at once by the simultaneous appearance of several new characteristics very different from the old. But why this accidental variation, this seeming departure from the causal chain, comes into being, the evolutionists cannot explain. But the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala doctrine explains it from the standpoint of teleology or the final goal inherent in all matter, so that it may be serviceable to the purusha. To be serviceable to the purusha is the one moral purpose in all prakṛti and its manifestations in the whole material world, which guide the course and direction of the smallest particle of matter. From the scientific point of view, the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala doctrine is very much in the same position as modern science, for it does not explain the cause of the accidental variation noticed in all the stages of evolutionary process from any physical point of view based on the observation of facts.
But it does much credit to the Pātañjala doctrines that they explain this accidental variation, this avyapadeśyatva or unpredicability of the onward course of evolution from a moral point of view, that of teleology, the serviceability of the purusha. They found, however, that this teleology should not be used to usurp the whole nature and function of matter. We find that the atoms are always moving by virtue of the rajas or energy, and it is to this movement of the atoms in space that all the products of evolution are due. We have found that the difference between the juices of Coco-nut, Palm, Bel, Tinduka (Diospyros Embryopteries), Āmalaka (Emblic Myrobalan) can be accounted for by the particular and peculiar arrangement of the atoms of earth and water alone, by their stress and strain; and we see also that the evolution of the organic from the inorganic is due to this change of position of the atoms themselves; for the unit of change is the change in an atom of its own dimension of spatial position. There is always the transformation of energy from the inorganic to the organic and back again from the organic. Thus the differences among things are solely due to the different stages which they occupy in the scale of evolution, as different expressions of the transformation of energy; but virtually there is no intrinsic difference among things sarvaṃ sarvātmakaṃ; the change of the collocation of atoms only changes potentiality into actuality, for there is potentiality of everything for every thing everywhere throughout this changing world. Thus Vācaspati writes: “The water possessing taste, colour, touch and sound and the earth possessing smell, taste, colour, touch, and sound suffer an infinite variety of changes as roots, flowers, fruits, leaves and their specific tastes and other qualities. The water and the earth which do not possess these qualities cannot have them, for we have proved that what is non-existent cannot come into being. The trees and plants produce the varied tastes and colours in animals, for it is by eating these that they acquire such richness of colour, etc. Animal products can again produce changes in plant bodies. By sprinkling blood on it a pomegranate may be made as big as a palm” (Tattvavaiśaradī, III. 14).
Looked at from the point of view of the guṇas, there is no intrinsic difference between things, though there are a thousand manifestations of differences, according to time, place, form and causality. The expressions of the guṇas, and the manifestations of the transformations of energy differ according to time, place, shape, or causality—these are the determining circumstances and environments which determine the modes of the evolutionary process; surrounding environments are also involved in determining this change, and it is said that two Āmalaka fruits placed in two different places undergo two different sorts of changes in connection with the particular spots in which they are placed, and that if anybody interchanges them a Yogin can recognise and distinguish the one from the other by seeing the changes that the fruits have undergone in connection with their particular points of space. Thus the Bhāshya says: “Two Āmalaka fruits having the same characteristic genus and species, their situation in two different points of space contributes to their specific distinction of development, so that they may be identified as this and that. When an Āmalaka is brought from a distance to a man previously inattentive to it, he naturally cannot distinguish this Āmalaka as being the distant one which has been brought before him without his knowledge. But right knowledge should be competent to discern the distinction; and the sūtra says that the place associated with one Āmalaka fruit is different from the place associated with another Āmalaka at another point of space; and the Yogin can perceive the difference of their specific evolution in association with their points of space; similarly the atoms also suffer different modifications at different points of space which can be perceived by Īśvara and the Yogins” (Vyāsa-bhāshya, III. 53).