[16]. Kārikā 17.
[17]. Gauḍapāda’s commentary on Kārikā 17.
[18]. Purusha is a substance (dravya) because it has independent existence (anāśrita) and has a measure (vibhu parimāṇa) of its own. So it always possesses the common characteristics (sāmānya guṇa) of substances, contact (saṃyoga), separation (viyoga) and number (saṃkhyā). Purusha cannot be considered to be suffering change or impure on account of the possession of the above common characteristics of all substances. Yoga-vārttika, II. 17.
[19]. Thus the Bhāshya says: bhavishyadvyaktikamanāgataṃanudbhūtavyaktikamatītaṃ svavyāpāropārūḍhaṃ varttamānaṃ trayaṃ, caitadvastu jñānasya jñeyaṃ yadi caitat svarūpato nābhavishyannedaṃ nirvishayaṃ jñānamudapatsyata tasmādatītamanāgataṃ svarūpato’ stīti.
[20]. Tattvavaiśāradī, IV. 14.
[21]. Vastusāmye cittabhedāt tayor vibhaktaḥ panthāḥ. Yoga-sūtra, IV. 15.
[22]. “Tattvāntara-pariṇāma” means the evolution of a wholly new category of existence. Thus the tanmātras are wholly different from the ego from which they are produced. So the atoms are wholly different from the tanmātras from which they are produced, for the latter, unlike the former, have no sense-properties. In all combinations of atoms, there would arise thousands of new qualities, but none of the products of the combination of atoms can be called a tattvāntara, or a new category of existence since all these qualities are the direct manifestations of the specific properties of the atoms.
[23]. Vyāsa-bhāshya, III. 52, says that the smallest indivisible part of a thing is called a paramāṇu. Vijñāna Bhikshu in explaining it says that paramāṇu here means guṇa, for if a thing say a stone is divided, then the furthest limit of division is reached when we come to the indivisible guṇas. But if the prakṛti is all-pervading (vibhu) how can the guṇas be atomic? Bhikshu says (Yoga-vārttika, III. 52) in reply that there are some classes of guṇas (e.g. those which produce mind antaḥkaraṇa and ākāśa) which are all-pervading, while the others are all atomic. In Bhikshu’s interpretation a moment is to be defined as the time which a guṇa entity takes to change its own unit of space. Guṇas are thus equivalent to the Vaiśeshika paramāṇus. Bhikshu, however, does not deny that there are no atoms of earth, water, etc., but he says that where reference is not made to these atoms but to guṇa atoms for the partless units of time can only be compared with the partless guṇas. But Vācaspati does not make any comment here to indicate that the smallest indivisible unit of matter should mean guṇas. Moreover, Yoga-sūtra, I. 40, and Vyāsa-bhāshya, I. 45, speak of paramāṇu and aṇu in the sense of earth-atoms, etc. Even Bhikshu does not maintain that paramāṇu is used there in the sense of atomic guṇa entities. I could not therefore accept Bhikshu’s interpretation that paramāṇu here refers to guṇa. Paramāṇu may here be taken in the sense of material atoms of earth, water, etc. The atoms (paramāṇu) here cannot be absolutely partless, for it has two sides, prior (pūrvadeśa) and posterior (uttaradeśa).
[24]. Bhikshu regards the movement of a guṇa of its own unit of space as the ultimate unit of time (kshaṇa). The whole world is nothing else but a series of kshaṇas. This view differs from the Buddhist view that everything is momentary in this that it does not admit of any other thing but the kshaṇas (na tu kskaṇātiriktaḥ kshaṇikaḥ padārthaḥ kaścidishyate taistu kskaṇamātrasthāyyeva padārthaḥ ishyate. Yoga-vārttika, III. 52).
[25]. There is a difference of opinion as regards the meaning of the word “kshaṇapratiyogi” in IV. 33. Vācaspati says that it means the growth associated with a particular kshaṇa or moment (kshaṇapracayāśraya). The word pratiyogī is interpreted by Vācaspati as related (pratisambandhī). Bhikshu, however, gives a quite different meaning. He interprets kshaṇa as “interval” and pratiyogī as “opposite of” (virodhī). So “kshaṇapratiyogī” means with him “without any interval” or “continuous.” He holds that the sūtra means that all change is continuous and not in succession. There is according to his interpretation no interval between the cessation of a previous character and the rise of a new one.