Well Protected on the East
Just as on the west, the Russian lines were far afield from the actual key position at Mukden, so on their left, or eastern positions their lines formed a far-reaching protective barrier, 20 miles away. As has been said, the main front on the east stretched away from the Sha-ho, thirty-five miles eastward to the Taitse River, which winds in a general northeasterly direction from Liao-yang. The defensive position of importance was at Tsinketchen, in the foothills of the Sierras, which run across Manchuria, and finally reach the east coast of Korea.
The only practicable path northward for the Japanese army was to skirt these foothills to the passes, northeast from Tsinketchen and Bentsiaputze and then debouch into the valley of the Hun River and fight their way northward to Fushan, the rugged nature of the country eastward from that place practically preventing any opportunity for play of strategy in a turning movement to strike northeast of the city. One of the wonders of the war and one of the most amazing of the feats constantly accomplished by the Japanese has been the skill and success with which they have attacked and captured mountain positions. General Kuroki in the campaign which, after a few months followed the victory of the Yalu, repeatedly drove the Russians from veritable Thermopylæs and in the fighting on every front which preceded the surrounding of the Russian army at Liao-yang the Japanese were constantly confronted with the necessity of making frontal attacks on mountain defiles which seemed to offer impregnable shelter to the defenders.
Battled for Mountain Passes
So also in the campaign on the east in the battle of Mukden. General Kuropatkin chose his defensive positions with skill. No pains were spared in fortifying the gaps in the mountain ridges through which the Japanese must pass. The principal routes open were through Da Pass and Gauto Pass. While these were the main defensive positions the Russians pushed fifteen miles further southward toward the enemy, and the earlier reverses at Tsinketchen were only fairly unimportant preludes to the battling at these mountain passes. The Russian line on the east had less geometrical regularity than the line of the west owing to the nature of the topography. The lines from the front extended to the foothills, as has been pointed out, and then were concentrated at the passes, the danger points, offering only a limited battle line until the fighting had swept over the mountains into the Valley of the Hun. What with artillery of a thousand guns and an army of 75,000 men only called upon to defend positions of vast natural strength, there was little wonder then when the open guns of the battle rolled over the plains in the west, General Kuropatkin concentrated his attention to the centre and gave little thought to events on his left. As it turned out the General's confidence was well founded. In all the war no braver or more stubborn or more successful fight has been waged by any Russian force than was waged by the army under Lieutenant-General Linevitch and General Rennenkampff on this flank. It has been said that the Japanese were fought to a standstill. That statement is literally true, and only the beginning of the Russian retreat made it possible for General Kuroki, the Japanese Commander here, to play any conspicuous part in the total disaster which befell the Russian Army.
Russians Had Advantage of Position
To summarize, the position in which General Kuropatkin found himself at the opening of the battle was an admirable one from every standpoint. His defensive lines fitted in well with the topography of the country. Broad rivers, rugged mountains, apparently impregnable mountain passes, commanding hills on front and flanks promised to aid materially in his defence. His army was nearly of equal strength with that of the enemy, while superior natural positions compensated for the slight deficiency of men. In the long winter months every possible means of communication from one to another of the units of his army had been perfected, while, apparently unassailable, stretched a great railroad behind him offering ready link between the front and the Russian base of supplies for all of Manchuria. His army had been recuperated, was eager to fight, and would be called upon to defend fortified positions, heavily supplied with artillery, a position which, as history plainly proves, brings out the best qualities of the Russian soldier. So far as the centre was concerned he had no fear. Lone Tree Hill, or, as he renamed it for the Russian who led the charge that had recaptured it from the Japanese, had been made as nearly impregnable as men and arms could make a position made by nature for defensive fighting. So westward, so eastward, topography, the condition of his army, the whole aspect of the field, spoke only of a repulse to the Japanese attack. Then would come the offensive against a worn-out army, then the victory for which all Russia was clamoring and upon which depended the future of the Commander-in-Chief himself.
So much for the Russian viewpoint.
RUSSIAN SUFFERING AT THE BATTLE OF MUKDEN.