The Outlook for Oyama
When the smoke of the battle of the Sha-ho cleared away it left the Japanese armies masters of practically the same territory they had occupied at the conclusion of the pursuit of the Russian after the victory at Liao-yang. General Kuroki, commanding the Japanese right army, had fallen back from Bentsiaputze to Bensihu, a distance of twenty miles; but this move had been made to correct the alignment of the army with the centre, at the Sha-ho River as a basis. Certainly, no great effort was made to advance this force after the initial Russian successes on this flank after the battle of the Sha-ho. Some advantages attached to the position finally occupied by General Kuroki, hence the view that he was impelled by strategic reasons when he had failed to advance, rather than by inability to retake the lost positions farther north. At the centre, which followed the south bank of the Sha-ho River, the Russians had succeeded in retaking Lone Tree Hill in the closing hours of the battle, and had a decided advantage. Every possible effort was made to retake the position, but when called upon for this effort the Japanese were exhausted by twelve days of incessant fighting, and they failed. Marshal Oyama, at the centre, therefore, was confronted by a practically impregnable position. Westward, on the left flank of the Japanese Army, the Russians were less aided by natural features of the country than at any other point. Their lines crossed the Sha-ho just west of the railroad and then spread northeastward through a series of villages dotting a comparatively level plain lying between the Sha-ho and the Hun Rivers. Of all the positions on the entire Russian front this seemed to offer the best opportunity for attack, for while an advance would have to be made over an open country, approach to the Russians' positions was facilitated by the innumerable villages in this fertile river plain. On the other hand, the Japanese were open to the same style of advance, and both commanders made unusual preparations to defend this angle of the great battlefield.
The Japanese lines along the front were merely a parallel of the Russian lines which have been described, except that while on the west and on the centre the entrenchments were only a few hundred yards separated, the lines farther east, except for outpost positions, were separated by distances ranging from five to fifteen miles, as developed when the operations of the Battle of Mukden were actually under way.
To the Japanese Commander-in-Chief the general situation could not have been particularly reassuring, except that he could count on the indomitable efforts of an unbeaten and fanatically brave army. So far as the topography was concerned, the enemy had every advantage. In all a very difficult and interesting problem was presented as the Mikado's hosts settled down for their long winter inaction.
Busy Preparations During Winter
Liao-yang was made the Japanese base after the occupation of that city, and the Engineer Corps performed a notable feat in the speedy manner in which the railroad running northward from Port Arthur was made over for the use of Japanese engines and cars. The Russians had a five-foot gauge, while the Japanese rolling stock was built to the standard measurement. This fact made necessary the relaying of the entire line, a task which was promptly completed, thereby affording the inland army base ready communication with the general supply base at Dalny and at Port Arthur after the capture of that port. In addition to this line of communication the Japanese had a line to the Yalu. Stores for the right army were landed at the mouth of the Yalu River, and then were transported overland on a light railroad for which horses were the motive power, to points well in reach of General Kuroki. Both of these lines of communication were vital to an army that had now penetrated two hundred miles inland and were the first consideration when the flanks and protective units were being placed in their winter quarters. The Liao-yang-Yalu line proved to have been safeguarded against danger, but Cossack raiders in January twice encircled the Japanese left army, penetrated to the railroad at Yinkow, and damaged the line. In each case the damage done was quickly repaired. The second raiding party was so nearly cut off and so nearly annihilated in its flight to the Russian lines and activities on a broader scale so soon after were begun, that no further attempts of the kind were attempted. Such trifling inconvenience resulted from these perilous raids that it would seem that the Russians were hardly recompensed for the sacrifice of life. Certainly, the vast bulk of all needed stores and ammunition were already within the Japanese lines before the attempts were made, and Marshal Oyama, in all probability, could have fought the entire battle of Mukden without further need of the railroad, particularly as no Japanese retreat resulted from that struggle. The incidents only bore out the long held reputation of the Cossacks for reckless bravery. Indeed, the Japanese have repeatedly expressed their admiration for the Cossacks as a foe worthy of their steel.
Deciding the Way to Strike
With his front well aligned, and with every possible precaution taken to safeguard his lines of communication, the question then before the Japanese Commander-in-Chief was the strategy to mark a resumption of hostilities. At Liao-yang, despite the sweeping nature of the victory, there can be no doubt that the Japanese were bitterly disappointed when, despite tremendously determined efforts to prevent their escape, practically the whole Russian Army had disentangled itself from a well-set net and had escaped to occupy new positions there to be fought all over again. The first thought in all of the planning of the new campaign that was to succeed the winter of inactivity, was to accomplish the actual envelopment of General Kuropatkin, forcing upon the Russian Commander a surrender as the only alternative to annihilation. The line of action decided upon is fully revealed in the details of the battle to be told later. This program of complete destruction stands out even more plainly than at Liao-yang. It came far nearer realization than in that struggle, and was not concluded with the mere taking of Mukden; but like the tentacles of a great octopus, Marshal Oyama's grim determination for complete annihilation of the foe spread far northward beyond the scene of the initial victory and relentlessly realized in large measure all that he had hoped.
Oyama's Plan of Battle
In brief, the plan was to hold the Russian centre in a combat which, however desperate and bloody, was only a feint. While this struggle went on with apparent success to Russian arms, the right and left flanks as aligned east and west of the Sha-ho were to press home an attack calculated slowly to bend back the Russians toward their line of retreat northward from Mukden.