The Japan-Russia War: An Illustrated History of the War in the Far East

by Sydney Tyler

The Second Scheme of Attack

The chapter of strategy which now opens is a fascinating one to any student of war, and fortunately its main features can be readily appreciated also by any layman who makes an intelligent study of a map of Manchuria and the Liao-tung Peninsula. The prime object of the Japanese plainly was to cut General Kuropatkin's extended line of communications, isolate Port Arthur, and then attempt to envelope his main force by advancing simultaneously from the south, the east, and the northeast. It was consequently necessary, as a preliminary, to establish the First Army securely in Manchuria, it being clear that with this menace on his left flank, General Kuropatkin would not be able to detach many troops to the south to prevent the investment of Port Arthur. Everything, therefore, depended on the fortune that would attend the advance of General Kuroki across the Yalu, and the Moltkes at Tokio, after a patient study of all the conditions of an intricate problem, had thought out two great alternative schemes to meet the eventuality either of victory or defeat. In case of General Kuroki's finding the task of crossing the Yalu unaided to be an insuperable one, the Second Army, under General Oku, was to be landed at Takushan, a port on the coast some miles to the west of the mouth of the river, and thence to strike a blow at General Sassulitch's right flank. On the other hand, if Kuroki met with success, Oku's army was to be landed at a point on the Liao-tung Peninsula to cut Kuropatkin's communications and invest Port Arthur. As we have seen, General Kuroki's signal triumph at the Yalu River rendered the first alternative unnecessary, and opened the way for the more decisive and dramatic stroke involved in the second scheme.

A Model of Organization

But before anything could be done to land the Second Army, either at Takushan or on the Liao-tung Peninsula, it was imperatively necessary to disarm the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur, and prevent even the remotest possibility of its interfering with the operations. Here, as always, the two services, the army and the navy, had to work in close correspondence and interdependence. From the beginning of the war these separate branches of the Japanese forces had fitted into one another like parts of the same piece of machinery, the whole directed by one uniform purpose and striving towards one great common end. The joint schemes of the naval and military strategists at Tokio will ever provide an invaluable object-lesson to all students of the art of war; and it may be predicted that they will prove of valuable assistance to the strategists of our own army and navy. One of the most remarkable features of the war has been the certainty and precision with which the Japanese have worked out their complex plans; it is no less remarkable, and affords a further striking evidence of their efficiency, that they felt able, absolutely, to count upon that certainty and precision, and to make arrangements long beforehand, which with a less carefully organized scheme and less trustworthy commanders to carry it out would have been foolhardy, or at least wasteful. Failure in any real sense does not seem to have entered into their calculations. One portion of the plan, indeed, might miscarry, but, as we have seen, partial failure had been provided against, and a rapid modification of strategy to meet the case would have been possible. It was, in fact, one of the most interesting examples of the application of brains to war that have ever been seen in the history of the world.

Perfect Secrecy of Plans

In the action and inter-action, then, of this great double machine, the army had done all that it was possible for it to do for the moment; and once again it came round to the turn of the navy to make the next decisive move. Upon the success of this move may be said to have depended the whole success of the after operations, but, calculating with absolute confidence upon the skill of Admiral Togo, the Mikado's strategists had already put the Second Army into a state of complete preparation, and had even ordered it to be conveyed to a place from which it could be transferred to the front at any quarter at a moment's notice. Arrangements for its embarkation were begun as soon as General Kuroki reached Wiju with the First Army in the early days of April. When that commander was able to report that his dispositions for the attack upon the Russian entrenchments on the right bank of the Yalu were well advanced, the process of embarking General Oku's troops was started at once. Not a hint was allowed to escape as to their destination; even if the press correspondents, chafing under their enforced inaction at Tokio, had learnt the name, the censor would not have let it pass to the outer world; but, as a matter of fact, it is safe to say that the secret was safely locked in the breasts of half a dozen men. By April 22nd the whole army with its transports, commissariat, ammunition train, and hospital corps, had been put on board ship, and said farewell to the shores of Japan, vanishing, for all the world could tell, into the inane. For more than a fortnight nothing further was heard of it No one could report its landing anywhere, no one could say what it was doing, and day by day the mystery grew more mysterious. Only on May 7th was the veil lifted, when this great army fell upon the coast of Liao-tung as if from the heavens, and proceeded to the investment of Port Arthur. The truth was that during this fortnight it had been lying perdu on some small islands close to the west coast of Korea, called the Sir James Hall group, and distant 160 miles in a southeastern direction from the shores of Liao-tung.

Cutting off Port Arthur

Here, briefly stated, is the manner in which the scheme worked out. On May 1st General Kuroki triumphantly crossed the Yalu and stormed the heights above Chiu-lien-cheng. On May 2nd Admiral Togo descended once more upon Port Arthur, and blocked the harbor completely by sinking eight steamers at the entrance to the channel. On the afternoon of May 3rd, having made sure of the thoroughness of the work, he set off at full speed for the Sir James Hall Islands, reaching his destination by early morning on the 4th. Everything there was in readiness for the expedition, and within a few hours the whole of the transports, escorted by the fleet, set sail for the east coast of Liao-tung. At dawn the next day they reached the point on the peninsula which had been selected for the landing—Yentoa Bay—and in a few short hours a considerable portion of the force had been disembarked, the resistance offered by a small detachment of Cossacks, the only force possessed by the Russians in the neighborhood, being entirely negligible. On the 6th the railway line was severed, and in a few days more the Japanese were sitting securely astride of the peninsula, and Port Arthur was cut off from the world. The scheme had been carried out like the combinations of a skilful chess player, or like the successive steps of a mathematical problem.

A DESPERATE ENCOUNTER AT PORT ARTHUR.