Do not let us fear to look the matter straight in the face. A war on three sides. Our Navy against three Navies, and a triple superiority. Victory at sea is impossible. However much we may harm our opponents we are certain to lose many colonies. On the mainland fighting on two flanks. Of course we cannot deny it and must look at the future coolly. It is idle to waste words about such a war; let us leave talk to others. Let us look at a favourable solution: the defeat of both opponents. What would peace bring us? Annexation of more French or Russian possessions? No rational being could think of such a poisoned gift.
And what about overseas and colonies? In foreign parts we shall have nothing more to say, for our mercantile and naval fleet will be almost entirely destroyed. And as for money indemnity, even in case we conquered our opponents we cannot hope for heavy terms. We shall be glad after this blood-letting to embrace peace and to receive a portion of our war expenses. We should have to fight hard, and only through rivers of blood and by straining every nerve can we hope to keep our Empire intact. In the 1870 war against the French Empire in nearly every case our victories were bought with superior losses. And how dear these victories cost us!
But not numbers, nor weapons, nor careful preparations in times of peace are going to conquer in the war of the future. Esprit alone will turn the scale, and to quote the words of Frederick the Great, “The esprit of an army lies in its officers.” Those officers will have the best influence on their men who have the most hardened physique and who are trained each one according to his particular bent, and are able to do without comforts and have the natural gift of comradeship with the common soldier combined with strict discipline. They must evoke the soldiers’ esteem and dependence and the blind trust which the unselfish care of their men will produce. This can be brought about only by placing the well-being of the troops in the forefront, and without the slightest consideration on the officers’ part for their own advantage, unselfishly sinking their personality, rising to every situation with courage, and bracing up every weakling or coward under their care by their example. That corps which possesses these qualities to the fullest extent will carry victory with their colours, and only such a set of officers can be our salvation.
Do not let us underestimate our opponents.
On the west we have the French Army with a lurking desire for revenge, its material intelligent and full of soldierly qualities. The sons of the Republic will fight with the same courage they did in the 1870-1871 campaign but under better generalship. The French have learnt a great deal; may we not admit this to-day?
And how is it with us?
An admission must be made at a critical moment. That moment has arrived. In the course of time the sober and earnest speech and thought of the old Prussians has become remote. Let us beware of overconfidence in ourselves. We have a forty years’ peace behind us, which is not very good for the German Army. So much for us.
And what will victory bring us?
The loss of our Navy and our Colonies, and our own destruction only avoided by a sea of blood. What will happen when the people return home, awakened as to their own character and chastened by a fruitless fight? We speak of a favourable result. And if this does not occur? If Germany does not win in the next war shall we be bled to death? Bismarck said this, and let us admit it openly: “In this war we have nothing to gain and everything to lose.”
He who brings about this war and who does not try to obviate the danger is perpetrating the greatest outrage on the German nation. He is endangering the creation of Bismarck and his King; he is playing with loaded dice.