Against what is Germany arming if not against England’s command of the sea? Must not every Englishman think so? Has not their mistrust been fostered by our policy, by the utterances of our men of mark, by the opinions of our Press, and last but not least by the propaganda of our Navy League?
How can a clear-headed people like the English entertain friendly feelings for us in view of these evident proofs of our mistrust? We have driven England into the Double Alliance. “He who is not with me is against me.” Should we not do exactly the same? We carry on a sentimental policy, play the injured party, whilst suspicion prevents us from being open-minded.
The German Empire ought therefore only to have a fleet sufficient for her real needs, able to defend her coasts, to act as maritime police in the areas of smaller States, and to perform convoy duty for our troop-ships to our colonies. A larger fleet is in fact either a luxury or it is directed against England. Such logic is inexorable. For our centre of gravity—otherwise than is the case with England—lies at home. We are not dependent on the importation of foodstuffs; the 5 per cent. of what is not grown on our own soil must be sacrificed in war.
As to our commerce, there will be no dispute. In the countries where our goods are sold the German merchant is not only a necessity but valued as an indispensable friend and educator. The merchant who is not able to create such a position is not worth having battleships near him to back up his weaknesses. Only the excellence and tastefulness of the wares he has to sell and the tact and ingenuity of the seller, coupled with a full knowledge of local requirements, can ensure the prosperity of our commerce; never the mailed fist! This cannot be repeated too often or too emphatically.
Up to now the agreement with France and Russia has guaranteed England’s safety. Now England sees that France, relying on the military convention with her two friends, is working seriously for war. She knows that in Russia the voice for war against Germany is increasing. Such a war would weaken England’s Navy; it would throw a hundred and fifty thousand Englishmen on the battlefield;[30] it would mean heavy demands on the country’s finance and her colonies might make threatening movements against her sovereignty. She would also lose her best buyer and seller. Europe’s predominance would be imperilled!
These are the weighty reasons why the English Government are trying—even at the eleventh hour—to prevent this war.
Many object that the psychological moment will not arrive for this war. Internal conditions will tend to promote it. Never have the opportunities been so favourable for the French and Russians to cross swords with us, and to endeavour to annihilate our position as a leading Power of the Continent.
France sees her population going down year by year. In the same ratio the prospect is dwindling for France to regain Alsace Lorraine and thereby increase of dominion, population, and prestige. The hatred of the conqueror continues to blaze; they have long since lost all respect for us, and they are longing to measure their strength with ours. Newspapers and leaflets stir up the flame and preach ceterum censeo.
The Republic undoubtedly binds the people together more closely, and will provide more means and men for their armaments than is the case with us. And the call will not be in vain, neither are Alliances nor Military Conventions. Russia’s Army and England’s fleet, plus 150,000 men, are guaranteed to France. Italy is tied up in Tripoli, the North Sea Canal is unusable, a third of the German voters have shown themselves as enemies of the State, and party disputes have demoralized the nation. When will such a concatenation be repeated?
And what is the outlook for Germany?