It may, then, be regarded as morally certain that the river on which the Britons encountered Caesar was the Great Stour. It has, indeed, been objected that the least distance of the Great Stour from Deal is not twelve, but fifteen miles; but while this argument may be valid against the theory that Caesar landed in 54 B.C. at Deal, the position that he defeated the Britons on the Great Stour remains unshaken.
4. The Reverend R. C. Jenkins[3432] holds that the scene of the encounter was Chilham, about six miles above Canterbury, on the Ashford road. ‘The only obstacle,’ he pleads, ‘is the increased distance, which is sixteen, instead of twelve miles ... a difference which the loss of a single stroke might account for [the scribe being supposed to have written XII instead of XVI], if, indeed, it is not sufficiently explained by the possible miscalculation of the time of the march ... everything else falls into perfect harmony with the narrative—the high wooded ground at the back, the steep banks, the wide and rapid stream,’ &c. And again, ‘Let us remember that the journey was during the night, when the ground would be rapidly passed over, and the actual distance would be less apparent ... the space traversed is only described as “milia passuum circiter duodecim”, and even then the position of the enemy was merely discerned afar off ... here we have ancient mounds and earthworks, which give silent testimony to the fact that Chilham was a military position of the highest importance even during the British period.’[3433]
These arguments have no weight. When numbers attested by the consensus of the MSS. are not manifestly wrong, we have no right to distort them into agreement with our own preferences. The distance, in a straight line, from the nearest point on which Caesar could have encamped, if he had landed near Sandwich,[3434] to Chilham, is about 20 Roman miles; from the place where he would have encamped if he had landed near Deal,[3435] approximately 16; and the actual distance which he would have had to march is of course considerably longer. Why he should have marched more rapidly by night than by day it would be difficult to explain;[3436] and the remark that ‘the position of the enemy was merely discerned afar off’ is a pure invention. If ‘we have ancient mounds and earthworks’ at Chilham, they prove nothing about Caesar;[3437] and we have them also at other places near the course of the river. Besides, why should Caesar have made a forced march in order to cross the Stour at Chilham when, by making an ordinary march of 12 miles, he could have crossed it near Canterbury?[3438]
Our search for the site is now confined within narrow limits. Below Fordwich, the Stour, in Caesar’s time, would certainly have been impassable in the face of an enemy; for it flowed through a broad morass.[3439] Between Canterbury and the bridge above Sturry the river is virtually flush with its banks. It appears to me, then, that Caesar must have crossed it either between Fordwich and Sturry, or in the neighbourhood of Thanington, just above Canterbury, or possibly at Canterbury itself. Above Canterbury it flows through nearly level meadows: its width is about 15 or 16 yards: the banks are about 2 feet high; and the depth of the water at present is apparently about 2 feet. The bottom at the bridge above Thanington is sandy and gravelly. Opposite this point and at a distance of, say, 600 yards, the ground begins to rise into wooded heights. Opposite Thanington, and east of it, the heights are considerably nearer the river; but they gradually sink as they approach Canterbury.
At Sturry the lower slopes of the low hills which extend along the northern side of the valley approach very close to the river, say to within 100 yards; but opposite Fordwich they are much further away. Just below the mill at Sturry the Stour is from 15 to 20 yards wide: the banks are 3 or 4 feet above the water: the average depth is apparently from about 18 inches to 2 feet; and the bottom is sand mixed with stones. At Fordwich the depth of the water, as seen from the bridge, is about 5 feet: the banks are 4 or 5 feet above the water; and the bottom from this point downwards is mud.
5. The eminent geographer, Major Rennell,[3440] believed that Caesar crossed at the place where ‘the western road intersects the course of the Stour’; but he gave no reasons for preferring this site to Fordwich, Sturry, or Thanington.
6. Von Göler[3441] and Guest[3442] maintain that the battle was fought at or near Sturry; and Heller[3443] appears to agree with them. So does Roach Smith,[3444] who, at Guest’s request, made ‘a survey of the vicinity of Grove Ferry’, which survey, I presume, extended as far up the river as Sturry. ‘There,’ he says, ‘I found the river with the high bank ... the woods and oppidum,’[3445] &c. Napoleon[3446] argues that the banks at Sturry are so steep that the Roman cavalry could not have forced a passage without great difficulty, whereas it would appear from Caesar’s account that they crossed easily; and also that Sturry is 15, not 12 miles from Deal. The latter objection may be disposed of at once. Napoleon himself maintains that Caesar’s anchorage in 54 B.C. was ‘some kilometres’ north of the spot where he had landed in the preceding year;[3447] and this spot he rightly fixes between Walmer and Deal. Therefore the place from which Caesar descried the Britons just before they advanced to the bank of the stream was not 12 miles from Deal, but, as I have shown in a previous article,[3448] from a point in the neighbourhood of Sandwich. Certainly it would have been more difficult to force the passage of the Stour at Sturry than of the Little Stour near Kingston; but, as we have seen, the latter would practically have presented no obstacle at all. Airy,[3449] who holds that if the Britons had been posted on the Stour at all, ‘Caesar would have crossed at the sound ground of Canterbury or above it,’ observes that ‘the place had been selected by the Britons as a defensive post at least two days previously, and may therefore be presumed to have had the qualifications necessary for a defensive post, namely that it could not be turned, and that enemies could attack it in front only at a disadvantage’; and, remarking that ‘there can scarcely be a doubt that Canterbury existed then as an important town’, he adds that ‘of this there is no mention in Caesar’. But why should Caesar have mentioned Canterbury? It was not a strategical point: there was nothing to be gained by attacking it except perhaps a little plunder; and anything worth plundering would certainly have been removed into the stronghold which he did attack. ‘The place [on the banks of the river] had been selected [or, at all events, occupied] as a defensive post’ not two days but one day previously; and, generally speaking, to select a defensive post on a river which cannot be turned is impossible.[3450] The stronghold to which the Britons retreated was probably, as Mr. George Payne holds,[3451] and as I have shown in my narrative,[3452] the British oppidum in Bigberry (or Bigbury) woods, about a mile and a half west of Canterbury, of which traces still exist; and it seems most likely that the passage of the river took place at some point between Canterbury and Thanington.
CAESAR’S EARLIER OPERATIONS IN 54 B. C. (B. G., V, 9-11)
Caesar’s account of the events which occurred on the day after his first encounter with the Britons in 54 B.C. has been interpreted in several different ways; and yet his narrative is so clear that one would have thought it impossible to misunderstand it. After describing the first encounter, he proceeds, ‘Caesar, however, forbade them [the legionaries] to pursue the fugitives far, partly because he had no knowledge of the ground, partly because the day was far spent and he wished to have time for entrenching his camp. On the following morning he sent a light division of infantry and cavalry, in three columns, to pursue the fugitives. They had advanced a considerable distance, the rear-guard being still in sight, when some troopers from Quintus Atrius came to Caesar with the news that there had been a great storm on the preceding night, and that almost all the ships had been damaged and gone ashore.... On receiving this information, Caesar recalled the legions and cavalry, ordering them to defend themselves as they marched, and went back himself to the ships.... Although it involved great trouble and labour, he decided that the best plan would be to have all the ships hauled up and connected with the camp by one entrenchment. About ten days were spent in these operations, the troops not suspending work even in the night.’ (Sed eos fugientes longius Caesar prosequi vetuit, et quod loci naturam ignorabat, et quod magna parte diei consumpta munitioni castrorum tempus relinqui volebat. Postridie eius diei mane tripertito milites equitesque in expeditionem misit, ut eos qui fugerant persequerentur. His aliquantum itineris progressis, cum iam extremi essent in prospectu, equites a Q. Atrio ad Caesarem venerunt, qui nuntiarent superiore nocte maxima coorta tempestate prope omnes naves adflictas atque in litus eiectas esse.... His rebus cognitis Caesar legiones equitatumque revocari atque in itinere resistere iubet, ipse ad naves revertitur ... Ipse, etsi res erat multae operae ac laboris, tamen commodissimum esse statuit omnes naves subduci et cum castris una munitione coniungi. In his rebus circiter dies X consumit ne nocturnis quidem temporibus ad laborem militum intermissis.[3453])