The camp for the construction of which Caesar wished to allow time was of course quite distinct from the one for which, on the previous day, he had selected a site near his landing-place,[3454] and was to be in the neighbourhood of the place where he had beaten the enemy, that is to say, twelve Roman miles or more from the sea.[3455] Next morning he dispatched three flying columns in pursuit of the fugitives; and his rear-guard was just visible when the messengers arrived with the news of the shipwreck. He sent a galloper to recall the pursuing columns; and, as their retreat would naturally encourage the fugitives to rally and return to the attack, they were to offer the best resistance they could as they marched back to the coast.

C. Schneider[3456] misunderstands the passage as far as misunderstanding is possible. He holds that cum iam extremi essent in prospectu means ‘when the rear of the enemy was just in sight’. But Caesar was not with any of the three pursuing columns, for he tells us that he sent them in pursuit: therefore, if Schneider were right, we should be forced to believe that he learned afterwards that the enemy’s rear had been just in sight. But why resort to this fanciful explanation, seeing that Caesar could by no possibility have ascertained that the rear of the fugitives was just visible to his troops at the very moment when he himself, separated from the troops, received the news of the shipwreck; and, further, that extremi must grammatically refer to his, that is to say, the pursuing columns? It has been objected that if extremi meant the Roman rear-guard, iam would not have its proper meaning, ‘already’ (ἤδη). But iam of course often means ‘by this time’, or ‘at length’ (nearly tandem). In the passage in question its sense may, I think, be illustrated by a clause in B. G., vii, 83, § 7,—cum iam meridies adpropinquare videretur (‘at length when it was evidently near noon’). Caesar meant to say that his pursuing columns had advanced so far that by the time when the news of the shipwreck reached him the rear-guard only was in sight. Again, Schneider takes the words in itinere resistere iubet to mean that Caesar ordered his troops ‘to stop in their march and halt where they were’. But, as Long[3457] points out, ‘if this is so, he returned to his ships himself (“ipse”), leaving his men in the country doing nothing for ten days. But he tells us that his soldiers were employed in making his “munitio”, and therefore they must have come back to the camp.’

So far Long is quite right; but he too makes a great mistake. He actually believes[3458] that the words munitioni castrorum tempus relinqui volebat (‘he wished to leave time for entrenching his camp’) refer to the camp near the seashore, for which he had selected a site immediately after the disembarkation. In other words, he believes that Caesar compelled his troops, who had already made a night-march of twelve miles, beaten the enemy on the banks of the Stour, stormed the stronghold to which the beaten enemy had retreated, and then pursued the fugitives for some distance, to march back all the way to the camp by the seashore, entrench it, and next morning march back again twelve miles or more into the interior, and then start in pursuit of the fugitives! The legionaries were hardy fellows; but if they did all this, they must have been as breathless as the reader will be when he has got to the end of the preceding sentence. And what had the fugitives been about? If Long is right, they must have got such a start that to pursue them would have been a wild-goose chase indeed. Needless to say, what Caesar meant was simply this:—when the Britons had been dislodged from their stronghold, he would not allow his troops to pursue them far because he wished to leave time for the construction of the temporary camp in which he intended to pass the night.

Von Göler[3459] needlessly quarrels with the text of the Commentaries, and makes matters worse by an absurd emendation. ‘The reading legiones equitatumque revocari atque in itinere resistere iubet (B. G., v, 11, § 1),’ he says, ‘is obviously corrupt. Atque requires that the following clause should involve a climax’ (Steigerung). But so it does:—Caesar ‘orders the legions and cavalry to be recalled, and [not only to come back but also] to defend themselves upon the march’. In this literal translation a climax is as evident as in the emendation, to be quoted presently, which von Göler offers; and any one who is not familiar with the Commentaries will find in Meusel’s Lexicon Caesarianum abundant evidence that atque in the passage which von Göler brands as corrupt is in accord with Caesar’s usus loquendi.

‘As finally,’ continues von Göler, ‘one may conclude with certainty from the later substance of the narrative that all the legions returned to the shore, but the necessary express mention of the march thither is nowhere to be found in the Commentaries, I believe that the passage originally ran as follows:—legiones equitatumque revocari atque in itinere persistere iubet ad naves, ipse revertitur.’ If we may ‘conclude with certainty’ that ‘the legions returned’, why should the ‘express mention’ of their return be necessary? Heller[3460] has taken the trouble to show that the text is above suspicion.

CAESAR’S SECOND COMBAT WITH THE BRITONS IN 54 B. C.

There is a passage in Caesar’s account of his second combat with the Britons in 54 B.C. which has greatly exercised the minds of the commentators; and editors have put upon it an interpretation which soldiers will not accept. The passage runs as follows:—‘Throughout this peculiar combat, which was fought in full view of every one and actually in front of the camp, it was clear that our infantry, owing to the weight of their armour, were ill fitted to engage an enemy of this kind; for they could not pursue him when he retreated, and they dared not abandon their regular formation: it was clear too that the cavalry fought at great risk, because the enemy generally fell back on purpose, and, after drawing our men a little distance away from the legions, leaped down from their chariots and fought on foot with the odds in their favour. [On the other hand, the mode in which their cavalry fought exposed the Romans, alike in retreat and in pursuit, to an exactly similar danger.[3461]]’ (Toto hoc in qenere pugnae cum sub oculis omnium ac pro castris dimicaretur, intellectum est nostros propter gravitatem armorum, quod neque insequi cedentes possent neque ab signis discedere auderent, minus aptos esse ad huius generis hostem, equites autem magno cum periculo proelio dimicare, propterea quod illi etiam consulto plerumque cederent et, cum paulum ab legionibus nostros removissent, ex essedis desilirent et pedibus dispari proelio contenderent. [Equestris autem proelii ratio et cedentibus et insequentibus par atque idem periculum inferebat[3462]]). It is the last sentence which has caused all the trouble.

1. ‘After describing the difficulties of the infantry,’ says Long,[3463] ‘Caesar explains the danger to which the cavalry was exposed, when they pursued the “essedarii”, for the Britanni quitted their “esseda” and fought on foot among the Roman “equites”.... This was an unequal kind of fighting (“dispar proelium”) for the Roman “equites”. Caesar adds, that on the other hand (“autem”) the British mode of fighting from the “esseda” (“equestris proelii ratio”) was equally dangerous to his cavalry and legions in the pursuit and the retreat. This is Schneider’s explanation, and I believe that it is right. The Britanni had no cavalry: they had only “essedarii”, to whom Caesar (iv, 33) applies the term “perequitant”. It follows that “equites hostium essedariique” (c. 15) are no more than the “essedarii” (iv, 24) [in other words that Caesar, who was not a prolix writer, used four words when one would have sufficed.] In iv, 34, however, Caesar says, “peditatus equitatusque.”’ Yes, he does; and the reader will please note the significance of this admission.

The assumption upon which Long’s explanation rests, namely, that ‘the Britanni had no cavalry’, is unsupported by any evidence, and is wholly inadmissible. Caesar says that in his first campaign in Britain a party of Roman foragers were surrounded by equitatu atque essedis.[3464] If these words do not mean ‘cavalry and chariots’, what do they mean? Warriors on horseback are depicted on ancient British coins;[3465] and the Britons certainly had cavalry as well as chariots in A.D. 61[3466] and in the time of Agricola.[3467] Besides, as von Göler points out,[3468] the charioteers could not have fought with effect unless they had been supported by cavalry. And when Long says that, according to Caesar, ‘the British mode of fighting from the “esseda” ... was equally dangerous to his cavalry and legions in the pursuit and the retreat,’ his explanation refutes itself. Caesar himself says that the legions could not pursue the charioteers; and, on the other hand, it is evident that they were not pursued by the charioteers.