2. According to von Göler,[3469] ‘by cedentibus et insequentibus the chariot-fighters only can be meant’ (Unter den ‘cedentibus et insequentibus’ können nur die Wagenstreiter verstanden werden); and, placing a comma after par, he translates the passage thus:—‘The mode of fighting of the [British] cavalry corresponded with that of their charioteers, whether they retreated or pursued, and brought the Roman cavalry into precisely the same danger’ (Der Gefechtsmechanismus der [britischen] Reiterei war aber der Fechtweise ihrer Wagenstreiter, ob sie wichen oder verfolgten, entsprechend [par] und brachte die römische Reiterei gerade in jenes nachtheilige Verhältniss[3470]). But no Latin scholar would admit that a comma could be placed after par, which would of course make it necessary to supply the word erat.
3. According to Dittenberger-Kraner,[3471] the words equestris autem proelii ratio, if they are genuine, can only mean, in opposition to ex essedis ... contenderent, the mode of fighting of the charioteers, which, while it was dangerous to the Romans when they pursued, was no less dangerous to them when they retreated. I confess that I cannot understand this comment.
4. Doberenz-Dinter[3472] also insist upon the opposition between equestris autem proelii ratio and ex essedis ... contenderent, and maintain that the former refers to ‘a regular cavalry combat (on the part of the Romans)’,—ein regelrechtes Reitertreffen (von Seiten der Römer). Now in the passage which ends with the words ex essedis ... contenderent Caesar describes a combat between the Roman cavalry and the British charioteers, who were supported by cavalry. Therefore the editors (if I have succeeded in grasping their meaning) suppose that the ‘regular cavalry combat’ to which they allude was fought between the Roman cavalry and the British cavalry alone. This must, I think, be what they intend to convey; for, according to Mr. Peskett,[3473] who may have followed them, ‘Caesar means that when the British and Roman cavalry were engaged, the danger was equalized [equestris autem proelii ratio et cedentibus et insequentibus par atque idem periculum inferebat], whereas when they used chariots the Britons were at an advantage.’ But if Caesar simply meant that the British cavalry and the Roman in the (hypothetical) ‘regular cavalry combat’ were each exposed to the same danger, what is the point of the words et cedentibus et insequentibus? Surely retreating cavalry are in greater danger than the cavalry which has forced them to retreat and is pursuing them! I do not see how Mr. Peskett’s explanation can be got out of the Latin. And who will believe that the Britons would have used their cavalry alone when, by associating them with chariots, they ‘were at an advantage’?
5. It might possibly be suggested that the words equestris ... inferebat refer to a cavalry combat between the Romans and the Britons, distinct from the combat between Roman cavalry and the British charioteers, in which the British cavalry, like that of the Germans,[3474] were associated with light infantry. But there is no evidence that the Britons had cavalry of this kind; and, as we have seen, it is certain that their cavalry acted in support of their charioteers.
6. Köchly and Rüstow[3475] offer the following explanation:—‘As the enemy were also supported by their cavalry, our men [the Romans] were exposed to the same danger, whether they advanced or retreated’ (Da aber der Feind auch die Unterstützung seiner Reiterei hatte, so war für die unsrige die Gefahr immer dieselbe, mochte sie vorgehen oder zurückgehen).
7. Napoleon the Third[3476] explains the matter thus:—‘Un désavantage plus grand encore existait pour les cavaliers. Les Bretons, par une fuite simulée, les attiraient loin des légions, et alors, sautant à bas de leurs chars, engageaient à pied une lutte inégale; car, toujours soutenus par leur cavalerie, ils étaient aussi dangereux dans l’attaque que dans la défense.’ These words, which appear to be virtually identical in sense with those of Köchly and Rüstow, undoubtedly give an accurate account of what took place. Apparently Köchly, Rüstow, and Napoleon do not take par atque idem periculum as meaning ‘an exactly similar danger’ (to that which Caesar described in the preceding sentence, Toto hoc ... contenderent), but as meaning that the danger which beset the Romans was the same whether they pursued or retreated. Now the Roman infantry, as Caesar says, did not pursue; obviously therefore et cedentibus et insequentibus can only refer to the Roman cavalry. I suppose then that what Köchly, Rüstow, and Napoleon meant was this:—if the Roman cavalry pursued the Britons, they were attacked by the charioteers, who jumped off their cars and fought as infantry: as soon as they retreated they were pursued by the British cavalry, and if they turned to bay the charioteers had time to mount their cars again, come up, and engage them anew. If this was what Caesar meant by equestris ... inferebat, his language was not lucid.
The words equestris proelii ratio, if they were really written by Caesar, must refer either to a combat between the Roman and the British cavalry or to a combat between the Roman cavalry and the combined British charioteers and cavalry. There is, as we have seen, no reason to suppose that a purely cavalry combat took place; and if it did, the idea that the Roman cavalry was as much in danger when it pursued as when it retreated is absurd. If we accept the other alternative, the meaning of the passage must be either (as Köchly, Rüstow, and Napoleon explain) ‘On the other hand, the mode in which the British cavalry fought (in co-operation with the charioteers) exposed the Romans, alike in retreat and in pursuit, to exactly the same danger’; or ‘In fact the nature of the combat of horse [that is to say, the combat between the Roman cavalry and the combined British charioteers and cavalry] exposed the Romans’, &c. In the former case autem would be an adversative, in the latter merely a connecting particle. The passage is not in the editio princeps of the Commentaries, and is bracketed in Meusel’s edition; and perhaps it is an interpolation.
THE COMBAT BETWEEN TREBONIUS AND THE BRITONS
‘At midday Caesar having sent three legions and all his cavalry on a foraging expedition under one of his generals, Gaius Trebonius, they [the enemy] suddenly swooped down from all points on the foragers, not hesitating to attack the ordered ranks of the legions’ (Sed meridie cum Caesar pabulandi causa tres legiones atque omnem equitatum cum C. Trebonio legato misisset, repente ex omnibus partibus [hostes] ad pabulatores advolaverunt, sic uti ab signis legionibusque non absisterent[3477]). To a plain man these words are perfectly intelligible; and no military commentator, so far as I know, has ever found any difficulty in them: but Kraner[3478] must needs rewrite the last clause. This is what he makes of it:—sicubi ab signis legionibusque absisterent. So, according to Kraner, the enemy attacked the foragers at every point where they were separated from the legions. The unpractical fellow fails to perceive that, as the foragers could not forage while they were in their ranks, there was no point where they were not separated from the legions. The legions, or rather a due proportion of the cohorts which composed them, were there to protect the foragers; and of course what Caesar means is that the enemy, flushed with their easy success in driving off the foragers and compelling them to rejoin their respective cohorts, had the temerity to attack the cohorts themselves.