Footnotes
[1]. It may be doubted whether all the English writers here mentioned can be strictly classed with the physiological school as understood by M. Ribot. With regard to Mr. Spencer, for instance, this is indicated by a brief summary of his own position in a private letter to the Rev. Angus Mackay, who had presented a statement of the “confused intelligence” theory, “which I conceive to be a part of the truth,” wrote Mr. Spencer, adding that “joined with the dimly aroused association of ideas derived from the experiences of the individual, I hold that the body of the emotion consists more largely of the inherited associations of experiences and still more vague states of consciousness which result from excitement of them.” It is clear that the evolutionary view does not necessarily fall wholly into the “physiological” group.—Ed.
[2]. “La sensibilité dans le règne animal et le règne végétal”, (1876, in Science expérimentale, pp. 218 et seq.).
[3]. “Ein rein emotionneller Bewusstseinszustand kommt nicht vor; Lust und Unlust sind stets an intellektuelle Zustände geknüpft,” Die Hauptgesetze der menschlichen Gefühlslebens (1892), p. 16.
[4]. Das Körperliche Gefühl (1887), pp. 80, 81.
[5]. For observations relative to this point see Revue Philosophique, March 1896.
[6]. Descartes is a brilliant exception to this method of procedure; later on we shall have to consider his method (Part II., [Chapter vii].).