[27]. The debates on this subject have chiefly been carried on by American psychologists. See Rutgers Marshall, Pain, Pleasure, and Æsthetics (1895); Nichols, “Origin of Pleasure and of Pain” (Philosophical Review, i. pp. 403 and 518); Strong, “Psychology of Pain” (Psychological Review, July 1895, and for criticisms and replies, Sept. and Nov. 1895, Jan. 1896); Luckey, “Some Recent Studies of Pain” (Am. Journal of Psychology, Oct. 1895).
[28]. Schmerz. und Temperaturempfindung, Berlin, 1893.
[29]. Hartmann alone, so far as I am aware, has dealt with this point, incidentally but very clearly: “When I have pain in my teeth or my finger or my stomach; when I lose my wife, my friend, or my situation, if in all these cases we distinguish what is pain and pain alone, and not to be confounded with perception, idea, or thought, we shall recognise that this special element is identical in all the cases.”—Philosophie des Unbewussten, vol. i., Part II., chap. iii.
[30]. Hahnemann distinguished 73 kinds of physical pain, Georget 38, Renaudin 12, etc. I give these numbers as curiosities. More recently Goldscheider (Ueber den Schmerz) establishes three stages in physical pain: (1) true, real (echte) pains; they depend on the nerves of special sensibility, and are caused by mechanical, thermal, or chemical stimulations, by inflammation and poisons; (2) indirect pains, pseudo-pains, which consist especially in a state of discomfort (Schmerzweh); in the case of the head, stomach, etc., they may be as oppressive and cause as much torture as “real” pains; (3) psychic or ideal (ideel) pains, which are a hyperæsthesia of the sensitive activity; they are met with in neuroses (neurasthenia, hysteria, hypochondria), in hallucinations, the hypnotic state, etc. This classification is perhaps acceptable in physiology. For psychology, every pain, in virtue of being a fact of consciousness, is “true” and “real.”
[31]. Beaunis, Sensations internes, chap. xxiii.
[32]. Fisiologia del piacere, Part II., chap. ii. He enumerates the following expressions:—Gusto, diletto, compiacenza, soddisfazione, conforto, contentezza, allegria, buon umore, gioia, giubilo, tripudio, delizia, voluttà, felicità, solletico, rapimento, trasporto, ebbrezza, delirio. Perhaps the Italian language is in this point richer than the German.
[33]. This thesis has been principally maintained in America by H. Nichols (Philosophical Review, July 1892), and in France by Bourdon (Revue Philosophique, September 1893). The former applies it to pleasure and pain, considering them fundamental sensations as distinct from one another as they are from other sensations. This article contains some ingenious considerations on the part played by the association of ideas. Bourdon applies it only to pleasure, and considers pain irreducible. He regards pleasure as a special sensation, not a common one or an attribute of all sensations; it is “of the same nature as the special sensation of tickling.” By adducing the pleasure of tickling (in which he follows Descartes and others), Bourdon partially escapes the criticism already advanced. It must be remarked, however, that tickling is itself a sensation of which the organic conditions are very vaguely determined. Besides the cutaneous impression, there are certainly also diffused reflex actions which connect it quite as much with internal sensibility as with the sense of touch.
[34]. Dr. G. Dumas has made experiments on the condition of the circulation in states of joy and of sadness. He has attempted an experimental verification of Lange’s theory by showing that a definite condition of the circulation always accompanies various agreeable and painful emotions, and that “joy and sadness may thus be regarded as the mental reverberation of these circulatory conditions and their organic consequences.” See “Recherches expérimentales sur la Joie et la Tristesse,” Revue Philosophique, June-August 1896.—Ed.
[35]. Richet, Recherches, etc., p. 212.
[36]. Lewes, Physical Basis of Mind, p. 327.