[74]. For details on this point, Wallaschek’s interesting work on Primitive Music should be consulted.
[75]. Beauquier, op. cit., p. 56.
[76]. Gurney, in a criticism of James’s hypothesis (Mind, ix. 425), says: “There is plenty of music from which I have received as much emotion in silent representation” [i.e., by purely internal audition, or merely reading the notes] “as when presented by the finest orchestra; but it is with the latter condition that I almost exclusively associate the cutaneous tingling and hair-stirring.” Professor James has, in my opinion, answered this objection (Psychology, ii. pp. 469, 470), which I should be inclined to refer to the problem of the “revivability of impressions,” to be examined later on.
[77]. I may indicate, somewhat at random, the principal documents for this controversy: Wundt, Philosophische Studien, vi. 3, p. 349 (he criticises Lange only); Gurney, Mind, July 1884; Marshall, ib., October 1884; Stanley, ib., January 1886; Worcester, Monist, January 1893; Psychological Review, September and November 1894, January 1895, etc.
[78]. “Though written in the earliest days of modern science, this work will bear comparison with anything that has been produced in recent years. It will be difficult, indeed, to find any treatment of the emotions much superior to it in originality, thoroughness, and suggestiveness. The position maintained is similar to that now held by Professor James, but Descartes does not content himself with defending in a general way the assertion that emotion is caused by physical change. After coming to the conclusion that there are six passions from which all the others are derived, he attempts to show that a special set of organic effects is concerned in the production of each of these primary states.”—D. Irons in Philosophical Review, May 1895, p. 291.
[79]. “When any great passion causes all the physical and moral troubles which it will cause, what I conceive to happen is that a physical impression made on the sense of sight or of hearing is propagated along a physical path to the brain, and arouses a physical commotion in its molecules; that from this centre of commotion the liberated energy is propagated by physical paths to other parts of the brain; and that it is finally discharged outwardly through proper physical paths, either in movements or in modifications of secretion and nutrition. The passion that is felt is the subjective side of the cerebral commotion—its motion out from the physical basis, as it were (e-motion), into consciousness.”—Pathology of Mind, 1879, p. 222.
[80]. In his lectures on Hysteria (Vol. i., Lecture 21), Pitres incidentally inquires into the existence of encephalic centres of the affective states, and concludes that “the molecular changes corresponding to the activity of the cellular elements shaken by the passions, radiate in every direction, stimulate or depress the excitability of adjacent elements, rebound on the motor and sensitive centres, and on the originatory nuclei of the visceral nerves, and finally determine the state of emotion, i.e., the psycho-physiological state which is the special expression of the reaction of the nervous centres to psychic excitations.”
[81]. Op. cit., pp. 490, 491.
[82]. For further details see Claude Bernard, La science expérimentale, Étude sur la physiologie du cœur, 1865, and Cyon’s Address to the Academy of St. Petersburg, “The Heart and the Brain,” translated in the Revue Scientifique, November 22nd, 1873. Also, Mosso, Sulla circolazione del sangue nel cervello (1880), and La Paura (Fear, English translation, 1896).
[83]. Kröner, Das körperliche Gefühl (Breslau, 1887), pp. 102-112.