[129]. I must here repeat Briquet’s remark on this point: “However strange these appetites may appear, their origin can frequently be discovered. Thus a young woman, who would greedily devour the embers of her foot-warmer, told me that she had, from the beginning, been fond of the crust of bread; from this she came to like the crust of toasted bread, then charred bread, and so gradually acquired the taste for small pieces of charcoal. I am inclined to think that, were we to inquire into the origin of many of these strange tastes, we should find it as simple as the above.” Pierre Janet (État mental des hystériques, ii. p. 71) transcribes this passage, and adds, “I have often followed this advice and been in a position to appreciate its value.” This psychological inquiry is very ingenious, but only removes the difficulty a stage further back. It shows us through what series of associations the final result is attained; but association alone is not sufficient to arrive at this result, still less to render it permanent. It is only the external mechanism which explains, at the utmost, why the deviation should have taken this particular direction. Many persons are fond of crust, even of burnt crust, who will never come to have the slightest appetite for charcoal. Many have eaten charcoal out of curiosity, or by accident, but without acquiring a taste for it. It is some deeper and more powerful cause than association which lies at the root of these feelings and renders them active.
[130]. For details, see Campbell “On the Appetite in Insanity,” in the Journal of Mental Science, July 1886, pp. 193 et seq., and Belmondo, “Pervertimenti dell’istinto di nutrizione,” in Tamburini’s Rivista, 1888, pp. 1 et seq., where is cited the case of an insane patient in whose stomach were found 1841 objects, such as nails, bits of lead, and the like, weighing in all eleven (English) pounds, ten ounces.
[131]. “On the Causes of Disgust,” in L’Homme et l’Intelligence, pp. 41-84.
[132]. J. Sully, The Human Mind, vol. ii. p. 91. The reader should also consult Mosso’s well-known monograph on Fear (English tr.), and Bain, The Emotions, ch. viii. Fear has been tolerably well studied. The absence of monographs concerned with the other emotions is another proof that emotional psychology is yet in its infancy, whereas for the memory, perceptions, images, etc., we find, on the contrary, a large number of special studies on special points.
[133]. Die Seele des Kindes, chap. vii.
[134]. Since the above was written the same conclusion has been reached by Professor Stanley Hall in a report founded on a statistical inquiry into the fears (some 6500 in number) of 1700 children and young persons. He concludes that “we must assume the capacity to fear or to anticipate pain, and to associate it with certain objects and experiences, as an inherited Anlage, often of a far higher antiquity than we are wont to appeal to in psychology.” He considers that such fears are analogous to rudimentary physical organs, though they still retain a certain use. (“A Study of Fears,” American Journal of Psychology, vol. viii., No. 2, 1897.)—Ed.
[135]. J. Sully, op. cit., ii. 91.
[136]. Dégénérescence et Criminalité, pp. 28 sqq., with the illustrative figures.
[137]. Gélineau, Des peurs maladives, p. 34; see also pp. 18, 109, 126, 169, etc.
[138]. Many “phobias” seem to me fresh proofs in favour of the existence of a true emotional memory.