At this stage of the running fight, the British battle cruisers, on a northwesterly course, had drawn ahead. The four Queen Elizabeth battleships of Evan-Thomas’s Fifth Battle Squadron were following them and “thereby played the part of cover for the badly damaged cruisers.” (S) The fight had “developed into a stern chase,” (S) with Hipper’s battle cruisers engaging the British battle cruisers, and the German Main Fleet pressing on in chase of the Fifth Battle Squadron. The German fleet was disposed in this order: Squadron III, Squadron I, Squadron II, (predreadnoughts).[16]
[16] See [Table II].
Squadrons III and I had opened fire at 4.45, but although they showed “speed much in excess of that for which they were designed,” (J) the German battleships were gradually falling behind the fast British ships. Admiral Beatty’s cruisers had drawn clear and shortly after 5.00 were free from the fire of Hipper’s battle cruisers. His increase to full speed enabled Vice Admiral Beatty to draw ahead. He again opened up a gap between his battle cruisers and the Fifth Battle Squadron, taking a course that curved to the north and northeast, in search of Admiral Jellicoe’s battle fleet, which was hastening to his assistance.
The ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron were also drawing away from the German battleships and were soon only under fire from the German battle cruisers and the leading division of Squadron III. As the British battleships continued to distance their pursuers, and the fire even of this leading German division grew ineffective, Admiral Scheer at 5.20 signaled to Vice Admiral Hipper “to give chase.” Hipper had already been outdistanced by the British battle cruisers. He was “forced, in order not to lose touch, to follow on the inner circle and adopt the enemy’s course.” (S) As Beatty swung by the north to a northeasterly direction, Hipper conformed to his course. At this stage the weather grew hazy. The wind changed from northwest to southwest, and smoke hung over the water.
The German advance was soon in a position where it could not engage to any advantage in the mist “with the sun so low on the horizon.” (S) Hipper was also in danger from torpedo attacks, and at 5.40 the German Vice Admiral was compelled to turn his battle cruisers to starboard, “and finally bring the unit round to S. W.” (S), to close up with the German battleships. This manœuvre was observed in the mist by the British, but not until some time after it was being carried out, as Lord Jellicoe placed it “between 6 and 6.16.” (J) At the same time the leading German battleships had also begun to veer around to starboard, to conform with the course of the British advance, which was swinging from northeast to an easterly direction. Observing this, Admiral Scheer states that at 5.45 the order “Leaders in Front” was signaled, “and the speed temporarily reduced to fifteen knots to make it possible for the divisions ahead, which had pushed on at high pressure, to get into position again.” (S) By this means, and through the early closing up of Hipper’s battle cruisers, as described, Admiral Scheer’s whole command was more in hand than had been believed. The intervals were closed and the German fleet in better readiness for its rehearsed manœuvre, to change direction of the line. These alterations of speed and direction also probably increased the difficulties of the British in locating the German fleet at this time, of which Lord Jellicoe writes in describing this stage of the action.
Still thinking that the German fleet would be encountered more to the eastward, Lord Jellicoe had altered the course of the Grand Fleet to south and then to southeast. (6.02 and 6.08.) The Lion had been sighted, and at 6.06 had signaled that “the enemy’s battle cruisers bore southeast.” (J) At 6.14 the Lion signaled, “Have sighted the enemy’s battle fleet bearing south-southwest.” (J) Lord Jellicoe writes: “This report gave me the first information on which I could take effective action for deployment.” At 6.16 Lord Jellicoe made signal to the Grand Fleet to form line of battle on the port wing column on a course southeast by east.
In the meantime the light German forces had become involved in a fight between the lines and were withdrawing under cover of smoke screens and torpedo attacks. The cruiser Wiesbaden was reported disabled at 6.02, and Scheer turned his fleet two points to port “to render assistance to the Wiesbaden” (S)—a strange reason for such a move at such a time! This brought on what Admiral Scheer called “heavy fighting round the damaged Wiesbaden,” from 6.20. Yet this eccentric thrust of the German fleet actually resulted in heavy damage to the British.
At this time the Grand Fleet was deploying as described, but not yet seriously engaged. Lord Jellicoe reports the Marlborough as opening fire at 6.17, the Iron Duke firing a few salvos at 6.20. But Vice Admiral Beatty’s four remaining battle cruisers were in closer action, as Beatty was crossing the German van on a course turning from east to southeast. The speed of the deploying Grand Fleet had been reduced to 14 knots to allow Beatty’s cruisers to pass ahead, “as there was danger of the fire of the Battle Fleet being blanketed by them.” (J) The Fifth Battle Squadron had been left behind Beatty’s battle cruisers by a long interval, and was making a turn to port (at 6.19) to form astern of the Grand Fleet.
Rear Admiral Hood’s Third Squadron of three battle cruisers which had been ordered to reinforce Beatty’s advance, was far ahead of the Grand Fleet, and had overrun to the southeast in the error as to location. On realizing this mistake, Hood had turned back in the direction of the British advance. Hood’s squadron was signaled by Vice Admiral Beatty “to form single line ahead and take station” (J) ahead of Admiral Beatty’s four remaining battle cruisers, which were turned to a southeast and southerly course across the van of the German fleet. In obedience to this signal, Rear Admiral Hood turned to take station ahead (6.21), closing to a range of 8,000 yards (6.25). “At about 6.34” (J) his flagship, the Invincible, was sunk by gunfire.
Almost at the same time three of Rear Admiral Arbuthnot’s armored cruisers, Black Prince, Warrior, and Defence, “not aware of the approach of the enemy’s heavy ships,” (J) were put out of action. (Defence was sunk; Warrior sank while attempt was being made to tow her home; Black Prince was sunk later.) In the turn of the Fifth Battle Squadron to take position astern of the Grand Fleet the Warspite had jammed her helm and was out of control for a while. She was a good deal damaged by gunfire, but was extricated from her predicament and taken back to the British base.